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INTRODUCTION
It is high time for the federal government to outlaw gun posses-
sion by anyone except the police and the military, and to round up all
firearms currently in private hands. Millions of Americans think so,
but even the most aggressive of America's gun control groups have
not been willing to advocate such a policy. Into the breach has
stepped the Communitarian Network, arguably the most influential
think tank in Washington. In a lengthy position paper, The Case for
Domestic Disarmament (Domestic Disarmament),' the Communitarian Net-
work presents a forceful law-and-policy case for a gun-free America.
Domestic Disarmament is noteworthy because it is almost the only
scholarly document arguing at length for confiscating all guns,2 rather
than merely outlawing the future production of certain "bad" guns
(such as handguns and so-called "assault weapons").' Domestic Dis-
armament is particularly important because it is a product of the Com-
munitarian Network, the think tank that, far more than any other, has
the ear of President Clinton and many other leading Democrats (and
1. AMirrAi ETZIONI & STEVEN HELLAND, THE CASE FOR DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT (1992)
[hereinafter DOMESTIC DIsARMAMENT].
2. Id. at 9. Domestic Disarmament is willing to make some concessions to gun collectors
and hunters. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
3. This Article uses the term "assault weapons" as gun prohibition advocates use it.
This usage, however, is a misnomer. For a critique of this misuse of the term, see David B.
Kopel, Rational Basis Analysis of "Assault Weapon"Prohibition, 20J. CONTEMP. L. 381 (1994).
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some Republicans).4 Moreover, Domestic Disarmament offers an en-
tirely new vantage point from which to view the firearms issue-from
the communitarian context, in which the individual's responsibilities
to society are seen as more important than the unlimited exercise of
rights.5
This Article evaluates and responds to Domestic Disarmament and
the Communitarian Network's gun prohibition agenda. In addition
to discussing Domestic Disarmament, this Article considers David C. Wil-
liams's Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second
Amendment,6 which calls for a somewhat different communitarian ap-
proach to gun policy. Williams argues that (1) the Second Amend-
ment poses no impediment to any form of gun control on
individuals,7 and (2) in the long term, the government should revive
the "well regulated Militia"' and encourage citizen proficiency with
arms and participation in communal defense organizations.9
Part I of this Article provides an overview of communitarianism
and the Communitarian Network and summarizes the argument of
Domestic Disarmament. Part II inquires into whether domestic disarma-
ment is enforceable and what communitarian problems may be raised
by enforceability issues. Part III sketches a variety of possible solutions
to the American gun dilemma, including the communitarian militia
proposals of Williams." Part IV briefly reviews the contribution that
firearms ownership may make to public safety, and Part V closely scru-
4. See infra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
5. Cf The Communitarian Network, The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and
Responsibilities, reprinted in RIGHTS AND THE COMMON GOOD: THE COMMUNITARIAN PERSPEC-
TIVE 11, 19 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995) [hereinafter Platform] (contending that "each mem-
ber of the community owes something to all the rest, and the community owes something
to each of its members").
6. David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terifying Second
Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 551 (1991).
7. Id. at 587-88. Williams contends that an individual right to own arms was "a periph-
eral issue in the debates over the Second Amendment. This secondary status is critical
because . . . under modem conditions an individual right to arms is positively counter-
productive to the goals and ideals implicit in a collective right." Id.
8. The words "well regulated Militia" come from the text of the Second Amendment,
which states in its entirety: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S.
CONST. amend. II.
9. Williams, supra note 6, at 607-08. Williams states: "The most obvious way to secure
the functions served by the old militia would be to reconstitute a universal militia along
republican lines." Id. at 607. As we detail below, Williams is not advocating the sort of
independent militias that have been so much in the news recently. See id. at 607-14; see also
infra notes 210-224 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 210-224 and accompanying text.
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tinizes Domestic Disarmament's conclusion that the Second Amendment
presents no barrier to firearms confiscation."1
For too long, the American gun control debate has avoided the
most fundamental issues. The progun and antigun lobbies both agree
that there are "good" gun owners and "bad" gun owners; the main
issues concern drawing a line between the two and determining what
kinds of measures should be used to keep the two groups separate. In
addition, the antigun lobbies argue that there are good guns (many
types of rifles and shotguns) and bad guns (handguns and assault
weapons) and that no gun control policy should deprive good Ameri-
cans of their good guns. 2 Nevertheless, none of the major policy
groups participating in the American gun debate argues, as does the
Communitarian Network, that America's gun policy should be
modeled on Japan's, in which communitarian values prevail, guns are
almost entirely prohibited, and gun violence is rare." By forcefully
raising the issue of whether any Americans should have guns at all, the
Communitarian Network performs a great service by inviting inquiry
into the most fundamental premises of the American gun control de-
bate. In this Article, the authors hope to advance the inquiry begun
by Domestic Disarmament.
I. THE COMMUNITARIAN NETWORK AND DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT
A. The Communitarian Agenda
The Communitarian Network is a public policy think tank
founded upon the philosophy of sociologist Amitai Etzioni, a profes-
sor of American Studies at George Washington University. 4 Dr. Et-
zioni is joined by a number of like-minded academics, many of whom
11. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 6, 29-38.
12. Cf Daniel Abrams, Ending the Other Arms Race: An Argument for a Ban on Assault
Weapons, 10 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 488, 500 (1992) ("Licenses should be granted only for
those weapons that are particularly suited to hunting or some other valid purpose, and
only to individuals who have passed a background check. This would allow 'honest citi-
zens' the privilege of owning a hunting weapon, and possibly, a licensed handgun for self-
defense.").
13. See DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE, AND THE COWBO. SHOULD
AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 20-23 (1992) (discussing gun
possession and gun-related crime in Japan).
14. See Mike Capuzzo, Idea Man, PHILA. INQ., June 16, 1992, at El, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Philinq File ("As the father of Communitarianism-he coined the word in
1990-Etzioni is being called an innovator."). For a statement by Etzioni about the Com-
munitarian Network, see Amitai Etzioni, Preface: We, the Communitarians, in RIGHTS AND THE
COMMON GOOD: THE COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE iii (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995) [hereinaf-
ter We, the Communitarians].
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enjoy close connections to the Washington political establishment.15
The Communitarian Network's mission is to address what it considers
the baneful societal effects of an imbalance between individual rights
and social responsibilities. 6 The United States, argue communitari-
ans, has become a place where responsibilities no longer accompany
rights to the extent they once did, resulting in a fragmented society in
which irresponsibility, selfishness, and violent crime run rampant. 17
These socially deleterious effects of an unrestrained individualism
must therefore be reversed through the advocacy and implementation
of new policies designed to further the common good." The Com-
munitarian Network's slogan is "strong rights presume strong
responsibilities."19
Communitarians also argue that parents should forsake con-
sumerism, personal advancement, and greed.21 Workplace reforms
such as paid parental leave and flex schedules should be mandated.21
Additionally, communitarians propose making it more difficult for
couples with children to divorce. 22 Advocacy of an increased empha-
sis on moral education in the nation's schools is another element of
the communitarian message.23 Schools should "teach those values
Americans share,"24 such as "the values of civility, sharing, and respon-
sibility to the common good."25
The Communitarian Network also advocates a number of other
public policy ideas to increase public virtue and advance the common
good. Included among these are campaign finance restrictions and a
heightened emphasis on the importance of voting, jury duty, and pay-
ing taxes. 26 Among the most controversial proposals are the imple-
mentation of widespread sobriety checkpoints, 7 less privacy for HIV
15. See We, the Communitarians, supra note 14, at iii.
16. See id. at iv ("We adopted the name 'communitarian' to emphasize that the time
had come to attend to our responsibilities to our communities.").
17. See id. (lamenting that "many Americans are rather reluctant to accept
responsibilities").
18. See id. at iv-v.
19. DoMrsTic DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at i. For a concise statement of the Commu-
nitarian Network's objectives, see Platform, supra note 5. This and other materials may be
obtained from The Communitarian Network, 2130 H Street, N.W., Suite 714-J, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20052 (1-800-245-7460).
20. See Platform, supra note 5, at 14.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 15.
23. See id. at 15-16.
24. Id. at 15.
25. Id. at 16.
26. See id. at 17-18.
27. See id. at 10.
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carriers,28 and mandatory organ harvesting from deceased persons
who had not expressly forbidden the government from appropriating
21their organs.
B. The Communitarian Movement
The Communitarian Network does not exhibit the scholarly indif-
ference of the ivory tower. "Like a scientist in a laboratory," writes the
Philadelphia Inquirer, Professor Etzioni "has a three-step formula for
changing society. Step One, create the message. Step Two, spread
the message. Step Three, organize a grassroots movement."30 The
Communitarian Network has created an activist arm to implement its
ideas on a grassroots level: the American Alliance for Rights and Re-
sponsibilities. There is also a communitarian journal, The Responsive
Community. Thejournal's subtitle includes the communitarian mantra
"rights and responsibilities."3 1 The communitarians have written sev-
eral books.3 2
Professor Etzioni's movement has especially piqued the media's
interest because the communitarians exercise a great deal of influ-
ence on the Clinton Administration. 3 Indeed, candidate Clinton's
"New Covenant" speech was drafted in part by communitarian philos-
28. See id. at 20-21.
29. See Mandatory Organ Donation Sought, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1992, at C1, available in
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
30. Capuzzo, supra note 14.
31. See We, the Communitarians, supra note 14, at v. The journal began publishing in
1991. see id.
32. A number of those books are cited elsewhere in this Article. See also, e.g., ROBERT
N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITs OF THE HEART: INDIVDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LimE
(1985) (discussing American individualism and community commitment); COMMUNITY IN
AMERICA: THE CHALLENGE OF Habits of the Heart (Charles H. Reynolds & Ralph V. Norman
eds., 1988) [hereinafter COMMUNITY IN AMERICA] (contributing to the ideas developed in
BELLAH ET AL., supra).
33. See Capuzzo, supra note 14; see also RA Zaldivar, Clinton Embraces Communitarianism,
DENV. PosT, Feb. 7, 1992, at A24 (revealing striking parallels between several of President
Clinton's speeches and certain proposals found in communitarian literature).
Communitarian rhetoric frequently emanates from the Clinton Administration. For
example, the President called for "community policing networks so that they'll know their
neighbors and they'll work with people not simply to catch criminals but to prevent crime
in the first place. We want to put more power in the hands of local communities ...."
President WilliamJ. Clinton, Radio Address to the American People (Oct. 23, 1993), in 29
WKLYv. COMP. PRES. Doc. 2157 (1993) (also available at various White House sites on the
Internet). President Clinton also stated that America's Founders "wrote a fairly radical
Constitution with a radical Bill of Rights, giving a radical amount of individual freedom to
Americans." Remarks by the President in MTV's "Enough Is Enough" Forum on Crime
(MTV television broadcast, Apr. 19, 1994) [hereinafter Remarks by the President in MTV's
"Enough Is Enough"] (responding to the second viewer question). That "radical" amount
of freedom that the government, in Clinton's view, "gave" to the American people was
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opher William Galston.' Dr. Etzioni opines that President Clinton is
a communitarian to the core. 5
Communitarians insist that they are not majoritarians and that
any scheme to further the cause of community rights must be constitu-
tionally sound. 6 Critics, however, accuse them of being disingenu-
ous. Many skeptics charge that communitarians are actually apostles
of a new statism and that the Communitarian Network is misleading
based on the assumption that "people would basically be raised in coherent families, in
coherent communities, and they would work for the common good." Id. Today,
[w] hen personal freedom's being abused, you have to move to limit it. That's
what we did in the announcement I made last weekend on the public housing
projects, about how we're going to have [warrantless, suspicionless, random,
unannounced] weapon sweeps [in the homes of public housing tenants] and
more things like that to try to make people safer in their communities.
Id.
In his book, Earth in the Balance, Vice President Al Gore wrote: "The emphasis on the
rights of the individual must be accompanied by a deeper understanding of the responsi-
bilities to the community that every individual must accept if the community is to have an
organizing principle at all." AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE 277 (1992). He further as-
serted that "we have tilted so far toward individual rights," and that this alleged imbalance
has caused both the community and the ecology to suffer. Id. at 278.
In an interview with Parade magazine, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton complained:
"We have not done a good job in expecting people to exercise their rights responsibly and
to be held accountable." Dotson Rader, 'We Are All Responsible,' PARADE, Apr. 11, 1993, at 4,
4. During a commencement speech to the graduating class of the University of Penn-
sylvania, she asked: "How do we create a new spirit of community given all the problems
that we are so aware of? Regrettably, the balance between the individual and the commu-
nity, between rights and responsibilities, has been thrown out of kilter over the last years."
Robert Pear, Hillary Clinton Gives Plea for Unity at Penn, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1993, at A17,
available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. "The spirit of community," the phrase used by
Mrs. Clinton, happens to be the title of a book on communitarianism by Etzioni. See
AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY THE REINVENTION OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1993)
[hereinafter THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY].
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Henry Cisneros was one of the original
endorsers of the Platform. See Platform, supra note 5.
34. See Paul Starobin, Snow Drifted but Not This Conversation, NAT'LJ., Jan. 20, 1996, at
125, available in LEXIS, News Library, Ntljnl File. University of Maryland political philoso-
pher and communitarian writer William Galston has served as a White House domestic
policy aide and is a part-time speech writer for Clinton. See id. The broad themes of Presi-
dent Clinton's 1996 State of the Union speech and his 1996 reelection campaign were
shaped in part by aJanuary 7, 1996 private White House conference between the President
and a group of academics. See id. The conference was arranged by Galston at the White
House's request, and the academic participants included Amitai Etzioni. See id.
35. See Zaldivar, supra note 33; see also William A. Galston, Clinton and the Promise of
Communitarianism, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 2, 1992, at A52 (arguing that journalists
have noted communitarian strands in the President's public utterances). It therefore
came as no surprise when an issue of The Communitarian Reporter stated that the White
House was apparently "seeking to move along communitarian lines." Amitai Etzioni, To
Stay the Communitarian Cours COMMUNITARiAN REP., Fall 1992, at 1 [hereinafter To Stay the
Communitarian Course].
36. See, e.g., Platform, supra note 5, at 12-13.
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its readers when it denies that majoritarian coercion will be necessary
to achieve many of its goals.3 7 Whatever communitarians are, they are
something new to the American political scene. 8
C. The Case for Domestic Disarmament
The Communitarian Network's papers on gun control call for se-
vere firearms legislation, based upon the premise that the right of in-
dividuals to keep and bear arms (which really is not a right at all, it is
argued) is outweighed by the right of the public to be safe. The posi-
tion is summarized in The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights
and Responsibilities (Platform): 9
There is little sense in gun registration. What we need to
significantly enhance public safety is domestic disarmament of
the kind that exists in practically all democracies. The Na-
tional Rifle Association's suggestion that criminals, not guns,
kill people ignores the fact that thousands are killed each
year, many of them children, from accidental discharge of
guns, and that people-whether criminal, insane, or tempo-
rarily carried away by impulse-kill and are much more
likely to do so when armed than when disarmed. The Sec-
ond Amendment, behind which the NRA hides, is subject to
a variety of interpretations, but the Supreme Court has re-
peatedly ruled, for over a hundred years, that it does not pre-
vent laws that bar guns. We join with those who read the Second
Amendment the way it was written, as a communitarian clause, call-
ing for community militias, not individual gun slingers.40
37. Libertarian political philosopher Tibor R. Machan, for example, calls communitari-
anism an attempt to present a "palatable collectivism" to the American people. Tibor R.
Machan, Individualism Versus Classical Liberal Political Economy (unpublished lecture),
at 1 (on file with author). Nadine Strossen, president of the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), faults communitarians for employing "rhetoric [that] is very slippery" in
an attempt to introduce a number of liberty-threatening measures into the body politic.
Peter Steinfels, A Political Movement Blends Its Ideas from Left and Right, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
1992, § 4, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. Conservative Burton Yale Pines
of the National Center for Public Policy Research characterizes communitarianism as "just
the latest incarnation to get the government meddling in people's affairs." James A.
Barnes, The New Guru of Communitarianism, NAT'LJ., Nov. 30, 1991, at 2931, 2931.
38. As Seymour Martin Lipset notes: "The recent efforts, led by Amitai Etzioni, to cre-
ate a 'communitarian' movement are an attempt to transport Toryism to America. British
and German Tories have recognized the link and have shown considerable interest in Et-
zioni's ideas." SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED
SWORD 37 (1996).
39. Platform, supra note 5.
40. Id. at 20-21. The actual number of accidental firearms deaths for the entire Ameri-
can population in 1993 was 1600. See NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 5 (1994).
The number of accidental firearms deaths of children aged 0 to 14 was 220. See id. In a
19971 445
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This position is developed in the Communitarian Network posi-
tion paper dedicated solely to the issue of gun ownership, Domestic
Disarmament. The paper's argument is summarized in five
propositions:
1. Legal analysis shows there is no individual right to keep and
bear arms guaranteed in the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution;4
2. Permitting individual gun ownership in this country causes
thousands of injuries and deaths every year and, therefore, poses an
inordinate threat to public safety;
4 2
3. Polls indicate that the vast majority of Americans want some
forms of additional gun control legislation;43
4. The gun control proposals currently advocated (waiting peri-
ods, registration, and the like) will not adequately mitigate the dam-
age gun ownership causes to the American community;44
5. Therefore, because there is no constitutional right of individu-
als to keep and bear arms, America must adopt laws even stricter than
those in Europe, Canada, and Japan.45
As a first step, Domestic Disarmament calls for a ban on the sale and
possession of handguns and so-called "semiautomatic assault weap-
ons," as well as a prohibition of all ammunition that can be used in
different context, Etzioni writes: "As Sigmund Freud would say, there are no accidents."
THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, supra note 33, at 226. Indeed, that is one reason why firearms
prohibition is unlikely to have much of an effect on the accidental death rate. Many fire-
arms accidents are the result of recklessness. The perpetrators are "disproportionately in-
volved in other accidents, violent crime, and heavy drinking." Philip J. Cook, The Role of
Firearms in Vwolent Crime: An Interpretative Review of the Literature, in CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 236,
269 (Marvin E. Wolfgang & Neil Alan Weiner eds., 1982) (citing G.D. NEWTON, JR. & F.E.
ZIMRING, FIREARMS & VIOLENCE IN AMERICAN LIFE 19 (1969)); see also GARY KLEcK, POINT
BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 282-83 (1991) ("[Data suggest] that there are
some common predisposing factors shared by participants in accidents and participants in
acts of intentional violence."); Roger Lane, On the Social Meaning of Homicide Trends in
America, in I VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 55, 59 (Ted Robert Gurr ed., 1989) ("[T he psychologi-
cal profile of the accident-prone suggests the same kind of aggressiveness shown by most
murderers ... ."). Thus, without guns, many gun accident victims might find some other
way to kill themselves "accidentally," such as by reckless driving. Indeed, they tend to have
a record of reckless driving and automobile accidents. See KLECK, supra, at 294 (citing
Julian A. Waller & Elbert B. Whorton, Unintentional Shootings, Highway Crashes and Acts of
Violence, in 5 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 351 (1973)). Banningjust one type of dan-
gerous object can accomplish little for this group.
41. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 29-38.
42. Id. at 5-6, 23-28.
43. Id. at 19-21.
44. Id. at 7-9.
45. 1d. at 9, 22.
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these firearms.46 (This latter requirement would outlaw virtually all
ammunition, because handguns and assault weapons come in a nearly
limitless variety of calibers.)
Etzioni is willing to offer a few concessions to gun owners:
Gun collectors may be accommodated by provisions allowing
them to keep their collections, but rendering them inopera-
tive (cement in the barrel is my favorite technique). Hunters
might be allowed (if one feels this "sport" must be tolerated)
to use long guns that cannot be concealed, without sights or
powerful bullets, making the event much more "sporting."
Finally, super-patriots, who still believe they need their right
to bear arms to protect us from the Commies, might be dep-
utized and invited to participate in the National Guard, as
long as the weapons with which they are trained are kept in
state-controlled armories. All this is acceptable, as long as all
other guns and bullets are removed from private hands.47
Making some breathtaking assumptions about the ease with which the
government will collect more than 200 million guns and many billion
rounds of ammunition from at least 50 million gun owners,48 Etzioni
proposes the following experiment designed to set the policy in
motion:
Perhaps the best way to proceed, if nationwide domestic dis-
armament cannot be achieved immediately, is to introduce it
in some major part of the country, say, the Northeast. That
will allow everyone to see the falsity of the NRA's beloved
statement that criminals kill people, not guns.... The rapid
fall in violent crime sure to follow will make ever more states
demand that domestic disarmament be extended to their
49region.
Thus, to Etzioni, the answer to gun crime is simple: implement a
national policy that entails the virtual prohibition of most firearms
and ammunition, beginning with a ban on assault weapons and hand-
guns, and eventually encompassing all firearms and ammunition in
private hands.
There are some indications that the Clinton Administration, fol-
lowing the communitarian lead, is thinking along similar lines.
Although President Clinton has stated his opposition to a ban on
hunting weapons, he has at least indicated support for most of the rest
46. Id. at 8-10.
47. Id. at 9-10.
48. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
49. DoMESTIC DiSRMMENT, supra note 1, at 11.
1997] 447
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
of the Communitarian Network's agenda on guns. In particular, he
put an immense amount of political capital into passing the 1994 fed-
eral ban on assault weapons.5" After that year's elections, he opined
that the assault weapons ban had cost the Democrats twenty seats in
the House of Representatives, thereby giving control of Congress to
the Republicans.51 Nevertheless, said President Clinton, he would sac-
rifice his own reelection to maintain the federal ban.52
In addition, President Clinton ordered Attorney General Janet
Reno to draft a comprehensive proposal for strict national handgun
licensing.55 A White House working group outlined a proposal for
highly restrictive licensing of all handguns and all semiautomatic long
guns that have not already been banned, and much more stringent
controls on all other firearms.54 In a 1993 interview, President Clin-
50. See David B. Kopel, Assault Weapons, in GUNS: WHO SHOULD HAVE THEM? 159, 160-
61 (David B. Kopel ed., 1995). The federal ban on assault weapons was codified at 18
U.S.C. § 922(u), (w) (as amended 1994).
51. See Evelyn Theiss, Clinton Blames Losses on NRA, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 14,
1995, at Al (quoting the President as saying, "the fight for the assault-weapons ban cost 20
members their seats in Congress"); see also Brad O'Leary, Fire Power, CAMPAIGNS & ELEG
TIONS, Dec./Jan. 1995, at 32, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mags File (arguing that the
NRA backed Republicans in the 1994 election, thereby contributing to Democratic
defeats). Of the 55 House races and 10 Senate races identified, 38 House races and 7
Senate races resulted in a progun Republican taking the seat away from Democratic con-
trol (by defeating an incumbent or, more typically, by winning an open seat from which a
Democrat was retiring). See Theiss, supra. Ten Senate races also involved a progun candi-
date winning by less than the number of self-identified NRA members in the state. See id
52. "'J im Florio gave up his governorship for it. If I have to give up the White House
for it, I'll do it.'" Theiss, supra note 51 (quoting President Clinton).
53. SeeJoe Battenfeld, Clinton Vows Full-Scale War on Crime Next Year, BOST. HERALD, Dec.
10, 1993, at 1, available in 1993 WL 6293677; Pierre Thomas, Clinton Mulls Registration of
Handguns, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1993, at Al, available in 1993 WL 2084315.
54. A White House Interdepartmental Working Group on Violence recommended
stringent new restrictions on gun rights. See INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKING GROUP ON VIO-
LENCE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE DOMFSTIC POLICY COUNCIL 21-25 (1994) [herein-
after REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT]. Although the report was intended to be kept secret, it
was uncovered and discussed in, among other places, National Review magazine. See Don B.
Kates, Jr., Shot Down, NAT'L REv., Mar. 6, 1995.
The Clinton proposal would regulate all secondary firearms transfers (transfers be-
tween private individuals). See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra, at 22. Every firearms trans-
action would be required to be routed through a licensed gun dealer and recorded by the
federal government. See id. Failure to register an already-owned "restricted" handgun with
the government would also be a federal crime. See id. Firearms purchases would be lim-
ited to one per month. See id. at 23. A license would also be required to purchase ammuni-
tion. See id. at 22. New "performance standards" would ban guns that hold too much
ammunition or fire too rapidly. See id. at 24. These new performance bans would be in
addition to the current assault weapon law that bans over 200 guns because they are said to
fire too fast. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(v), (w) (1994). The White House memorandum predicts
that such regulation would make illegal "[m]any handguns now manufactured in the
United States for civilian use." REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra, at 24. Even stricter laws
[VOL. 56:438
COMMUNITARIANS, NEOREPUBLICANS, AND GUNS
ton stated that he favored a ban on all handguns, but that he recog-
nized such a ban was not currently politically feasible.55 The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and President Clinton have begun
pushing for broad new restrictions on ammunition.56 Finally, Henry
Cisneros, the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment (HUD) during President Clinton's first term, was a signer
of the Platform manifesto before accepting his post in the Clinton Ad-
ministration." Were his views sharply out of step with those of the
President (for example, had he signed a document calling for a com-
plete ban on abortion), it is doubtful that he would have remained in
the Cabinet.
would apply for the group of handguns and semiautomatic long guns that remained legal.
See id. at 22. All handguns and all semiautomatic long guns-even a Marlin Camp Car-
bine-would become "restricted weapons." Id. Owners of restricted weapons could only
possess them at home, at work, or at a target range or in transport there. See id. Thus, it
would be a federal crime to go bird hunting with a Remington 1100 shotgun. It would be a
federal crime to carry a handgun in public for protection-even if the carrier had a state
license authorizing handgun carrying. See id. at 23-24. (Thirty-one states currently make
handgun carry permits readily available to ordinary citizens who pass a background check,
and sometimes a safety class.) SeeJohn R. Lott & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and
Right-to-Ca7y Concealed Handguns, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1997). In addition, the White
House memorandum recommends consideration of a federal law to outlaw "the carrying
of firearms in ... work sites." REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra at 23.
55. SeeJann S. Wenner & William Greider, The Rolling Stone Interview: President Clinton,
ROLLING STONE, Dec. 9, 1993, at 45. President Clinton is not pushing for a handgun ban
now, but only because he does not "think the American people are there right now." Id.
56. A Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) paper recommended expanding the fed-
eral ban to "armor piercing ammunition." Memorandum from Agent John E. Coiling-
wood to the Director, FBI, Proposed FBIPolicy on Gun Contro May 12, 1993, at 4, 6, 7 (on file
with author). The definition of such ammunition, according to the FBI recommendation,
should be "based upon performance standards, not upon composition." Id. at 7. In other
words, if ammunition can perform in such a way as to pierce body armor, it should be
banned. By this definition, virtually all hunting ammunition is armor piercing because any
round from a high-powered rifle can penetrate body armor. The proposal harmonizes well
with the communitarian desire to ban everything. If the .30 '06 and other hunting rounds
are prohibited, there is obviously little use for the rifles that fire them.
At the signing of a directive on handgun safety locks, President Clinton remarked: "If
a bullet can tear through a bulletproof vest like a hot knife through butter, it should be
against the law and that is the bottom line." Remarks on Signing the Memorandum on
Child Safety Lock Devices for Handguns and an Exchange with Reporters, 33 WKLY. ComP.
PREs. Doc. 10 (Mar. 10, 1997); see also H.R. 2386, 104th Cong. (1995) (granting the Secre-
tary of State authority to promulgate rules defining armor piercing ammunition under 18
U.S.C. § 921(a) (17) (B)).
57. DoMESrIc DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 2. The Platform contained a paragraph
overview of the communitarian call for domestic disarmament. See Platform, supra note 5,
at 1; see supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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II. THE FEASIBILITY AND COMMUNITARIAN IMPLICATIONS OF
DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT
Communitarians, including President Clinton, argue that the
presence of so many guns in America makes it the most dangerous
country in which to live. 8 Rhetorical flourish is employed to drive the
point home: "[T] he danger that our cities be turned into Beiruts or
Dubrovniks must be averted."59 The gun control proposals that have
been enacted into law and those that are currently the subject of polit-
ical discussion are but "vanilla-pale measures," according to Etzioni; to
him, the only truly effective measure to end gun violence is domestic
disarmament.60
Many criminologists agree that the enactment of laws that Etzioni
calls vanilla-pale measures will do little to stem the tide of gun-related
violence in this country. The leading criminological studies, those
done by James Wright, Kathleen Daly, Peter Rossi, and Gary Kleck,
conclude that the measures currently proposed will, at best, only
slightly mitigate the level of criminal misuse of firearms.61 One of the
Wright-Rossi studies, a National Institute of Justice survey of felons in
state prisons, concluded that criminals will always get guns and use
them, no matter what gun control laws are passed.6" Indirectly sup-
porting the viewpoint of Domestic Disarmament, Kleck observes that, in
a country awash in guns, such as ours, no gun control policy-short of
universal confiscation-"is likely to have a dramatic impact on vio-
lence in America. Because gun availability, even among high-risk indi-
viduals, seems to have at best a modest impact on violence rates, gun
controls only nibble at the edges of the problem rather than striking
58. The President complained that "no other nation" tolerates the level of gun vio-
lence seen in America. Ronald A. Taylor, Clinton Blasts NRA for Opposing Gun Control,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at A6, available in 1993 WL 5826697.
59. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 5.
60. Id. at 8-11.
61. See KLECK, supra note 40, at 32-33 (indicating that of 121 possible effects of gun
restrictions, "only ten are solidly or partially consistent with a hypothesis of gun control
effectiveness"); JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE
IN AMERICA 317 (1983) (stating that some studies on connections between gun control
legislation and gun homicides and gun assaults purport to show relatively few incidents in
states with restrictive laws, but other studies purport to show no such trend); JAMES D.
WRIGHT & PETER H. RossI, ARMED AND DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIRE-
ARMS 227-28 (1986) (observing that despite all of the gun control laws of the twentieth
century, "the number of armed criminals and the amount of armed crime has tended to
increase, not abate"). Prior to researching the firearms issue, Wright, Rossi, and Kieck
were proponents of gun control legislation. They have generally reversed their positions as
a result of investigating the issue. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra at 310-24.
62. See WRIGHT & RoSSi, supra note 61, at 18.
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at its core."6" Thus, Etzioni's repudiation of vanilla-pale gun control
measures is well supported by scholarly research on the gun issue.
Most European nations (Switzerland and a few others excepted)
impose stricter firearms controls than does the United States.64 The
typical model is a strict licensing system for handguns and a somewhat
milder licensing system for most long guns.65 There is a great deal of
variation in this model, from countries with the most rigorous laws
and the most aggressive enforcement against ordinary gun owners
(such as Spain, Germany, and Great Britain)66 to countries with more
relaxed attitudes (such as Norway, France, Italy, Belgium, Latvia, and
the Czech Republic).67 Actual bans on handguns (Ireland)6" are rare,
and bans on all guns (Romania under Facism Communism)69 are
rarer still. Thus, Domestic Disarmament goes far beyond where most Eu-
ropean nations have trod, at least during their periods of democratic
rule. Nevertheless, Domestic Disarmament springs in part from what
might be termed a European sensibility toward an armed populace.7 °
In a 1976 Public Interest essay, The Great American Gun War,71 historian
B. Bruce-Briggs described the combatants of what he called a "low-
grade war"72 fought over gun ownership by social factions represent-
ing "two alternative views of what America is and ought to be."73 Ad-
vocates of strict gun control are usually
those who take bourgeois Europe as a model of a civilized
society: a society just, equitable, and democratic; but well or-
dered, with the lines of responsibility and authority clearly
drawn, and with decisions made rationally and correctly by
63. KLECK, supra note 40, at 445. Kleck does believe that some gun control proposals,
such as regulating the private transfer of firearms, could have a modest effect on gun
crime. See id. at 336.
64. See KOPEL, supra note 13, at 15.
65. See id. at 59.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. SeeJim Cusack, Handguns Banned in Ireland Since Early 70s, IRISH TIMES, Oct. 17,
1996, at 10, available in 1996 WL 12405749. England recently banned most handguns, but
still allows single-shot .22 calibre handguns. See Guns and Freedom, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), May 12, 1997, at 21, available in LEXIS, News Library, Txmws File.
69. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, LAW LBRARY, GUN CONTROL LAWS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
163-66 (revised 1976) (discussing a 1941 decree, abrogated in 1971, which stipulated that
'whoever possesses firearms, ammunition and explosives of any kind and under any form,
even if such holders have a license for possession and use, shall . . . surrender them'"
(quoting Decree No. 142, M.O., No. 20 bis, Jan. 24, 1941)).
70. For the communitarians' attempt to create a European-style Tory political ideology
in the United States, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
71. B. Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1976, at 37.
72. Id. at 37.
73. Id. at 61.
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intelligent men for the entire nation. To such people, hunt-
ing is atavistic, personal violence is shameful, and uncon-
trolled gun ownership is a blot upon civilization. 4
In most of Europe, gun ownership is not a right but a state-granted
privilege. 5 Likewise, the Communitarian Network views gun owner-
ship in America as a privilege rather than a right, a privilege that
should now, due to the level of gun violence, be denied.76
Ironically, despite the Communitarian Network's emphasis on
the importance of individuals yielding to the will of the majority of the
community, the Communitarian Network's gun prohibition policy ac-
tually deviates greatly from what a large majority of Americans favor.
Polls indicate that most Americans believe the Second Amendment
does protect an individual right to arms,7" although many Americans
do support what they see as moderate gun control measures. 78 Most
Americans do not favor firearms prohibition; rather, they view self-
defense 79 and the recreational use of firearms as obvious benefits to
be retained." A ban on handguns is favored by only twenty-seven per-
cent.8' A ban on long guns garners only eleven percent support.8 2
Because, in all likelihood, Americans will not support a policy of
gun prohibition, why even take this particular proposal of the Com-
munitarian Network seriously? Although the case for domestic dis-
armament is at the moment a pipe dream, there are important
reasons why the Communitarian Network's argument deserves serious
attention.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., KOPEL, supra note 13, at 82-87 (discussing British system).
76. DOMESTIC DISAMENT, supra note 1, at 9-11.
77. See KLECY, supra note 40, at 359-77 (comparing various polls and studies which show
that most Americans believe that individuals have rights to own guns); Gordon Witkin,
Should You Own a Gun?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Aug. 15, 1994, at 24 (reporting that 86%
of men and 67% of women support the right to individual gun ownership; 80% of whites
and 65% of blacks support gun rights).
78. See Witkin, supra note 77, at 28 (reporting that 49% of all Americans believe gun
owners should receive government licenses and complete, mandatory training).
79. See id. at 24 (reporting that 45% of American gun owners cite self-protection as a
primary reason for gun ownership).
80. See KLECK, supra note 40, at 374-75 (arguing that gun ownership allows for the bene-
fits of hunting).
81. See LuNTz WEBER RESEARCH & STRATEGIC SERVICES, A NATIONAL SURVEY ON CRIME,
VIOLENCE AND GUNS 9-10 (1993).
82. See Nearly 2 in 5 Americans Have Heard a Gunshot in Their Neighborhood and 3 in 4
Support Gun Ownership for Average Citizens, According to New U.S. News Poll, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REP. (news release), Aug. 8, 1994, at 1, 4-5 (reproducing the results of a telephone
survey conducted by the Tarrance Group and Mellman-Lazarus-Lake from May 16, 1994 to
May 18, 1994). Ten percent of those polled favored a "[tiotal ban" on guns, while one
percent "lean[ed] toward a total ban." See id.
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First, the gun rights lobby has long argued that the eventual goal
of gun control legislation is gun prohibition.8" Procontrol voices have
pointed to this allegation as evidence of the lobby's "paranoia."84 We
now witness an important think tank, one that strongly influences the
present Administration and many members of Congress, openly call-
ing for gun confiscation. Second, while the communitarians serving
in the Clinton Administration do not believe that total disarmament is
possible, they clearly hope to achieve a high degree of disarmament.
85
Serious reflection on the argument for domestic disarmament
raises the question of how wise such a policy would be, particularly
from the standpoint of communitarianism. Might the attempt to seize
as many firearms as possible create more communal problems than it
would solve? This question is faced squarely by Washington, D.C., at-
torney and former Justice Department official Ronald Goldfarb, who
follows Etzioni in calling for domestic disarmament "beginning with a
model program."86 Disarmament should be implemented in three
phases, avers Goldfarb: (1) increasing regulation of firearms sales, (2)
registering firearms once the sales of such have been efficiently regu-
lated, and finally (3) confiscating as many weapons and as much am-
munition as possible.87 Goldfarb seems troubled, however, over
problems arising from such a controversial and herculean endeavor:
Is there an individual right to self-defense that cannot be ab-
rogated? How do we balance the necessary policing with the
public's right of privacy and its constitutional protections
against illegal searches and seizures?
... How would disarmament be accomplished? What
would be done with the existing 200 million firearms . ?
What about hunters and other sportsmen?
83. See KLECK, supra note 40, at 9 (asserting that gun control opponents argue "that
today's controls, no matter how limited and sensible, will just make it that much easier to
take the next, more drastic step tomorrow, and then the next step, and the next, until
finally total prohibition of private possession of firearms is achieved").
84. See id. at 11 ("The fact that such escalation [of gun controls] could happen says
nothing about whether it will happen.").
85. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
86. Ronald Goldfarb, Domestic Disarmament: It's Time to Take a Second Look at the Second
Amendment, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1993, at C3, available in 1993 WL 2087239.
87. See id. Goldfarb's three-step strategy is similar to the one proffered by the late
Nelson T. "Pete" Shields, the Founding Chair of Handgun Control, Inc.:
The first problem is to slow down the number of handguns being produced and
sold in this country. The second problem is to get handguns registered. The
final problem is to make possession of all handguns and all handgun ammuni-
tion-except for the military, police, licensed security guards, licensed sporting
clubs, and licensed gun collectors-totally illegal.
Richard Harris, A Reporter at Large: Handguns, NEW YORKER, July 26, 1976, at 53, 58.
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* * .What is the danger of creating a disarmed public?
How do we adopt such a profound proposal . . .? Would
virtual disarmament make the law enforcement establish-
ment too powerful? Would a real ban on guns fail as dis-
mally as the attempt to ban alcohol?88
A. Guns and Other Dangerous Items
No approach to gun control can claim to be rational without first
putting gun violence in perspective. There are at least 50 million gun-
owning families in America.89 Of the roughly 200 million guns they
own, about a third are handguns.90 There are at least one million so-
called assault weapons.9"
There are approximately 30-35,000 gun-related deaths in
America every year.9 2 Viewed in light of how many guns and gun own-
ers there are in America, the numbers reflect that only a very small
fraction of gun owners misuse their guns. This fact has led sociologist
James D. Wright to note that, in sum, "gun ownership is apparently a
topic more appropriate to the sociology of leisure than to the crimi-
nology or epidemiology of violence."9 3
It is undisputed that firearms are used for defensive purposes at
least several tens of thousands of times per year.94 Yet the Communi-
tarian Network does not propose banning a product that is involved in
more deaths every year than guns, a product that does not prevent any
crimes. That product is alcohol, which is in some ways a close ana-
logue to guns.
88. Goldfarb, supra note 86.
89. SeeJames D. Wright, Ten Essential Observations on Guns in America, SociET', Mar. 1,
1995, at 63, available in 1995 WL 12535299.
90. See id.
91. See Jim Stewart & Andrew Alexander, Assault Guns Muscling in on Front Lines of
Crime, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., May 21, 1989, reprinted in 135 GONG. REC. S7006-01 (daily ed.
June 20, 1989) (reporting that assault guns are 1 million of the 200 million privately owned
firearms in the United States); cf Michael G. Lenett, Taking a Bite out of Volent Crime, 20 U.
DAYrON L. RFv. 573, 573 (1995) ("There are over one million semiautomatic assault weap-
ons.., on the streets of America today.").
92. See Wright, supra note 89, at 63.
93. Id.
94. See Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of
Self-Defense with a Gun, 86J. ClM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 153 (1995) (reporting that the
National Crime Victimization Survey of the Department of Justice, see infra note 97, suggests
that Americans use guns for self-defense reasons approximately 80,000 times per year in
assaults, robberies, and household burglaries, while other studies find self-defense use of
guns occurring more frequently). Even the gun control groups accept the figure of tens of
thousands of defensive uses as valid. See id. (reporting that antigun writers concede the
findings in the National Crime Victimization Survey).
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Though a legal drug rather than a manufactured tool, alcohol,
like guns, is used recreationally by millions of Americans. 95 Although
the manner in which harm is wrought by drinking (alcohol-related
diseases, accidents caused by drunks, and criminal violence perpe-
trated by the disinhibited) is not exactly the same as with guns (sui-
cide, firearms accidents, and crimes perpetrated with guns), alcohol,
like guns, is a material cause of harm to many Americans.96 Further,
because alcohol disinhibits potential criminals and lowers the defen-
sive awareness of potential victims, it contributes to a much larger
fraction of violent crime than do firearms." The use of alcohol is a
material cause of approximately 100,000 deaths every year in America,
nearly three times as many deaths as caused by firearms."8 The paral-
lel between alcohol and firearms is also reflected by the fact that the
same agency supervises the two items: the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco and Firearms (BATF), which might aptly be called the "Bureau
of Semi-Licit but Morally Suspect Consumer Products."
In contrast to the expansive gun control arguments of Domestic
Disarmament, the Communitarian Network limits its attention to the
societal costs of alcohol to vanilla-pale measures such as drunk driving
roadblocks.99 Where is the Communitarian Network's argument for
additional "alcohol control" laws analogous to those they advocate for
guns? Why not impose a ban on distilled liquor on the basis that "no
one needs" that much alcoholic firepower to have a good time? (This
is the usual line of argument for laws banning assault weapons.)100
More important, where are the Communitarian Network's position
papers on the reinstitution of domestic prohibition? Why are we to
95. Cf J. Michael McGinnis & William H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United
States, 270 JAMA 2207, 2208 (1993) (reporting that approximately 18 million Americans
suffer from alcohol abuse while another 76 million are affected by alcohol abuse at some
time).
96. See id. at 2208-10.
97. Firearms are involved in less than 12% of violent crimes. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, HIGHLIGHTS FROM 20 YEARS OF SURVEYING CRIME VICrIMS: THE NATIONAL CRIME
VICrIMIZATION SURVEY, 1973-92, at 29 (1993) (reporting that 32% of all violent crime in-
cludes the use of weapons; of the weapons used, handguns are used 29% of the time, and
other guns are used 8% of the time).
98. See McGinnis & Foege, supra note 95, at 2208-09.
99. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
100. See Testimony of Richard M. Aborn Before the Committee on Codes of the Assem-
bly of the State of NewYork (Jan. 3, 1991). Aborn, then an attorney for Handgun Control,
Inc., later President of the group, testified:
These [semi-automatic pistols] gave appeal because of the ease of firing and the
large clips that they can hold. There is no reason why a legitimate gun owner
needs to have a clip capable of holding more than six rounds, and thus I would
suggest the banning of clips that hold more than six rounds.
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accept the toll exacted on society by the easy availability of alcohol,
but not that of the less-easy availability of guns, especially when the
former kills nearly three times more than the latter?
Communitarian advocates of prohibitive gun control laws-most
of whom, it is safe to assume, imbibe on occasion-apparently accept
the cost to society of the ease with which alcohol is procured and con-
sumed, most likely because drinking is pleasurable and the large ma-
jority of drinkers are responsible. Thus the Communitarian Network
does not apply the same logic to gun ownership as to alcohol, even
though the vast majority of gun owners take pleasure in owning fire-
arms and exercise that right responsibly. Guns are singled out for
prohibitionist legislation, while a relatively blind eye is turned toward
the much heavier toll exacted by the sale and consumption of alcohol.
This analogy between guns and alcohol is not intended to mini-
mize either the annual tragedy of 35,000 firearms-related deaths or of
100,000 alcohol-related deaths. It is only intended to put matters in
perspective and to highlight that, as a matter of course, Americans
accept the social costs of potentially dangerous substances such as al-
cohol, or potentially dangerous objects such as automobiles and guns,
because of the benefits those things afford. One may certainly argue
that alcohol actually provides little benefit to society, but the experi-
ment with alcohol prohibition during the 1920s demonstrated that
millions of Americans found the recreational benefits of alcohol con-
sumption to be sufficient justification for resistance to that policy. It
was this stubborn refusal of Americans to give up their freedom, com-
bined with the observation of how alcohol prohibition lined the pock-
ets of gangsters,'0 1 that led to the repeal of Prohibition. 10 2 Few today,
communitarians included, would argue for the resurrection of the
failed Prohibition experiment, even though alcohol actually inflicts
greater harm on society than do firearms.10
1. Noncompliance of Law Enforcement Personnel.-Proponents of
gun prohibition sometimes forget that America's law enforcement
community, which would obviously be needed in the effort to confis-
cate all firearms, includes many "gun culture" types. This is all the
more true in the nation's vast rural areas, where a disproportionate
101. Cf SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 899-
902 (1965) (explaining that organized crime, which benefitted from bootlegging, allied
itself with local governments such as the City of Chicago).
102. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (repealing U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII).
103. Alcohol prohibition retains a core support of approximately 17%, which is at least
as large as the percentage favoring complete gun confiscation. See ABC News/Wash. Post
Survey (telephone poll conducted May 8, 1985-May 13, 1985).
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fraction of the nation's guns are possessed." 4 Surveys have indicated
that the rank-and-file of the law enforcement community possess a
deep-seated belief that law-abiding citizens have a constitutional right
to own firearms.10 5 It is therefore likely, as firearms instructor and
former police officer Massad Ayoob suggests, that many members of
the law enforcement community would either openly refuse to carry
out a gun confiscation law or would at least contribute to its subver-
sion in some. way.10
6
One such law enforcer is Richard Mack, former Sheriff of Gra-
ham County, Arizona. Sheriff Mack has gained national attention be-
cause of his successful federal lawsuit that blocked implementation of
the Brady Act 07 in his state.1" 8 Mack believes that law enforcement
104. See Witkin, supra note 77, at 31 (indicating that 78% of all rural residents own
firearms, while only 44% of city residents and 43% of suburban dwellers do).
105. A 1993 poll conducted by the Southern States Police Benevolent Association, for
example, reveals that 90% of southern police feel that the Constitution protects the right
of individuals to keep and bear arms. See Police Views on Gun Control, AUSTIN AMERICAN-
STATESMAN, Oct. 4, 1993, at A8, available in 1993 WL 6804712; see also Funny You Should Ask,
POLICE, Apr. 1993, at 56 (describing a poll of police attitudes that indicated 85% believed
gun ownership by civilians increased public safety); The Law Enforcement Technology Gun
Control Survey, LAw ENFORCEMENT TECH., July/Aug. 1991, at 14-15 (reporting survey that
indicated 77.4% of respondents thought gun control infringed on the constitutional right
to bear arms; 84.6% thought gun control did not lessen crime; and police chiefs, sheriffs,
and top managers were more likely to support gun control than middle managers, while
street officers were the least likely to support such control); cf Scott Marshall, Poll: South's
Police Leery of Stricter Gun Contro ATLANTA CONST., July 13, 1993, at 3A ("Nearly two-thirds
of rank-and-file Southern police officers believe that stricter control laws are not the an-
swer to curbing violent crime.").
106. See Will the Police Confiscate Your Guns?-No, AM. HANDGUNNER, Sept./Oct. 1994, at
116, 116-19.
107. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536
(1993) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-930 (1994)).
108. See Mack v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Ariz. 1994) (holding that
certain provisions of the Brady Act violate the Tenth Amendment), rev'd, 66 F.3d 1025,
1032 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom. Printz v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2521 (1996).
By the time the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court's decision, the Arizona legislature
had enacted an "instant check" law that excepted Sheriff Mack (and all other Arizonans)
from the Brady Act. See Ajuz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13-3114 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996).
There are several other cases in which sheriffs have sued to overturn the Brady Act.
See, e.g., Romero v. United States, 883 F. Supp. 1076, 1088 (W.D. La. 1994) (holding certain
provisions of the Brady Act to violate the Tenth Amendment); McGee v. United States, 863
F. Supp. 321, 327-28 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (finding portions of the Brady Act to contravene the
Tenth Amendment and to exceed congressional authority as bestowed by Article I, § 8 of
the Constitution), aff'd sub nom. Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1996); Frank
v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1030, 1044 (D. Vt. 1994) (holding certain provisions of the
Brady Act to be violative of the Tenth Amendment), rev'd, 78 F.3d 815 (2d Cir. 1996); Koog
v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1376, 1389 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (finding the Brady Act to be
consistent with the dictates of the Tenth Amendment), rev'd, 79 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1996).
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officials and military personnel are bound by their oath of office to
refuse to enforce any unconstitutional gun law:
No police officer, soldier, or any other government official,
should in any manner comply with an order that is unlawful
or attempt to enforce a mandate that is unconstitutional....
May each of us in this most noble profession, as we pursue
the guilty among us, never be guilty ourselves of the greater
crime: violating our oath in God's name to defend the con-
stitutional rights of the people we work for."'
2. Resistance.-As Ronald Goldfarb and other gun prohibition-
ists realize, a successful policy of domestic disarmament must be pre-
ceded by a federal attempt to register all firearms currently owned. 10
In fact, the German Nazi regime used registration records as a precur-
sor to, or as a means of, confiscating guns within its own borders and
within its territorial acquisitions, and many gun owners are aware of
this historical precedent.111 Fear of confiscation is one reason for
such little compliance with current registration laws where they have
been enacted in America. New York's "Sullivan Law,"" 2 the first ma-
jor licensing and registration scheme imposed in twentieth-century
America, is ignored by millions of New Yorkers."' In Illinois it is esti-
mated that about 75% of handgun owners are in noncompliance with
the state's registration law." 4
There has also been substantial resistance to laws that require re-
gistration of so-called assault weapons. California was the first state to
pass a ban on military-style semiautomatics." 5 The California law re-
109. RICHARD I. MACK & TIMOTHY ROBERT WALTERS, FROM MY COLD DEAD FINGERS: WHY
AMERICA NEEDS GUNS! 211, 213 (1994).
110. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
111. See Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment: Declarations by a
Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. REV. 597, 623-30
(1995).
112. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265, 400 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1997) (originally enacted as
N.Y. PENAL LAW 1909 §§ 1896, 1903).
113. Cf KOPEL, supra note 13, at 393 ("[11f 1 percent of illegal handgun owners in New
York City were caught, tried, and sent to prison for a year, the state prison system would
collapse." (citing DONALD B. KATE,JR., GUNS, MURDERS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: A R.ALis-
TIC ASSESSMENT OF GUN CONTROL 59 (1990))).
114. See Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Control: Prohibition Revisited, INQUIRY, Dec. 5, 1977, at
20, 20 n.1.
115. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 12275-12290 (West 1992). The California law, entitled the
Roberti-Roos Assault Weapons Control Act of 1989, bans rifles, handguns, and shotguns
that (1) are designated as assault weapons by the statute, (2) are simply variations of those
designated, or (3) possess characteristics sufficient to warrant inclusion on a list of assault
weapons promulgated by the Attorney General. See id. § 12276.
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quires mandatory registration of all such weapons owned prior to the
enactment of the ban. 116 A group called Gun Owners React openly
called for those who owned such arms to disobey the registration re-
quirement. 1 7  Nearly 90% of the approximately 300,000 assault
weapon owners in California refused to register their weapons. 1 8 A
few months later, Denver passed a similar ordinance. 19 Only 1% of
the estimated 10,000 assault weapons in that jurisdiction were ever
registered. 1 0 Other municipalities that have passed similar ordi-
nances have seen about the same percentage of guns registered.121
NewJersey was the next state to enact an assault weapon ban.' 2 2 Out
of the 100,000 to 300,000 assault weapons in that state, 947 were regis-
tered, an additional 888 were rendered inoperable, and 4 were turned
over to the authorities.1
2 3
If the Morton Grove, Illinois, handgun ban is any indication, gun
owners appear to be even more disobedient to decrees requiring
them to turn their firearms over to authorities.' 24 The Morton Grove
police wisely adopted an "honor system," whereby guns would be con-
fiscated through the owners' voluntary compliance with the ban,
rather than by searching the residences of known handgun owners.12 5
Only a handful of handguns were turned in.12 6 Noncompliance with
such laws in more libertarian areas of the nation, such as the West and
116. See id. § 12285(a).
117. See Seth Mydans, Californians Defy Assault Weapons Law, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 28, 1990, at
24, available in 1990 WL 2902280 (characterizing the civil disobedience of Gun Owners
React as being in the tradition of Gandhi and Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.).
118. Cf KOPEL, supra note 13, at 231 n.210 (reporting that "approximately 10 percent
have registered themselves as required by law").
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. ("The rate of compliance with semi-automatic bans in Boston, Cleveland,
and other American cities has been about one percent.").
122. See id.
123. See Wayne King, New Jersey Law to Limit Guns Is Being Ignored, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26,
1991, § 1, at 22, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; Howard Rabb, NewJersey Politi-
cians' Nightmare Comes True: Gun-Owners Stage Successful Mass Rebellion, GSSA SENTINEL, Fall
1991, at 4.
124. See Ban Gives No Ammunition to Either Side of Gun Debate: Not Much Has Changed in the
Illinois Village That Enacted the Toughest Handgun Law in the Nation 10 Years Ago, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, June 14, 1992, at A14, available in 1992 WL 10608228.
125. Cf id. ("Of the 54 handguns taken in by Morton Grove police since 1982, 31 were
surrendered voluntarily. Most of the rest were confiscated-usually during arrests for
other matters.").
126. See KLECK, supra note 40, at 409-10. This phenomenon is consistent with a poll
revealing that 73% of Illinois residents would not obey a law requiring them to turn over
their firearms to the federal government. See id. at 330 (citing DAVID J. BORDUA ET AL.,
ILLINOIS LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMISSION, PATTERNS OF FIREARMS OWNERSHIP, REGULATION,
AND USE IN ILLINOIS (1979)).
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South, may be higher. Indeed, noncompliance is legitimized by vocal
progun police such as the implacable Sheriff Richard Mack and his
journalist cohort, Timothy Robert Walters:
Only a nation of armed citizens-the ones who protect
themselves from criminal attack every 48 seconds-is
equipped of mind, spirit and arsenal sufficient to protect the
intent of the Founding Fathers and the tenets of the U.S.
Constitution and Bill of Rights. As a united people, we must
not allow the enemy to take away our last argument for
freedom.1 27
3. Overwhelming and Ruining the Criminal Justice System.-Crimi-
nologist Don Kates observes that even if only half of all handgun own-
ers defied a confiscation law, the criminal justice system would simply
not be able to cope:
Terrorizing [tens of millions of handgun owners] into com-
pliance would require catching, trying and jailing large num-
bers of them. But to jail just one percent of probable
violators would fill all the cells in our present federal, state
and local jail system. We would have to either free all the
murderers, robbers, and rapists now serving time or build a
brand new prison system doubling our combined national
capacity-just to hold one percent of all probable gun law
violators. Comparable expansion would be required for our
courts, prosecutors and police. Effective enforcement of na-
tional gun legislation would require an expenditure equal to
the cost of catching, trying and punishing every other kind
of federal, state, and local criminal combined. I cannot do
better than to quote the question with which [a University
of] Wisconsin study ends: "Are we willing to make sociologi-
cal and economic investments of such a tremendous nature
in a social experiment for which there is no empirical
support?"1 2 8
Add to a handgun ban the attempt to enforce a law banning all fire-
arms, or virtually all firearms, and enforceability problems become
immense.
Just as alcohol prohibition in the 1920s and drug prohibition in
modem times have spawned vast increases in federal power, as well as
127. MACK & WALTERS, supra note 109, at 143.
128. Don B. Kates, Jr., Some Remarks on the Prohibition of Handguns, 23 ST. Louis U. L.J.
11, 29 (1979). The University of Wisconsin study concluded that it "is inevitabl[e] that gun
control laws have no individual or collective effect in reducing the rates of violent crime."
Id. at 26.
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vast infringements on the Bill of Rights, another national war against
the millions of Americans who are determined to possess a product
that is very important to them is almost certain to cause tremendous
additional erosion of constitutional freedom and traditional liberty.
Legal and customary protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures, invasion of privacy, selective enforcement of laws, and harsh
and punitive statutes would all suffer. 29 Attempting to disarm Ameri-
cans would likely result in widespread police corruption, increased
wiretaps, and other evils associated with enforcement of laws against
consensual possessory offenses,13 0 thus encouraging public contempt
for the law.
Of course, the problem of citizen noncompliance could be par-
tially avoided by simply banning the production of new firearms or by
adopting a Morton Grove-type "honor system"13 1 to enforcement of a
law against gun possession. These vanilla-pale approaches, however,
would leave most of America's 200 million guns in private hands,
hardly domestic disarmament.
4. "Nasty Things May Happen": Armed Resistance.-More alarm-
ing than simple noncompliance with gun prohibition is the apparent
willingness of many gun owners to fight, if necessary, for their right to
bear arms.13 2 The rhetoric of resistance is not confined to gun
magazines, but also appears in scholarly journals.1 3 3
129. See David B. Kopel, Peril or Protection? The Risks and Benefits of Handgun Prohibition,
12 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 285, 319-23 (1993) (offering a detailed analysis of the civil
rights implications of gun-prohibition laws).
130. See Don B. Kates, Jr., Why a Civil Libertarian Opposes Gun Contro, 3 Civ. LIBERTIES
REv.June/July 1976, at 24, 24 ("[Elnforcement of even a partial prohibition on handguns
would take an immense toll in human liberty and bring about a sharp increase in repug-
nant police practices as well as hundreds of thousands ofjail sentences."); see also David T.
Hardy & Kenneth L. Chotiner, The Potentiality for Civil Liberties Viwlations in the Enforcement of
Handgun Prohibition, in REsTRiCrINc HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTIcs SPEAK Our (Don B.
Kates, Jr. ed., 1979) (discussing the potential for police abuse and popular resistance to
handgun prohibition).
131. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Stephen Weaver, Freedom's Last Stand: Are You Willing to Fight for Your Guns?,
GUNS & AMMO, Sept. 1994, at 28, 29, 127 ("We cannot hope to prevail against a tyrannical
government armed with fully automatic weapons when we are reduced to bolt actions or
worse.... Do I know what I'm suggesting here? Yes I do. I am speaking of the specter of
civil war while adamantly hoping it can be avoided.").
133. See, e.g.,Jeffrey R. Snyder, A Nation of Cowards, PUB. INTEREST, Fall 1993, at 40. Sny-
der stated:
The repeal of the Second Amendment would no more render the outlawing
of firearms legitimate than the repeal of the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment would authorize the government to imprison and kill people at will.
A government that abrogates any of the Bill of Rights, with or without
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How seriously should the possibility of a civil war over gun prohi-
bition be taken? The emotions over gun control today run extremely
high. The "militia movement" that is much in the news these days is a
reaction, in part, to gun control legislation.134
The number of those currently involved with citizen militias is at
least in the tens of thousands nationwide, and possibly higher."3 5
Most mainstream gun owners, including most of the "hard core," do
not currently belong to these militias. This is largely because many of
the militias are motivated as much by other political concerns (some
of them truly bizarre, such as United Nations invasion conspiracies) as
they are by gun control legislation, and these concerns are not gener-
ally shared by mainstream gun owners.13 6 Some analysts believe, how-
ever, that the militias are even now drawing an increasing number of
mainstream gun owners to their ranks. 137 If the federal government
actually attempted to disarm Americans, not only would many Ameri-
majoritarian approval, forever acts illegitimately, becomes tyrannical, and loses
the moral right to govern.
This is the uncompromising understanding reflected in the warning that
America's gun owners will not go gently into that good, utopian night: "You can
have my gun when you pry it from my cold, dead hands." While liberals take this
statement as evidence of the retrograde, violent nature of gun owners, we gun
owners hope that liberals hold equally strong sentiments about their printing
presses, word processors, and television cameras. The republic depends upon
fervent devotion to all our fundamental rights.
Id. at 47-48, 55.
134. See Steve Lipsher, The Radical Right, DENY. POST, Jan. 22, 1995 (first of two-part
series), at 1A, available in LEXIS, News Library, DPost File ("Frustrated by taxes, gun laws
and intrusive regulations, a growing number of ultra-conservative 'patriots' has coalesced
in Colorado to battle Big Brother-the government."); cf. Stacey Baca, Secrecy: The Key to
Militias, DENv. POST, Jan. 23, 1995 (second of two-part series), at 1A, available in LEXIS,
News Library, DPost File (quoting the head of the Colorado Free Militia: "'We are an
organization founded to support, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States
and Colorado. It may come to the point where we literally have to defend ourselves against
the tyrannical government .... A gun is a very good tool to do that.'").
135. Cf Baca, supra note 134 (reporting that "[a]n FBI report obtained by The Post"
reveals that 3000 citizens have joined militias in Colorado); Lipsher, supra note 134 (re-
porting that "FBI documents" reveal that up to 3000 citizens have joined militias in Colo-
rado alone).
136. Cf. Stacey Baca, FBI Finds Militias Encompass a Cross-Section of Citizens, DENV. POST,
Jan. 23, 1995, at 4A, available in 1995 WL 6564048 ("Militia members come from all walks
of life, and that worries cops and watchdog organizations. The concern is noted in an FBI
investigative document, which sizes up militia members as a cross-section of citizens.").
137. An informative article on the militia movement (though typical of attempts to paint
the movement with a broad brush) appears in Daniel Junas, Angry White Guys with Guns:
The Rise of the Militias, Covert Action Q., Spring 1995, at 20. The author hints, correctly,
that there are important distinctions between the small group of white supremacists, the
larger group of conspiracy theorists, and the much larger group of disaffected "main-
stream gun owners" who are being attracted to the movement as a result of the gun control
measures adopted by the Bush and Clinton Administrations, not because these gun owners
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cans likely fight back, but the number of those who would do so could
conceivably be in the millions.13 8
hold racist views. See id. at 20-25. For a less frantic view of militias, see Mack Tanner,
Extreme Prejudice: How the Media Misrepresent the Militia Movement, REASON, July 1995, at 42.
While it is true that the "patriot" movement is composed of a significant number of
conspiracy theorists and a much smaller number of supremacists, a tiny fraction of whom
can rightly be described as potential terrorists, it is clear that the movement is actually
more racially and ideologically diverse than commonly reported. For example, an author
of a report by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith has admitted: "[T] he movement
overall is [not necessarily] fundamentally racist and anti-Semitic .... It is a factor but not
the predominant factor by any means." Baca, supra note 136. Baca notes thatJamesJohn-
son, a spokesman for the Ohio Unorganized Militia, is an African American. See id. Econo-
mist and nationally syndicated columnist Walter Williams is also an African American.
Although Williams has not proclaimed himself a militia member, he recently called for
private citizens to organize militias and evict federal agencies from their states should those
agencies fail to heed Tenth Amendment resolutions passed by those states. See Walter
Williams, Too Many Laws, and Fewer and Fewer Worth Obeying, NAT'L EDUCATOR, quoted in
WAKE-Up CALL AMERICA, Aug. 1994, at 7.
Much is said and written about "right-wing" patriot groups, but little is mentioned
about the libertarian contingent. Libertarians, who are adamantly progun and who believe
in the right to resistance, nevertheless reject conspiracy theories and most of the other
beliefs of the far right. These contrasting views unfortunately do not stop the media from
linking libertarians with ultra conservatives. Commenting on one journalist's apparent in-
ability to understand (or unwillingness to report) the distinction between libertarianism
and the far right, Libertarian Party of Denver Chairman David Segal complained:
Lumping Libertarians, John Birchers, religious zealots, hatemongers, tax protes-
ters, gun proponents and constitutionalists together in the same Patriot Move-
ment is like lumping the Nazi SS, Soviet NKVD, British Commandos, United
States Marines and the Mafia together in the same "professional killer
movement."
I can only assume it was our support for constitutional government and the
right to keep and bear arms-rather than our advocacy of equal rights for gays
and lesbians, abortion choice, ending drug prohibition and, yes, your right to
publish sensationalistic drivel-that earned us a place among the hatemongers
and religious zealots in Lipsher's version of the "patriot movement."
David Segal, in Letters to the Post, DENV. POST, Jan. 29, 1995, at D2, available in 1995 WL
6565815 (responding to Lipsher, supra note 134).
138. Using a conservative percentage, assume that only 2% of the roughly 50 million
American gun owners, see supra note 89 and accompanying text, would resort to force of
arms in the face of prohibitive gun legislation. This would be about 1 million people.
Various polls suggest the potential for explosive growth of the militia movement. A
Time/CNN poll indicates that 27% of Americans feel that armed resistance to the govern-
ment is a right. See I in 4 Says Armed Opposition Is OK ROCKY MTN. NEws (Reuters), Apr. 29,
1995, at 44A. According to the same poll, 52% of Americans feel that the government "has
become so large and powerful it poses a threat to the rights and freedoms of ordinary
citizens." See id. An ABC News/ Washington Post poll shows that 36% of Americans agree
that the federal government threatens personal rights and freedoms, but only 9% agree
that violence against the government is sometimes justified. See Nightline (ABC television
broadcast, May 17, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, Script File. According to the
poll, 13% of Americans support private militias. See id. As ABC's Chris Bury points out, 9%
and 13% of the population translates into 17 million and 25 million adults, respectively.
See id.
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As the specter of myriad American civilians fighting their own
government to retain their gun rights were not troubling enough,
there is evidence that at least some members of the armed forces
would join the resistance. Many members of the armed services are
gun culture types: they own firearms themselves, are convinced that
Americans have the inalienable right to keep and bear arms, and they
take an oath to defend the Constitution from every enemy, "foreign or
domestic.""3 9 It is therefore likely that at least some in the military
would not simply look the other way as the government attempted to
enforce a policy of domestic disarmament.1 40 A master's thesis study-
ing the attitudes of American soldiers found that the large majority
would not obey orders to fire on citizens who resisted gun
confiscation. 1
41
Contrasting these hard-core members of the gun culture with the
advocates of prohibitionist gun legislation "who take bourgeois Eu-
rope as a model of a civilized society," Bruce-Briggs describes the for-
mer as
a group of people who do not tend to be especially articulate
or literate, and whose world view is rarely expressed in print.
Their model is that of the independent frontiersman who
takes care of himself and his family with no interference
from the state. They are "conservative" in the sense that they
cling to America's unique pre-modem tradition-a non-feu-
dal society with a sort of medieval liberty writ large for every-
man. To these people, "sociological" is an epithet. Life is
tough and competitive. Manhood means responsibility and
caring for your own.
This hard-core group is probably very small, not more
than a few million people, but it is a dangerous group to
cross. From the point of view of a right-wing threat to inter-
nal security, these are perhaps the people who should be dis-
139. 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1994).
140. See 60 Minutes: The Resister (CBS television broadcast, Apr. 30, 1995). According to
one member of the Special Forces writing in a recent issue of The Resister, published by an
underground group of members of the Special Forces,
My friends and I are all in agreement; our government is getting out of control
and the first time we are given a mission to disarm the citizens of this country we
are going to desert and join whatever guerrilla movement demonstrates it is fight-
ing to restore the principles this country was founded on, republicanism and indi-
vidual rights.
"John," SWCS Instructors Participating in Drug Raids, 1 RESISTER, Summer 1994, at 1, 4.
141. See ERNEST Guy CUNNINGHAM, PEACEKEEPING AND U.N. OPERATIONAL CONTROL: A
STUDY OF THEIR EFIEcr ON UNIT COHESION (U.S. Navy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monte-
rey, Cal., Mar. 1995) (indicating 61.66% of the 300 Marines surveyed stated they would not
obey such orders, while 12% had no opinion).
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armed first, but in practice they will be the last. As they say,
to a man, "I'll bury my guns in the wall first." They ask, be-
cause they do not understand the other side, "Why do these
people want to disarm us?" They consider themselves no
threat to anyone; they are not criminals, not revolutionaries.
But slowly, as they become politicized, they find an analysis
that fits the phenomenon they experience: Someone fears
their having guns, someone is afraid of their defending their
families, property, and liberty. Nasty things may happen if
these people begin to feel that they are cornered. 142
"Nasty things" would likely ensue if the government attempted to
enact and enforce gun prohibition. It was, after all, government at-
tempts to confiscate "weapons of war" at Lexington and Concord that
sparked the American Revolution143 and the Texan rebellion against
Mexico. 1" If it is true, as Bruce-Briggs implies, that millions rather
than mere thousands of gun owners would be involved in fighting for
their gun rights, then those who foresee a speedy quashing of this
rebellion are probably deluding themselves.
Many people will be incredulous, even scandalized, over the
proposition that many gun owners would resist attempted disarma-
ment. Nevertheless, a number of notable constitutional scholars have
shown that this type of disobedience is not only characteristically
American, but that the Second Amendment's very reason for being is
to enable American citizens to resist even their own government when
their civil liberties are thus assailed. 45 It was the Framers of the Con-
stitution and the revolutionary generation, and not the 1990s "Militia
of Montana," who first insisted that the only reason a government
would seek to disarm its population would be to enslave it.1 4 6
142. Bruce-Briggs, supra note 71, at 61-62.
143. See Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., Who Is the Militia: The Viginia Ratification Convention
and the Right to Bear Arms, 19 LINCOLN L. REv. 1, 6 (1990) ("General Gage ... attempt[ed]
to seize arms and munitions at Lexington, Massachusetts, resulting in the 'shot heard
round the world.'"); cf EssEx GAZETTE, Apr. 25, 1775, at 3, col. 3 (giving a contemporary
account of the happenings in Boston).
144. See Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right to Bear Arms in Texas: The Intent of the Framers of
the Bills of Rights, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 629, 636 (1989) ("The 'Lexington' of the Texas Revolu-
tion was sparked at Gonzales, where the Mexicans tried to seize a small cannon the settlers
used to scare away Indians." (citing N. SMrrHWICK, THE EVOLUTION OF A STATE, OR RECOL-
LECTIONS OF OLD TEXAS DAYS 71 (2d ed. 1984))).
145. For a discussion of the origin of the Second Amendment, as well as commentary by
constitutional scholars, see infra notes 401-451 and accompanying text.
146. For example, at the Virginia Convention to ratify the Constitution, George Mason
pointed out that the British government had decided "to disarm the people ... was the
best and most effectual way to enslave them." 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTI-
TUTION 380 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1859).
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Virtually all legal scholarship on the Second Amendment from
the last two decades acknowledges as much. Sanford Levinson so con-
cluded in his famous Yale Law Journal article, The Embarrassing Second
Amendment." 7 Levinson is not alone. Constitutional scholarship on
the Second Amendment shows that one of the major reasons the
Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights was to ensure the per-
petuation of a force of armed citizens that could resist domestic tyr-
anny when-but only when-it was absolutely necessary.1 48
147. Sanford Levinson, Comment, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE LJ. 637,
657 (1989) ("If one does accept the plausibility of any of the arguments on behalf of a
strong reading of the Second Amendment, but, nevertheless, rejects them in the name of
social prudence and the present-day consequences produced by finicky adherence to ear-
lier understandings, why do we not apply such consequentialist criteria to each and every
part of the Bill of Rights?").
148. The American Political Dictionary states that the "right to bear arms is an implicit
recognition of the right of revolution, stemming from the idea that a tyrant could not be
overthrown if the people were denied the means." JACK C. PIANO & MILTON GREENBERG,
THE AMERICAN PoLricAL DICTIONARY 76 (6th ed. 1982). One of the earliest law review
pieces devoted to the issue of the fight to keep and bear arms concluded that the right to
arms is "for preserving to the people the right and power of organized military defense of
themselves and the state and of organized military resistance to unlawful acts of the govern-
ment itself, as in the case of the American Revolution." Lucilius A. Emery, Note, The Con-
stitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 28 HARv. L. REv. 473, 476 (1915). As to the question
of when armed resistance is justified-when it becomes lawful resistance as opposed to
insurrection-the Founders were clear that violence must always be the last resort. See THE
ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS xlvi
(David E. Young ed., 2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT].
All peaceful means of redressing the situation must be pursued, they argued, before shots
may be fired. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Up in Arms About a Revolting Movement, CHI. TIuB.,
Jan. 30, 1995, at 11, available in 1995 WL 6161015.
There has been an explosion of Second Amendment research in the last two decades,
resulting in a number of people within the legal academy converting, sometimes reluc-
tandy, to the "individual right" interpretation of the Second Amendment. One of these
converts is Duke Law School constitutional law professor William Van Alstyne who, while
not supporting every position taken by the NRA on gun control, nevertheless states that
the individual right stance "advanced by the NRA with respect to the Second Amendment
is extremely strong .... Indeed, it is largely by the 'unreasonable' persistence ofjust such
organizations in this country that the Bill of Rights has endured." William Van Alstyne, The
Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE LJ. 1236, 1255 (1994).
These scholars point out that the current militia phenomenon is not unprecedented.
American history has witnessed a number of instances in which Americans have taken up
arms in response to perceived acts of despotism on the part of government. The current
situation, in fact, bears some similarity to the state of affairs that shortly preceded the
Revolutionary War. In response to what the colonials perceived as a systematic British
assault upon their rights, independent local militias were formed all over the colonies,
often in opposition to the will of the royal governors. These militia "associations" were
usually created through declarations or resolutions by county entities, much in the same
way that certain county commissions have recently created their own militias. See infra note
283. For example, George Mason and George Washington formed the Fairfax County Mili-
tia Association by resolution. See STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE
EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 60 (2d ed. 1994). In this resolution, George Ma-
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Although most gun owners have not, of course, kept up with the
Yale LawJourna4 the ideology of forceful resistance to a gun-banning
central government has been transmitted-from American gun own-
ers in 1776 to American gun owners in 1997-quite effectively. Many
gun owners believe that it would be perfectly legitimate-even morally
required-to oppose gun prohibition by force of arms.1 49 When we
celebrate the Fourth of July, we remember that America was, after all,
born through what the British perceived as "insurrection"; our Foun-
ders enjoined us never to lose that "spirit of resistance.""' ° Millions of
American gun owners, rightly or wrongly, still heed that message.
Predictably, proponents of gun control have responded bitterly
that the conclusion of Levinson and other legal scholars represents
nothing less than an "insurrectionist" interpretation of the Second
Amendment." t Such a criticism ignores the important distinction be-
son declared: "'Threat'ned with the Destruction of our Civil-rights, & liberty.... we will,
each of us, constantly keep by us'" arms and ammunition. Id. (quoting George Mason). In
other places, the refusal of local government entities to create militias did not prevent the
formation of autonomous militias. As a writer from Georgia warned: "'[T]he English
troops in our front, and our governors forbid giving assent to militia laws, make it high
time that we enter into associations for learning the use of arms, and to choose officers
.... '" Id. (quoting the WILLIAMSBURG VIRGINIA GAZETrE, Oct. 27, 1774). Similar associa-
tions had been formed all over the colonies by the time the Revolution came to an end. See
id. at 60-65 (discussing various colonial military associations).
Autonomous militias were also formed by African Americans during the 1960s to pro-
tect the black community and the civil rights movement from racist groups, such as the Ku
Klux Klan, which often engaged in terrorism with approval from law enforcement authori-
ties. See RobertJ. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Recomideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 356-58 (1991).
149. See supra notes 132-134 and accompanying text.
150. Thomas Jefferson is perhaps the best known of the leading Founders for insurrec-
tionist utterances. With reference to Shays' Rebellion, Jefferson reminded James Madison
that "a little rebellion now and then is a good thing .... It is a medecine [sic] necessary
for the sound health of government." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(Jan. 30, 1787), in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEfFERSON 415, 417 (Merrill D. Peterson ed.,
1975). Jefferson also asked: "[W ] hat country can preserve it's [sic] liberties if their rulers
are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let
them take arms .... The tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the
blood of patriots & tyrants." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith
(Nov. 13, 1787), in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 148, at 102.
151. See, e.g., Dennis Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L.
REv. 107 (1991). Henigan, who serves as Director of the Legal Action Project at the Center
to Prevent Handgun Violence in Washington, D.C., argues that Levinson's insurrectionist
interpretation of the Second Amendment spells an end to the rule of law in America. See
id. at 123. It is not surprising, therefore, that Henigan's response to the Santa Rosa County
Commission's militia resolution is that it creates only a "bogus local militia." See Larry
Rohter, County Creates Militia to Defend Gun Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1994, at L14, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. If Santa Rosa County's militia is "bogus," then so
were those militias formed by American counties to fight the British during the Revolution-
ary War. Having insisted that a militia is something created only by the government, an-
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tween unjustifiable resistance-insurrection-and just iable resistance
to government tyranny-a right that Americans exercised in the
Revolution and one that the Founders declared to be an inalienable
right. 52 To criticize the notion of rebellion and resistance per se is to
criticize the theory of government embodied in the Declaration of
Independence. 153
"It would be useful," Bruce-Briggs concludes, "if some of the min-
dless passion, on both sides, could be drained out of the gun control
issue.'"M On the communitarian side, Etzioni and others must ask
themselves the following question: If the passage of the Brady Act"5
and the assault weapon ban1 56 have caused such alarm and have trig-
gered plans of resistance in the minds of many otherwise law-abiding
gun owners, what is bound to happen if such an extreme proposal as
domestic disarmament is made the law of the land? The worst case
scenario would be a civil war, while the best case scenario would be a
massive conflict and breakdown of law and order, reminiscent of the
era of alcohol prohibition. In neither case would a more harmonious,
tigun groups now face the uncomfortable problem of having to explain away militias that
are created by governments.
152. The distinction between justifiable resistance to tyranny and insurrection is clearer
in theory than in practice. The current militia movement-many of whose members ad-
here to conspiracy theories-advocates "working within the system," because the federal
government and the United Nations have not made a violent effort to impose full-scale
tyranny. See Tanner, supra note 137, at 45, 47. Likewise, the revolutionaries of the 1770s
also worked within the system (through petitions to Royal Governors and the like), until
they became convinced that the various problems with the British were more than just a
large collection of problems-that the individual abuses were elements of a monarchical
plot to reduce the Americans to slavery. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2
(U.S. 1776). For more on the colonists as conspiracy buffs, see LANCE BANNING, THE JEF-
FERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY 42-51 (1978). It was essential to
1770s Patriots that they demonstrate-to themselves and to the world-the justice of their
rebellion by showing that there was a master plot. For this reason, the Declaration of
Independence, before detailing King George's "long train of abuses and usurpations," put
those abuses and usurpations in context: Americans have suffered "a long train of abuses
and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object [that] evinces a design to reduce [the
Americans] under absolute Despotism." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra, at
para. 2 (emphasis added).
In fact, Jefferson and the rest of the 1770s "Patriot movement" were wrong. Although
King George III pursued a terrible, destructive policy toward the American colonies, there
was no "design" to reduce the Americans under "absolute Despotism." The King was
heavy-handed, but he had no master plan; his policies were reactionary.
153. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 152, at para. 1 (declaring that
humans have a right and a duty to overthrow tyrannical government); Luther Martin, Gen-
uine Information X MD. GAZETTE, Feb. 1, 1788, reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT, supra note 148, at 246.
154. Bruce-Briggs, supra note 71, at 62.
155. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s), (t) (1994).
156. Id. § 922(u), (w).
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unified, communitarian society result. Moreover, it is not only law-
abiding citizens who would not give up their guns, criminals would
not either.
B. Country, Court, and the Crisis of Legitimacy
Prohibitionist solutions, whether they involve the banning of al-
cohol, firearms, gold, or other goods, serve in the long run to dimin-
ish "legitimacy"-the popular sense that the government exists to
serve rational, pragmatic ends and, therefore, ought to be obeyed.
Historian William Marina, who has written extensively on the Ameri-
can Revolution, has argued that successful firearms prohibition will
never become a reality in the United States and is doomed to fail in-
ternationally as well.' 57
With the benefit of historical perspective, Marina made two
points, both stemming from his study of resistance and revolution in
the modern world. The first was an empirical observation about re-
pressive regimes: Oppressive states are inherently unstable, and most
of them eventually give way to populist forces of reform or revolu-
tion.15 This is especially true in the modern era, which may aptly be
dubbed the "era of revolution." (Marina made these predictions in
the wake of Watergate and Vietnam, long before the collapse of the
Soviet Empire.) 15 When states become tyrannical they lose legiti-
macy, and hence their legitimate authority to govern. Marina focused
on the American Revolution as one of the clearest examples of what
happens when there is a "crisis of legitimacy" that pits the people
against their government."
The American Revolution was the product of what Marina called
the "Country" ideology, which stresses popular sovereignty and repub-
licanism, as opposed to the "Court," or centralized, statist ideology. 6'
"Here," noted Marina, "the authority emanated from the people up-
ward, versus the standing army, where authority rested with the state.
157. See William Marina, Weapons, Technology and Legitimacy: The Second Amendment in
Global Perspective, in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 417, 446 (Don B.
Kates, Jr. ed., 1984).
158. See id. at 443.
159. See id. at 418.
160. See id. at 432-35.
161. See id. at 432. The story is told in much greater detail in Joyce Lee Malcolm's
excellent history of the conflict over the right to keep and bear arms in seventeenth-cen-
tury England, the prototype court versus country conflict. SeeJOYCE LEE MALCOLM, To
KEEP AND BEAR ARMs: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (1994).
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Participation in the people's militia was thus an integral aspect of citi-
zenship in what was perceived as a republican culture."162
America, partly by design, has avoided the most intense country
versus court conflicts. The national capital was deliberately chosen to
be far removed from the finance and trade centers (New York and
Philadelphia at the time).163 Yet it is still true that Washington, D.C.,
is in many ways quite different from the rest of the United States. A
demographic survey of various American cities focused on what their
inhabitants liked to do for fun: was a good time to them a night at the
ballet, cooking a gourmet meal, a morning of Bible reading, or a
weekend of hunting?164 The survey results revealed that the most ab-
errational city was Washington, D.C.; its inhabitants had less in com-
mon with the "average American" than those of any other American
city."' (Among other things, the percentage of hunters was very
low.)166 Thus, it should not be particularly surprising that a think
tank located in the court city, a think tank that has the Executive's ear,
should simply fail to understand how intense the resistance to its pro-
posals would be out in the "country," nor would it be surprising for
the court to fail to foresee that an attempt to disarm the populace,
and further centralize armed force under court control, could literally
start a civil war. That was how the English Civil War was started.'6 7
Just as it is predictable for the court to underestimate the inten-
sity of the country's likely resistance to court's demands for disarma-
ment, it is also predictable that the court will overestimate its ability to
control the country.1 6 8 (This miscalculation also contributed to the
English Civil War.) This realization leads to Marina's second histori-
cal point: Powerful states have rarely been able to control revolutions
in arms technology, 169 nor have they been able, historically, to prevent
the people from obtaining that technology, especially when it comes
to small arms. 170 Even modern superpowers have been largely incapa-
162. Marina, supra note 157, at 421.
163. See Whit Cobb, Democracy in Search of Utopia: The History, Law, and Politics of Relocat-
ing the National Capital, 99 DicK. L. REv. 527, 529-38 (1995).
164. See Paul Farhi, D.C. Rated As Nation's Yuppie Capital, WASH. POsr, May 25, 1990, at
Fl, available in 1990 WL 2129720.
165. See id.; see also Paul Farhi, Not Your Ordinary Metropolis, WASH. Posr, Aug. 6, 1989, at
Al, available in 1989 WL 2040394 (citing results of consumer research studies).
166. See Farhi, supra note 164.
167. See MALCOLM, supra note 161, at 19.
168. See Marina, supra note 157, at 445.
169. See id. at 422-28 (discussing the technological weapons advance and shortfalls of the
ancient Chinese, Greeks, and Romans).
170. See id. at 445 ("With the present system of international arms trade, governments
cannot control the flow of arms downward.").
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ble of disarming or vanquishing targeted armed populations. 171 Sup-
port for Marina's thesis can be seen in the inability of powerful
modem states to defeat the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, the
Irish Republican Army, the Afghan mujahedin, and the Somali militias.
Marina analyzed the impotence of powerful states not only in
terms of the inherent lack of military flexibility created by reliance on
superweapons, but also in terms of the eventual societal decline that
"imperial" nations have historically suffered (among which he num-
bers America) .171 The Founders were also aware that, historically, na-
tions that became empires became both morally and politically
corrupt, and, therefore, impotent. Thus, the Founders consciously
sought to establish a general government of specified, limited powers
that would not excessively involve itself in foreign entanglements, and
whose authority emanated upward from the states.' 71 Nevertheless,
this vision did not prevent America from passing into its own imperial
phase, just as the Roman Republic had done. This drift toward em-
pire on the part of America has only led, once again, to a global crisis
of legitimacy.17 Witness, for example, the impotence of the United
Nations in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere throughout the world
where various states have reconfigured themselves or asserted their
former sovereignty. 175
Stagnation created by the drift toward empire has resulted in
what Marina has called "the emergence of a new paradigm. In many
ways this paradigm is an updating of the 'Country' ideology, yet
bridges a spectrum from left to right and includes many who would
view themselves as nonpolitical .... ,17' This new paradigm, with its
attendant ideas of people participation, decentralization, smallness of
scale, and obtaining appropriate intermediate technology such as
small arms, may lead adherents to bypass or ignore the government,
"despite the efforts of imperial centralizers to stop the process."
177
171. Marina concludes: "As the international arms trade increases... more people will
obtain access to guns as governments lose control over the great number of arms being
traded." Id. at 441-42. Firearms prohibition is thus "a dubious if not impossible proposi-
tion in any given country, and certainly in one with the personal freedoms long enjoyed by
Americans." Id. at 444.
172. See id. at 443-44.
173. See MORuSON, supra note 101, at 305-12.
174. See Marina, supra note 157, at 445.
175. See Helene Fontanaud, Chirac Takes Center Stage: Britain, U.S. Admonished to 'Pull
Themselves Together,' S.F. CHRON., July 15, 1995, at A8, available in 1995 WL 5290810; Ste-
phenJ. Hedges et al., WillJustice Be Done? Bosnia's War Has Ended, but Its Worst Criminals Are
Still at Large, U.S. NEws & WoRLn REP., Dec. 25, 1995, at 44, available in 1995 WL 13413526.
176. Marina, supra note 157, at 445.
177. Id.
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Thus, "the larger philosophical outlook underlying the Country inter-
pretation of the Second Amendment takes on a new meaning and
relevance. In today's international context, any such effort at arms
prohibition by the state against the individual, in violation of the Sec-
ond Amendment, is bound to fail."17
Failure to heed the argument that gun prohibition is futile "is apt
to have far more serious repercussions on the legitimacy of those seek-
ing prohibition than upon the actions or existence of those whose
lives they seek to regulate." 179 Moreover, a return to "decentraliza-
tion" and "smallness of scale" in America and elsewhere may be inevi-
table."' Such a return to a "republican culture," as shall be argued
below, is the most plausible cure for gun-related violence in America.
Solutions to America's plague of violence are most likely to be
found if all Americans, whatever their feelings about guns, heed the
words of Isaiah: "Let us reason together."'" Etzioni and the com-
munitarians do attempt to reason with the public concerning the
types of rights beloved in the "court" at Washington. Although the
communitarian agenda for selective censorship,"8 2 drug testing, 83
and the like'84 may not comport with strict construction of the Consti-
tution, there is a recognition that freedom of speech and privacy are
tremendously important, and that First and Fourth Amendment rights
should be infringed only when there is a compelling reason to do so.
Etzioni formulates a four-part test for when rights may be infringed:
(1) clear and present danger, (2) no alternative way to proceed, (3)
"adjustments" should be as limited as possible, and (4) infringing poli-
cies should minimize harmful side effects.'85 His respectful hesitancy
toward infringing rights ofjournalists vanishes, however, when the ob-
ject of regulation becomes the one-half of American households that
own guns. Consider the Communitarian Network's "accommodation"
of gun owners: rendering collectors' guns "inoperative" and limiting
hunters to long guns "without sights or powerful bullets, making the
event much more sporting."186
178. Id. at 446.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 445-46.
181. Isaiah 1:18.
182. See Platform, supra note 5, at 19 (arguing that curbs on "verbal expressions of racism,
sexism, and other slurs" are not necessarily violative of the First Amendment and should be
employed).
183. See id. at 20.
184. For other items on the Communitarian Agenda, see supra notes 14-29 and accom-
panying text.
185. See THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, supra note 33, at 177-90.
186. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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There is an important ethical case to be made against hunting,
but that case is properly made within the context of animal rights (a
cause for which Etzioni's book displays absolutely no sympathy) ,187
and vegetarianism. While dismissing the idea that hunting could be a
true "sport," Etzioni displays a truly cosmopolitan ignorance about
hunting, and about the interests of animals. The statement about de-
nying hunters "powerful bullets" obviously comes from someone who
has never thought about hunting in a serious manner. If hunting is to
be tolerated, it is desirable that the hunted be killed as painlessly and
rapidly as possible. Accordingly, hunters today are trained only to
take a shot that they are confident will bring the animal down almost
instantly (typically, a shot to the heart or the lungs). No ethical
hunter would fire at the general mass of a deer, hoping to hit a leg or
some nonvital organ. To the extent that hunters are deprived of
"powerful bullets" (that is, bullets that have been found suitable for
bringing the animal down) or deprived of scopes (which make the
shot more precise), hunters would use inferior, less capable bullets,
and would shoot them less accurately. As a result, many animals
would be wounded rather than killed. Fleeing, some would escape,
only to die a lingering, painful death after days or weeks, as a result of
infection or other complication from the bullet wound. Persons who
have strong ethical objections to hunting per se, but who also believe
that hunting, to the extent allowed, should be done as humanely as
possible, should prefer that animals be hunted with powerful and ac-
curate rifles, rather than with other weapons, such as bows or inferior
firearms, which risk causing an especially slow and agonizing death.
Etzioni's snide accommodation of gun collectors-by allowing
them to keep their guns if they employ his "favorite" technique of
pouring "cement in the barrel"l 8 -is likewise explainable only as a
product of condescending ignorance. Most automobile collectors
would find little value in a car that was rendered inoperable, as by
pouring cement in the piston cylinders. Even if a collected car spends
all its time in a garage, or a collected gun resides in a wall-mounted
display case, it is still important to the collector to know that his object
could serve its purpose. Rendering the object inoperable-especially
through internal destruction such as cementing vital parts-also de-
stroys most of the economic value of the collected object. Many law-
187. Etzioni is opposed to "minting" any new rights for humans, which makes it unlikely
that new rights for animals would be recognized. His other reference to "animal rights" is
a passage referring to terrorism. See THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY, supra note 33, at 42, 199
(mentioning how some Americans go to extremes fighting for animal rights).
188. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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abiding gun collectors would lose tens of thousands of dollars, in col-
lections built up over decades, if Etzioni's scheme were enacted. One
wonders if Etzioni has ever viewed a friend's gun collection, or has
ever thought seriously about the real impact his gun confiscation pro-
posal would have on the millions of good citizens who are gun collec-
tors. Perhaps an argument could be made that gun collecting
presents such a risk of harm to society that even licensed collectors
with registered collections should be forced to destroy (by disabling)
their collections. Etzioni has not made such an argument. He has
simply sneered at the cretins whom he imagines compose the ranks of
the nation's gun collectors and hunters. 189
If Etzioni were H.L. Mencken, sneering at the booboisie beyond
the Beltway or the Bos-Wash corridor would be understandable, 9 ' but
Etzioni proclaims himself a communitarian, a man who wants to (in
Richard Nixon's words) "bring us together."19 1 The Americans who
live more than half an hour from a Metroliner stop are hardly going
to be persuaded to put down their guns by a man and movement that
hold them in contempt and view them as cretins to be subjugated,
rather than as fellow citizens with whom to begin a dialogue.1 92
C. Summary
If domestic disarmament became policy in this country, tens of
millions of Americans would simply hide their guns from the authori-
ties. The majority of these guns are now, and would remain, unregis-
tered. Thus, the majority of firearms would remain in the hands of
189. For more on the culture of gun collectors, see Barbara Stenross, The Meanings of
Guns: Hunters, Shooters, and Gun Collectors, in THE GUN CULTURE AND ITS ENEMIES 53-55
(William R. Tonso ed., 1990). There are many more gun collectors than there are gun
criminals; there are hardly any articles on the former, and innumerable articles on the
latter. By treating nonviolent, lawful uses of firearms as barely worth study, the mainstream
of modem sociology produces a distorted picture of firearms in America.
190. See Richard H. Gilluly, Editorial, A Second Look at Mencken, BAIT. SuN,June 21, 1995,
at 15A, available in 1995 WL 2448743 (explaining that Mencken created the pejorative
term-"the booboisie"-to show his disdain for ordinary people).
191. THEODORE H. WHITE, AMERICA IN SEARCH OF ITSELF 431 (1982) (quoting Richard M.
Nixon).
192. "[T]rue communal values cannot be imposed by an outside group or an internal
elite or minority but must be generated by the members of community in a dialogue which
is open to all and fully responsive to the membership." Amitai Etzioni, Old Chestnuts and
New Spurs, in NEW COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND COM-
MUNrIES 17 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995) [hereinafter Old Chestnuts]. Communitarians
should seek "political modes of... compromise that seek creative syntheses from different
interests and divergent moral concerns." Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., Communitarian Liber-
aism, in NEW COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNI-
TIES 50 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995).
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their owners, or on the black market. Just as organized crime is able
to smuggle tons of drugs into the country every year, it would be able
to do the same with illicit firearms. Even if illegal imports could be
entirely eliminated, guns are not particularly difficult to manufacture
in a basement workshop with tools that can be obtained at a hardware
store. 
1 93
The vigorous attempt to enforce domestic disarmament would
entail systematic violations of fundamental rights enjoyed by Ameri-
can citizens. Even if it proved possible to catch and prosecute only a
small fraction of the projected number of those who would refuse to
comply with registration or relinquishment requirements, both the
courts and the nation's jails would almost certainly be overloaded.1 94
Attempted enforcement of domestic disarmament would also likely re-
sult in law enforcement oppression, corruption, resistance, or rebel-
lion (depending upon the officer)'95 This, in turn, could very well
lead to a breakdown in respect for the law and the institutions that
make it.1
96
There is an alarming potential for violence that would result from
a serious attempt to disarm Americans. Many Americans are already
preparing to meet force with force should gun prohibition laws be
passed. The size of the militia movement is sure to increase should it
become clear that the federal government intended to embark upon
the wholesale disarmament of its citizens.
Domestic disarmament could be a cure worse than the disease. It
would therefore be preferable, as Bruce-Briggs suggests, to drain the
.mindless passion" out of the gun control debate1 97 and begin to dis-
cuss rationally what might realistically lead to a diminution of gun vio-
lence among a people that has historically been armed and will almost
certainly remain so.
193. See RONALD B. BROWN, HOMEMADE GUNS AND HOMEMADE AMMO (1986); BILL
HOLMES, HOME WORKSHOP GUNS FOR DEFENSE AND RESISTANCE: THE HANDGUN (1979).
194. See supra notes 115-123 and accompanying text (discussing the disobedience of as-
sault weapons owners in California, Denver, and NewJersey after thesejurisdictions passed
stringent gun control measures).
195. See supra notes 104-109 and accompanying text (discussing the resistance of Ameri-
can law enforcement personnel to disarmament).
196. It is precisely stubborn realities such as these that led former ACLU Executive Di-
rector Aryeh Neier to conclude that because "reprehensible police practices are probably
needed to make anti-gun laws effective, my proposal to ban all guns should probably be
marked a failure before it is even tried." Hardy & Chotiner, supra note 130, at 194.
197. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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III. VIRTUE AND COMMUNITY MILITIAS
The Communitarian Network's platform argues that the Second
Amendment does not protect an individual right to keep and bear
arms, but rather only the existence of "community militias," which the
Network equates with the National Guard.19 For this assertion, Et-
zioni relies largely upon an essay by historian Lawrence Delbert
Cress. 99 This reliance is appropriate, as Cress's article is one of the
few historical pieces in the last twenty years written by an academic
and published in a' scholarly journal that concludes the Second
Amendment is not an individual right. 00 Cress reasons that because
the discussion surrounding the ratification of the Second Amendment
focused mainly on the necessity of protecting the institution of the
militia, a community rather than an individual right is guaranteed in
the Second Amendment.20 1
This community-only view has serious problems. Because this
view is exclusively propounded by gun control advocates who wish to
remove the Second Amendment as an obstacle to gun control propos-
als, no community-rights theorist has explained what the Second
Amendment does mean if it does not mean that people have a right to
keep and bear arms. Glenn Reynolds and Don Kates actually do inves-
tigate what the Second Amendment means if it is not a guarantee of
individual right.20 2 They demonstrate that the nonindividual view of
the Second Amendment is intellectually incoherent, °2 0  inconsistent
with Article I of the Constitution,2 0 4 and actually allows states (to the
extent that they desire) to repeal all federal gun controls within their
borders.2 5
The Communitarian Network claims to favor "community mili-
tias" rather than individual "gun slingers."2 °6 A problem arises when
the Comrmunitarian Network then advocates disarming private citi-
zens and "much of the police force."20 7 Whatever the community mi-
litia might be, it can hardly be a militia at all if its members are totally
198. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 1.
199. Id. at 10; see Lawrence Delbert Cress, An Armed Community: The Origin and Meaning
of the Right to BearArms, 71J. AM. Hisr. 22 (1984).
200. See Cress, supra note 199, at 23.
201. See id. at 29-42.
202. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds & Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States' Rights:
A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737 (1995).
203. See id. at 1741-43.
204. See id. at 1743-49.
205. See id. at 1752-53.
206. Platform, supra note 5, at 21.
207. DoMEsTiC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 9.
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disarmed. The Communitarian Network contends that the commu-
nity militia is the National Guard. So because the Second Amend-
ment guarantees some "right," do all Americans have a right to serve in
the National Guard? If the community militia is not the National
Guard, who will supply it with "arms," without which it could hardly be
the "militia" referred to in the Second Amendment? If we are to be
faithful to the Constitution, there must be some kind of militia; what
should this militia look like?
To begin to answer these questions, which the Communitarian
Network has failed to do, we turn to David C. Williams, who has de-
voted great attention to the militia's relevance in contemporary
America.2 °8
A. The Militia and Republicanism
Republicanism has gained many academic adherents in recent
years, first among historians, and more recently in the law schools.
The modern communitarian movement may even be viewed, at least
in part, as an expression of the republican philosophy.209
In his Yale Law Journal article, entitled Civic Republicanism and the
Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second Amendment,2 10 Williams takes a
"modern, republican" look at the Second Amendment.21 He agrees
with the communitarians that America has become a fragmented soci-
ety and that a sense of the importance of civic duty, such as that mani-
fested during the early days of the republic, needs to be restored
among the American people.212 "Republicanism appeals to many be-
cause it emphasizes community over separation and public dialogue
over strict autonomy."2 13 Thus, a "neorepublican" America would be
one in which communitarian values would take hold among the
American populace, leading away from the atomized society that the
Communitarian Network and other advocates of the common good
decry.
Williams acknowledges that true republics have citizen militias.
Under republican theory, the militia
208. See Williams, supra note 6.
209. See Spragens, supra note 192, at 37-38. Spragens refers to the movement as a "twen-
tieth century legatee of the civic Republican tradition." Id. at 37; see also ROBERT BOOTH
FOWLER, THE DANCE WITH COMMUNITY: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE IN AMERICAN POUTICAL
THOUGHT 63-79 (1991) (determining that the ideal republican community is encapsulated
in "civil virtue").
210. Williams, supra note 6.
211. Id. at 552.
212. Id. at 570.
213. Id. at 562.
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constituted a forum in which state and society met and
melded, and this combination offered some advantages for
curbing corruption. If the evil of partiality touched a seg-
ment of the population, then the militia-constituted as an
instrument of the state-could restrain any movement to-
ward demagogic rebellion. But if the state became corrupt,
then the militia-now constituted as "the people"-could re-
sist despotism. Indeed, the line between state and people
ideally disappeared in the militia, in that the militia mem-
bers were both the rulers and the ruled. 14
Furthermore, the militia "offered training in virtue, making citizens
independent and self-sacrificing."215 It also "allowed citizens to par-
ticipate directly in their own self-government, not just through the
process of representation, and it consigned to them ultimate control
of the means of force."216
Thus, Williams understands that the right to arms as guaranteed
by the Second Amendment is a reference to the right of the people
themselves to act as a popular militia, notjust to "have" a professional,
select militia such as the National Guard. Nevertheless, he is not
ready to say that community militias such as those that existed in the
eighteenth century should be restored: "In republican theory, only a
virtuous citizen militia can be entrusted with the means of force to
resist state authority, but citizens will not be virtuous until they are
already participating in policy making under a republican form of
government. '217 This state of affairs, Williams argues, no longer exists
in America i.2 1  American citizens are generally too preoccupied with
self-interest and too far removed in their political thinking from the
republicanism that reigned in eighteenth-century America.2 19 They
can no longer be trusted to be virtuous.220 Furthermore, today's so-
214. Id. at 554. Even the promilitia Resister is concerned about the composition of the
civilian militia and the potential for "demagogic rebellion" when it devolves into rag-tag
bands of armed people:
The unorganized militia is the armed citizenry at large. This arrangement is not
only rational, it is essential, for without legitimate authority any demagogue could
form a "militia," which in practice would be little more than a local armed gang.
Therein lies the inherent danger of the militia movement and the reason the
Special Forces Underground will not commit its assets indiscriminately.
J.FAL Davidson, On Militia, REsiSTER, Spring 1995, at 1, 19.
215. Williams, supra note 6, at 602.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 605.
218. Id. at 607-08. "Conditions have so changed, however, that the new militia could not
generate all of the benefits of the old-although it might produce some." Id.
219. Id. at 602-05.
220. Id.
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called "militia" is not universal (though Williams admits that militia
participation never was). Guns are owned by only a "slice" of the
American populace,2 21 and that segment of society cannot seriously be
considered America's militia for a number of reasons, the chief of
which is that "a modem militia would be a reflection of modem
America-divided and driven by self-interest."22 2 Because America
has drifted from its republican moorings, the Second Amendment to-
day is not only "embarrassing," it is "terrifying."22 ' Thus, Williams
concludes, because the militia does not exist, the Second Amendment
poses no obstacle to current gun control laws.22 4
As a practical matter, gun ownership is not confined to a mere
"slice" of the American population; guns are possessed in roughly half
of all households.225 As a matter of current constitutional policy, Wil-
liams's argument runs into one insurmountable obstacle: the lan-
guage of the Second Amendment itself.22 6 The Second Amendment
does not say that "the militia" has a "right to keep and bear arms";
rather, "the people" have the right. The introductory, subordinate
phrase of the Second Amendment ("A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State") does not, grammatically,
limit the scope of the right in the main clause ("the right of the peo-
ple to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"). Parsing the Sec-
ond Amendment carefully can lead to no other result.22 7
221. Id. at 554.
222. Id. at 608. Williams's article was published before, and therefore makes no refer-
ence to, the rise of the civilian militias described above. See supra notes 134-138 and accom-
panying text. Williams would doubtless point to these militias as proof that there really is
no true militia in America today and that Americans are "divided and driven by self-inter-
est"-the divisions being those of the left, the right, and everything in between, and the
self-interest consisting of the interest on the part of the gun culture to remain armed on
one hand and, on the other, the desire of those who eschew the idea of gun ownership to
be "safe" from guns. See infra note 237.
If Americans are divided and driven by self-interest on the gun issue, it is partly be-
cause the government has departed so far from the republicanism of the Founders and
have opted, instead, for the idea of the state as the chief guarantor of "security." The right-
wing militias, as wild-eyed and wrong-headed as they often are, at least stand closer to the
communal republican tradition Williams wants to see revived than do those who would
cede the means of force to those government forces they believe will remain beneficent.
223. Williams, supra note 6, at 553.
224. Id. at 615.
225. See KLECK, supra note 40, at 51-52 Tbl. 2.2.
226. See supra note 8.
227. In a passage cited by the Supreme Court as one of the many "important opinions
and comments" on the militia, nineteenth-century commentator Thomas Cooley wrote:
"The alternative to a standing army is 'a well-regulated militia'; but this cannot exist unless
the people are trained to bearing arms." THOMAS COOLEY, CONSTrTrrIoNAL LIMITATIONS
729 (Walter Carrington ed., 8th ed. 1927), cited in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 182
n.3 (1939). Cooley also wrote:
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Moreover, the Second Amendment right cannot be dependent on
government action for its continued existence, any more than the
First Amendment right to freedom of speech can be contingent on
The ight is Genera!-It may be supposed from the phraseology of this provision
that the right to keep and bear arms was only guaranteed to the militia; but this
would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent .... [I]f the right were
limited to those enrolled [by law in the militia], the purpose of this guaranty
might be defeated altogether by the action or neglect to act of the government it
was meant to hold in check. The meaning of the provision undoubtedly is, that
the people, from whom the militia must be taken, shall have the right to keep and
bear arms, and they need no permission or regulation of law for the purpose.
THOMAS COOLEY, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 282 (2d ed. 1891):
Stephen Halbrook observes that the Second Amendment may be stated in the form of
a hypothetical syllogism: "If a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free
state . . . then the right to the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
HALBROOK, supra note 148, at 85. If, for argument's sake, a civilian "well-regulated militia"
is no longer "necessary to the preservation of a free State," it does not logically follow that
"the right of the people to keep and bear arms" may be now infringed. To so conclude
would be to commit the fallacy of denying the antecedent. In illustrating the fallacious
logic entailed in denying the antecedent, an analogous but simpler syllogism may be used:
"If it is raining, there are clouds. It is not raining. Therefore, there are no clouds." The
conclusion is obviously fallacious, for there may in fact be clouds even though it is not
raining.
The Cato Institute's Sheldon Richman parses as follows:
Approaching the sentence as grammarians, we immediately note two things:
the simple subject is "right" and the full predicate is "shall not be infringed."
This, in other words, is a sentence about a right that is already assumed to exist.
It does not say, "The people shall have a right to keep and bear arms ...."
That has important implications for the opening militia phrase .... Gun
opponents often argue that if the opening phrase does not apply-if, say, the
standing army takes the place of the militia-then the right to keep and bear
arms is nullified. That view would require a willingness by the framers of the
Constitution to agree to this statement: If a well-regulated militia is not necessary
to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
(or may) be infringed. But it is absurd to think that the Framers would embrace
that statement. Their political philosophy would not permit them to speak of a
permissible infringement of rights .... The term infringement implies a lack of
consent ....
If [the Framers'] concern had been to keep the national government from
limiting the states' power to form militias, they might have written: "A well-regu-
lated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the power of the States
to form and control militias shall not be limited."
Sheldon Richman, What the Second Amendment Means, FREEDOM DAILY, OCL 1995, at 28, 29-
31. Richman also explains that nullifying the opening clause does not nullify the entire
sentence: "Imagine a long-lost Constitution that stated: 'The earth being flat, the right of
the people to abstain from ocean travel shall not be infringed.' Would anyone seriously
argue that discovery of the earth's spherical shape would justify compelling people to sail?"
Id. at 30.
Neil Schulman, an award-winning science fiction writer from southern California, and
also a writer on gun control issues, asked professional grammarians what the Second
Amendment meant and obtained the same result. SeeJ. NEIL SCHULMAN, STOPPING POWER:
WHiY 70 MILLION AMERICANS OWN GUNS 151-59 (1994).
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the government's teaching people to read virtuous books. Fundamen-
tally, the Founders saw rights, including the right to arms, as being
recognized by the government rather than granted by the govern-
ment."2 8 The (justifiable) fear that the federal government would ne-
glect militia training, and thereby increase the relative power of the
federal standing army, was an important objection of the Anti-Federal-
ists.229 That Anti-Federalist predictions have come true today to a
great degree is hardly an argument for eviscerating the Second
Amendment (or any of the other checks on the federal government
that the Anti-Federalists successfully demanded be added to the
Constitution).
The grammatical result is also consistent with original intent.
The natural right to arms had the purpose of facilitating resistance to
both criminal governments and individual criminals. Against a lone
criminal, an individual gun owner might use her firearm by herself,
rather than as part of a militia. The subordinate clause of the Second
Amendment was certainly never intended to abrogate the common
law and natural right to self-defense against criminal attack.230
228. See generaUy Don B. Kates,Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-Protection,
9 CoNsr. COMMENTARY 87 (1992) (discussing the natural law philosophers who influenced
the Founders in the belief that it is man's right and duty to engage in self-defense).
For example, in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), the United States
Supreme Court noted that the right to peaceably assemble derives "'from those laws whose
authority is acknowledged by civilized man throughout the world.' It is found wherever
civilization exists." Id. at 551-53 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211
(1824)). For a more detailed discussion of Cruikshank, see infra notes 476-489 and accom-
panying text.
229. This objection was articulated by George Mason, who, at the Virginia Convention
to ratify the Constitution, stated:
The militia may be here destroyed by that method which has been practised in
other parts of the world before; that is, by rendering them useless-by disarming
them. Under various pretences, Congress may neglect to provide for arming and
disciplining the militia....
But we need not give them power to abolish our militia. If they neglect to
arm them, and prescribe proper discipline, they will be of no use.
George Mason, Speech in Virginia Convention (June 14, 1788), in Martin, supra note 153,
at 401-02.
Patrick Henry echoed this sentiment: "If Congress neglect[s] or refuse[s] to disci-
pline or arm our militia, they will be useless .... " Patrick Henry, Speech in Virginia
Convention (June 5, 1788), in id. at 374.
230. See Kates, supra note 228, at 87. Kates supplies quotations from or references to
William Blackstone, the Baron de Montesquieu, John Locke, Algernon Sidney, John
Trenchard and Walter Moyle (authors of Cato's Letters), Thomas Paine, Timothy Dwight,
John Barlow, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison, among others. See id. at 89-101. As
Kates demonstrates, the right to defense against a criminal government was simply seen as
an instance of the natural right to resistance against individual criminals. See id. at 89-90.
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Moreover, Williams's proposals for current substitutes for the mi-
litia, designed to restore healthy republicanism, are problematic. Wil-
liams favors the creation of "militia surrogates"-universal national
service, for example.2" ' Yet, as Professor Akhil Amar points out,
mandatory service in a federal standing army (or other enforced fed-
eral labor) is antithetical to the very notion of a local, state-based mili-
tia as a check on federal power. 32 In republican theory, one of the
key "virtues" of the militiaman was his independence; he had his own
means of support and was not dependent on or submissive to the gov-
ernment. He was wholly opposite to the federal conscript, who, under
republican theory, by virtue of his submission to and dependence on
the central government, was morally degraded.2"'
Williams does not dismiss the idea of a civilian militia as an ideal
to someday be reinstituted. He specifically notes the role the militia
historically played in the inculcation of public virtue and political par-
ticipation, as well as in the preservation of liberty.234 "Eventually," Wil-
liams concludes, "the people should reacquire direct control of the
means of force, but only when the right structures offer them an op-
portunity for virtue."235 In short, Williams takes the Constitution seri-
ously. Unlike virtually every other person who reads the Second
Amendment as not guaranteeing an individual right, he gives the Sec-
ond Amendment a content that makes it meaningful.
Williams's article is not, however, without its weaknesses. First, it
is not intuitively obvious that Americans in the 1990s are, in contrast
to their 1790s forebears, unfit to possess arms. Americans of the 1990s
are considerably less racist and sexist than their predecessors.236 They
have not only abolished slavery (present in twelve of the thirteen
231. Williams, supra note 6, at 610-12. Williams describes this concept as service ren-
dered by youths from different backgrounds brought together for a common, not necessar-
ily military, experience. Id. at 610. He notes the most significant problem as
totalitarianism if service is mandatory. Id. at 611.
232. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights As a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1165
(1991).
233. See id. at 1169-70.
234. Williams, supra note 6, at 602.
235. Id. at 615.
236. Slavery impaired civic virtue not just because it excluded slaves from the polity, but
because of the degrading effect that slavery had on whites. As Thomas Jefferson wrote:
There must doubtless be an unhappy influence on the manners of our people
produced by the existence of slavery among us. The whole commerce between
master and slave is a perpetual exercise of the most boisterous passions, the most
unremitting despotism on the one part, and degrading submissions on the other.
Our children see this, and learn to imitate it; for man is an imitative animal. This
quality is the germ of all education in him. From his cradle to his grave he is
learning to do what he sees others do.
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states when the Constitution was ratified), but they have also extended
full civil equality to persons of all races and both sexes. Such a
broadly inclusive view of the community was unimaginable in the
1790s, and modem Americans deserve some credit for having had the
virtue to achieve it.
The suggestion that changed circumstances allow one to ignore,
rather than amend, a provision of the Constitution ought, at the very
least, to be accompanied by compelling proof of dramatic changes in
circumstances. Given that human nature remains relatively constant,
it is far from proven that modem Americans are far less virtuous than
Americans of two hundred or one hundred years ago.23 7
THOMAS JEFFERSON, Manners, in NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 162 (William Peden ed.,
University of North Carolina Press 1982) (1782).
237. In The Militia Movement and Second Amendment Revolution: Conjuring with the People,
81 CORNLL L REv. 879 (1996), David C. Williams elaborates his thesis that "the People"
on which the Second Amendment is contingent have ceased to exist. "The People" were,
in Williams's idealized republican conception, ethnically homogeneous, unified, and civi-
cally virtuous, able to act decisively to overthrow a tyrant. Id. at 904-09. In contrast, mod-
em, pluralistic, diverse Americans are a mere collection of individuals. Ironically, the
political divisiveness that is allegedly fomented by the "individual rights" analysis of the
Second Amendment is itself a barrier to the unified polity on which the Second Amend-
ment must be predicated. Id. at 951-52.
Williams deserves credit for engaging the individual rights/insurrectionary (that is,
the historical) basis of the Second Amendment in a serious manner, a dialogic responsibil-
ity none of the other critics of the Second Amendment even attempts to fulfill. Neverthe-
less, Williams's Cornell Law Review piece, like his Yale Lawjournal piece, see supra note 6, still
falls short of successfully explaining the Second Amendment into nothing.
The most important reason is that his description of the idealized, united "the People"
on which the Second Amendment is said to depend is ahistorical. "The People"-in the
sense of militia-eligible people-may have all been free white males, but this hardly means
that they were homogenous, or that they felt they had much in common with each other.
In contrast, modem Americans share a national media, a national economy, and easy inter-
state travel. As John Adams wrote:
The Colonies had grown up under constitutions of government so different,
there was so great a variety of religions, they were composed of so many different
nations, their customs, manners, and habits had so little resemblance, and their
intercourse had been so rare, and their knowledge of each other so imperfect,
that to unite them in the same principles in theory and the same system of action,
was certainly a very difficult enterprise.
X THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: WITH A LIFE OF
THE AuTHOR 283 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1850-56), quoted in Anne Husted Burleigh,
John Adams 54-55 (1969).
The American Revolution was not the work of a united polity that rose as one against a
tyrant. John Adams estimated that only a third of the population supported the Revolu-
tion, with another third opposed, and one-third neutral. See HowARD ZIN, A PEOPLE'S
HisroR OF THE UNITED STATES 76 (1980).
Williams insists that a revolution conducted pursuant to the precepts of the Second
Amendment must be "made by an orderly and unified people according to commonly
shared norms and understandings." Williams, supra, at 951. The American Revolution was
no such revolution, so why should a Second Amendment revolution have to be? What
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Ratification of the right to arms was not a single act from two
hundred years ago. From Kentucky to Alaska, almost every state that
has entered the Union has included a right to bear arms provision in
its state constitution."3 8 During the 1980s four states without that type
of provision added one by popular vote,239 one added the provision by
brought together one-third of the American population from 1776 to 1781 was not a com-
mon religion or common ethnic heritage or a similar worldview. What the revolutionary
minority of the population had in common was a belief that King George was taking away
their ancient rights-what they called "the rights of Englishmen." If there is ever a Second
Amendment revolution in this country, it will be because a very large fraction of the Ameri-
can population becomes so convinced that the federal government is taking away the tradi-
tional rights of Americans-as expressed in the Constitution-and because tens of millions
of Americans are willing to take up arms, and like the revolutionary minority of 1776,
submit themselves to the immense perils of rebellion against the most powerful military in
the history of the world. It is doubtful that America will ever come to such an unhappy
state, but if the federal government one day became so oppressive that a third of the popu-
lation would risk their lives and fortunes to fight against it, the rebellion would be precisely
the act for which the Second Amendment was written.
Williams admits, briefly, that what he defines as "the People" may never have existed
in 1776, let alone in the early republic. Williams, supra, at 922, 949. Williams accuses the
Framers of making the same error as modem individual rights theorists: "conjuring with
the People." Id. at 949. Williams then suggests that modern Americans should not be
permitted to interpret the Second Amendment in precisely the same (allegedly mistaken)
way that their Framers did. Id. Why assume that the Framers were mistaken? Perhaps,
much better than late twentieth-century law professors, the Framers understood the
profound disunity of America in the late eighteenth century. (Domestic discord and bitter
rivalries between various states were one reason, after all, that the Framers felt a need to
replace the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution, and a stronger central govern-
ment.) Why presume that the Framers thought that a homogenized, unified people were
the condition precedent of the Second Amendment, when the Framers' historical experi-
ence showed that such unity did not exist, and had never existed?
Even if one accepts Williams's argument that "the People" imagined by the authors of
the Second Amendment are wholly different from the people of the United States today,
he has not made his case. The Constitution also refers to "the House of Representatives,"
and that collective body today is radically different from the House of Representatives that
the Framers envisioned. Like the American people, from which the House is drawn, the
modem House is far more diverse racially, ethnically, and religiously than its 1792 ances-
tor. The civic virtue that the Framers intended to be represented in the House has been
replaced by party factions and by career office holders, both of which were anathema to
the Framers.
What if one could prove beyond any doubt that today's House resembles in name only
the House of virtue that the Framers envisioned as the foundation of Article I? Would
such proof be the slightest reason for a court or a scholar to assert that the modem House
no longer has constitutional authority to exercise the powers granted it by the Constitu-
tion? Under a written Constitution, "the People," like "the House of Representatives," can-
not be divested of their constitutional rights by pointing out how they have changed,
arguably for the worse, over the last two centuries.
238. See infra note 390 (setting forth a sampling of the constitutional provisions of those
states guaranteeing the right to bear arms).
239. See NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1 (affirming the right to bear arms for defense of self and
family, for the common defense, and for hunting and recreation; adopted Nov. 8, 1988 by
general election); NEv. CONsr. art. 1, § 11 (affirming the right to keep and bear arms for
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240legislative action, while Utah strengthened the language of an ex-
isting provision.24 At the federal level, the Freedmen's Bureau Bill,
the Civil Rights Acts passed by the Reconstruction Congress, and the
Fourteenth Amendment (which, of course, was ratified by most states)
were all intended, in part, to protect the individual right to arms from
state infringement.2 42 The Property Requisition Act of 1941 and the
Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986 were enacted by Congress to
protect the gun ownership rights of American citizens.24 A "changed
circumstances" argument negating the right to arms becomes particu-
larly implausible when Congress, the states, and the American people
have repeatedly affirmed and added additional protections to that
right up through the present era.
Criticism that would cite the current militia movement as proof
that modem Americans are, compared to their ancestors, too rebel-
lious to be trusted with Second Amendment rights lacks historical sup-
port. The Second Amendment was proposed only three years after
three counties in western Massachusetts had erupted against oppres-
sive state taxes and heavy-handed sheriffs in "Shays' Rebellion."244
security, defense, lawful hunting, and recreation; adopted Nov. 2, 1982 by general elec-
tion); N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2-a ("All persons have the right to keep and bear arms in
defense of themselves, their families, their property and the state."); W. VA. CONST. art. III,
§ 22 (affirming the right of citizens to bear arms for defense of family, self, and state and
for recreation, and hunting; ratified Nov. 4, 1986).
240. See DEL. CONST. art. I, § 20 (affirming the right to keep and bear arms for "defense
of self, family, home and state, and for hunting and recreational use": adopted Apr. 16,
1987).
241. Compare UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The individual right of the people to keep and
bear arms for security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as
for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed . . . ."), with UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6
(amended 1984), quoted in Robert Dowlut &Janet A. Knoop, State Constitutions and the Right
to Keep and Bear Arms, 7 OKLA. Crr U. L. REv. 177, app. at 240 (1982) ("The people have
the right to bear arms for their security and defense.... ."). See generally M. Truman Hunt,
Comment, The Individual Right to Bear Arms: An Illusoy Public Pacifier, 1986 UTAH L. REv.
751 (discussing the 1984 amendment to Article I, Section 6 of the Utah Constitution and
concluding that the state retains broad discretion to regulate arms).
242. See infra notes 466-475 and accompanying text.
243. See Stephen Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment: Declarations by a Co-
Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. REv. 597, 599 (1995).
244. See MoRISoN, supra note 101, at 301-04; Alden T. Vaughan, The "Horrid and Unnatu-
ral Rebellion" of Daniel Shays, AM. HERITAGE, June 1966, at 50, 50-53, 77-81. Shays's list of
grievances for which the people, "now at arms," demanded reforms dealt mostly with taxes
and other financial issues. See Letter from Thomas Grover to the "Printer of the Hamp-
shire Herald" (Dec. 7, 1786), reprinted in THE TREE OF LIBER Y A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF REBELLION AND POLITICAL CRIME IN AMERICA 71-72 (Nichols N. Kittrie & Eldon D. Wed-
lock, Jr. eds., 1986). There were also complaints about the suspension of habeas corpus
and the "unlimited power" granted to law enforcement officers by the Riot Act. See id. The
last of eight reforms demanded by the Shaysites was that "Deputy Sheriffs [be] totally set
aside, as a useless set of officers in the community." Id. at 72.
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Three years after the Second Amendment was ratified, parts of Vir-
ginia (today, West Virginia) and western Pennsylvania revolted against
high federal taxes on whiskey.245 President Washington exercised his
power to call forth the militia to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion, the
local militia responded, and the insurrection was crushed.246
Despite some limitations, Williams does get to the heart of the
primary question that the Second Amendment poses: what can be
done to promote responsible gun ownership. As he recognizes, the mi-
litia, in its republican conception, was similar to the jury.247 While the
jury right was (and is) exercised by individuals (individual defendants
claiming a right to a jury trial, or individual Americans claiming a
right not to be excluded from ajury pool), the jury comes together as
a collective body. This collective body is at once an instrument of
state power (the criminal justice system) and at the same time a check
on state power. Thus, for the same reasons that the Communitarian
Network exalts service in the jury, the Communitarian Network ought
to be looking for ways to encourage service in well-regulated militias.
Domestic disarmament will obviously not build "a well-regulated mili-
tia" any more than getting rid of trial by jury would encourage respon-
sible jury service.
If, on the other hand, Williams is correct that Americans have so
little virtue that they cannot participate in communal institutions such
as the militia,2 48 then the argument can be made that modem Ameri-
cans likewise lack the virtue to serve on juries, making decisions that
involve life and death, millions of dollars, or decades of imprison-
ment. Yet who among even the most severe critics of the contempo-
rary jury system would suggest that the constitutional right to a jury
trial can simply be ignored due to changed circumstances?
The communitarians are correct that responsibilities should ac-
company rights, or as Williams frames the issue, the early republicans
were correct in believing that public virtue is necessary if the republic
is to survive with its liberties intact.249 If, as the Founders intended,
245. See MORISON, supra note 101, at 340-41.
246. See id. at 341. Western farmers needed to distill their corn into whiskey in order to
shrink it for transportation for sale. See Gerald Carson, Watermelon Armies and Whiskey Boys,
in RIOT, RouT, AND TUMULT: READINGS IN AMERICAN SOCIAL AND POLMCAL VIOLENCE 70, 72
(Roger Lane & John J. Turner, Jr. eds., 1978) [hereinafter RIOT, ROUT, AND TUMULT].
Virginians and Pennsylvanians were angry that the whiskey tax bore so one-sidedly on
them, and that it was enforced so rigorously by the federal government. See id. at 71. One
year after the insurrection, George Washington pardoned two captured rebel leaders. See
MORISON, supra note 101, at 341.
247. Williams, supra note 6, at 579 n.161 (citing Amar, supra note 232, at 1191-95).
248. Id. at 554.
249. Id. at 553.
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the people were to remain armed, then it would also be necessary to
instill in them the highest degree of virtue in order to minimize fire-
arms misuse. How might public policy contribute to the rebirth of the
kind of virtue and familiarity with firearms that the Founders believed
necessary to an enduring republic? Is it possible to take the first steps
toward the revitalization of the citizen militia?
B. Toward Well-Regulated Militias
Williams appears to be of two minds. On the one hand, he wants
the American people to prove themselves largely virtuous before they
should be trusted with arms. On the other hand, he acknowledges the
truth of the Founders' belief that the historical militia "offered training
in virtue, making citizens independent and self-sacrificing."25 ° A good
militia is not just an effect of public virtue, but a builder of virtue as
well. Thus, it is appropriate to begin by considering policies that will
eventually help citizens to be more virtuous and responsible with
firearms.
1. What "A Well-Regulated Militia"Is Not.-Before we suggest how
to progress toward a well-regulated militia, we should explain what a
militia is not. Though the word "militia" likely evokes images of
armed, camouflaged right-wingers who train in anticipation of fight-
ing the troops of the "New World Order," this is not what is meant
here. What is meant is a true citizen militia, as was common in the
eight-eenth and nineteenth centuries. The Supreme Court has stated
that the militia is composed of "civilians primarily" 5' and that "all
citizens capable of bearing arms constitute the reserved military force
or reserve militia of the United States." 252
As uniformed, armed bodies of government employees, some-
times subject to federal command, the modern National Guard and
the modern police would both have been seen by the Founders as
close cousins to the dreaded "standing army." To the Founders, "se-
lect militias" (comprising only a small fraction of "the people") and
standing armies were thought to constitute the threat to liberty par
excellence.253 The same Congress that passed the Bill of Rights, includ-
250. Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
251. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939).
252. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (holding that the Military Code of Illi-
nois, fairly construed, does not conflict with the laws of Congress regarding militias).
253. Richard Henry Lee, writing under the pseudonym "The Federal Farmer," articu-
lated this fear of select militias and standing armies:
First, the constitution ought to secure a genuine and guard against a select mili-
tia, by providing that the militia shall always be kept well organized, armed, and
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ing the Second Amendment and its militia language, also passed the
Uniform Militia Act of 1792.254 That Act enrolled all able-bodied,
white males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five in the militia
and required them to furnish their own firearms, ammunition, and
gunpowder.2 55 The modem federal National Guard was specifically
raised under Congress's power to "raise and support Armies, "256 not
under its power to "[p]rovide for organizing, arming, and disciplin-
ing, the Militia. '2 57 The National Guard's weapons plainly cannot be
the arms protected by the Second Amendment, because Guard weap-
ons are owned by the federal government.2 58 To call the National
Guard the militia of the Second Amendment is an Orwellian inversion
of meaning.
We should also explain what "well-regulated" is not. The Second
Amendment's phrase "a well-regulated militia" is sometimes said to
mean something akin to "a militia subject to large amounts of bureau-
cratic regulation."259 Hence, gun controls not amounting to prohibi-
tion would be permissible restrictions on the well-regulated militia.
The colonial political usage of the phrase "well-regulated militia"
also suggests that the word "regulated" was not an invitation to bu-
reaucracy. Before independence was even declared, Josiah Quincy,
Jr., had argued for the necessity of "a well regulated militia composed
disciplined, and include, according to the past and general usuage [sic] of the
states, all men capable of bearing arms; and that all regulations tending to render
this general militia useless and defenceless, by establishing select corps of militia,
or distinct bodies of military men, not having permanent interests and attach-
ments in the community to be avoided.... [T]o preserve liberty, it is essential
that the whole body of the people always possess arms, and be taught alike, espe-
cially when young, how to use them .... The mind that aims at a select militia,
must be influenced by a truly anti-republican principle; and when we see many
men disposed to practice upon it, whenever they can prevail, no wonder true
republicans are for carefully guarding against it.
Richard Henry Lee, An Additional Number of Letters from the Federal Farmer to the
Republican, Letter No. 18 (1788), in THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note
148, at 354-55 (footnote omitted). The first sentence in the above quotation, slightly short-
ened, was included in a proposed Declaration of Rights at the NewYork Convention in July
1788. See THE ORIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 148, at 474.
254. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (repealed Jan. 21, 1903).
255. See id.
256. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
257. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16; seeJeffrey A.Jacobs, Note, Reform of the National Guard:
A Proposal to Strengthen the National Defense, 78 GEO. L.J. 625, 626-32 (1990) (tracing the
historical, constitutional, and statutory evolution of the National Guard).
258. See 32 U.S.C. §§ 105(a)(4), 106 (1959 & Supp. 1997).
259. See Greg Cantrell, "Well-Regulated"Key Term in Second Amendmen AusTIN AM.-STATES-
MAN, May 1, 1995, at All, available in 1995 WL 6091052.
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of the freeholders, citizen and husbandman, who take up arms to pre-
serve their property as individuals, and their rights as freemen."2 60
We should also note the particular meaning that the word "regu-
lated" has in relation to firearms. In firearms parlance, "regulating" a
gun has the same meaning today that it did centuries ago: adjusting
the weapon so that successive shots hit as close as possible together. If
the objective is achieved, the gun is "well-regulated." For example, an
article that appeared in Gun Digest concerning double-barreled rifles
notes: "The well-regulated double [rifle] shoots closely enough with
both barrels to hit an animal at normal ranges. '"261
260. CLINTON ROSSITER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 127
(1963) (quotingJosiah Quincy, Jr., at the time of the Coercive Acts).
261. Howard E. French, Double Rifles Had Glamour, in GUN DIGEST 70, 73 (Ken Warner
ed., 43d ed. 1989). The article continues:
[T]hese 8-bore bullets regulated perfectly ....
When people speak of how double rifles group they always mention "regulat-
ing." The barrels of double rifles are not parallel, the bores are angled from rear
to front. If the barrels were aligned side-by-side, the right barrel would shoot to
the right and the left barrel to the left. To align the barrels of a double rifle they
are fastened at the breech while the muzzles are held in a device that allows the
barrels to be moved by wedges or by re-soldering until the bullets from both bar-
rels shoot properly. Only then are the muzzles permanently affixed. The regulat-
ing of a double is simple in theory but difficult in practice. Probably most double
rifles were regulated to shoot in the tropics, using Cordite, where temperatures
could run as high as 120 degrees.
Id.
The Rfle Guide notes: "All of these [older, larger, black-powder, British] double rifles
are regulated for a given bullet weight and a specific powder charge. Regulating, in this
instance, means that both barrels will shoot very close together." RA STEINDLER, RIFLE
GUIDE 96 (1978).
The following illustrate some additional uses of the term "regulated": "Guns like the
now obsolete Paradox, 'Jungle Gun,' 'Explora,' 'Fauneta' and other similar 'ball and shot
guns' were regulated for heavy bullets." Jack Lott, Double Gun Actions, in BAsIC GUN REPAIR
56, 57 (Hans Tanner ed., 1973).
Luckily, "most old pairs of barrels will have been regulated during manufacture so no
additional adjustments will be necessary." WILLIAM R. BROCKWAY, RECREATING THE DOUBLE
BARREL MUZZLE-LoADING SHOTGUN 180 (1985).
The Firearms Dictionary does not define the term "regulated," but does define "regulat-
ing barrels" as "a tedious job needed to make both barrels of a side-by-side or O/U [over
and under] gun shoot to the same point." R.A. STEINDLER, THE FREARMS DICrIONARY 193
(1970).
The definition of "regulate" as "[a] Iter or control with reference to some standard or
purpose; adjust (a clock or other machine) so that the working may be accurate" dates
back to the middle of the seventeenth century. II THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 2530 (3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter NEW SHORTER OxFoRD ENGLISH DICrIONARY].
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Thus, a well-regulated militia would be an effective citizen militia
whose members hit their targets. 262 Government efforts to make the
militia well-regulated would seem permissible, whereas regulations
that did not promote militia quality would be suspect. Let us now
examine some particular programs that could promote a well-regu-
lated militia.
2. The Civilian Marksmanship Program.-One easy starting point
for the promotion of a well-regulated militia-because it exists al-
ready-is the Civilian Marksmanship program. The Director of Civil-
ian Marksmanship program (DCM), created through the efforts of
Theodore Roosevelt, is the federal government's attempt to educate
the public about gun safety and marksmanship.263
DCM training takes place according to congressional directive
and receives federal financial and resource support.264 Most training
is conducted at gun clubs that have been certified as DCM partici-
pants.2 65 The DCM training program involves rifles only.
2 66
One purpose of the program is to provide the armed forces with
recruits that have firearms training upon enlistment.267 Nevertheless,
the fraction of the civilian population (including the DCM popula-
tion) thatjoins the military is small enough that the DCM may not be
cost-effective from a purely military perspective. Enhancing the stand-
ing army, however, is not the only purpose of the DCM.
The DCM serves another purpose. Because the American people
constitute, as the Supreme Court states, "the reserved military force or
reserve militia of the United States,"2 68 the DCM is one of the key ways
262. "Regulated" can be used in a similar manner regarding the "accurizing" of other
items. For example, one could speak of "regulating" a grandfather clock so that it keeps
proper time. See NEw SHORTER OxFORD ENGLISH DICrIONARv, supra note 261, at 2530.
263. See Civilian Marksmanship: Promotion of Practice with Rifled Arms, Army Reg.
920-20 (Mar. 19, 1990) [hereinafter Civilian Marksmanship].
264. Cf Vaughn R. Croft, Editorial, Marksmanship Program Was and Is Needed, Helpful,
PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, Ill.), May 14, 1995, at Al3, available in 1995 WL 5242973 ("The
Civilian Marksmanship Program trains youth in body, soul and mind in the ideals of re-
sponsible citizenship. Teddy Roosevelt wanted youth to learn the ideals of telling the truth
and shooting straight.").
265. See Civilian Marksmanship, supra note 263, at 7.
266. See id. at 3.
267. See id. "The purpose of the [DCM] is to promote practice in the use of rifled arms
by citizens... subject to induction into the U.S. Armed Forces." Id. A federal study found
that, to the extent DCM participants do enlist in the armed forces, they were much better
marksmen. See ARTHUR D. LrrTLE, INC., A STUDY OF THE AcTvPriEs AND MISSIONS OF THE
NBPRP [NATIONAL BOARD FOR THE PROMOTION OF RIFLE PRACTICE], REPORT TO THE DEPART-
MENT OF THE ARMY, No. C-67431 (Jan. 1966).
268. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886).
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in which the federal government carries out Article I, Section 8,
Clause 16 of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress "[t]o pro-
vide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for gov-
erning such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the
United States." 269 Of course, other benefits are reaped from the pro-
gram as well: Americans learn how to handle firearms safely and com-
petently, and the program is an implicit affirmation of every
American's responsibility to further the common good.
The real opposition to the DCM comes not from deficit hawks,
but from the most determined congressional allies of the antigun lob-
bies.27" From their viewpoint, the DCM does send the wrong
message-civilians are not only entitled, but they are encouraged to be-
come proficient users of rifles such as the M-1 Garand. 27 ' From the
viewpoint of persons (including communitarians) that want a genuine
well-regulated militia, however, the DCM sends the message that
American gun owners should be educated in the safe and responsible
use of firearms and in their duty to assist in the common defense.272
3. Other Marksmanship and Safety Training Programs.-There are
many potential marksmanship programs that could be implemented
to extend responsible marksmanship training far beyond the federal
DCM program. With the exception of gun prohibitionists, most par-
ties to the gun debate would agree that the better trained gun owners
are, the better off society is. Individuals who practice shooting with
their friends at target ranges are the most likely to be influenced by
social models of responsible gun use. City dwellers, who may buy a
gun for self-protection and never learn how to fire it safely, could par-
ticularly benefit from marksmanship and safety training programs. 7 '
269. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
270. SeeJohn Mintz, M-1 Rifle Giveaway Riles Gun Control Proponents, PLAIN DEALER (Cleve-
land), May 9, 1996, at 14A, available in 1996 WL 3550238.
271. See id.
272. As a result of recently enacted legislation, the DCM program will no longer require
a federal subsidy. The program will be turned over to a private, nonprofit institution that
will fund the DCM through donations, and from the sale of obsolete army rifles to partici-
pants. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106,
110 Stat. 186 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 36 U.S.C. and 10 U.S.C.). If the
rifles were not sold, the federal government would have to bear the expense of storing
them or destroying them.
273. Roy Innis, National Chairman of the Congress on Racial Equality, noted: "Another
irony of oppressive gun control laws is that as decent citizens are forced to arm themselves
illegally, they are less likely to practice and gain proficiency with the weapon." Roy Innis,
"Bearing Arms for Self-Defense-A Human and Civil Right," Speech (May 15, 1990) (tran-
script on file with author).
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The simplest way to promote marksmanship programs is to re-
move illogical legal impediments to such programs. In New York
State, for example, a father may not take his eleven-year-old son to a
shooting range and allow the son to shoot a rifle, even under continu-
ous parental supervision.2 74 Such laws should be repealed.
Target shooting can promote character development in a city or
school. It emphasizes mental discipline, is nonsexist, and is a lifetime
sport.275 Moreover, it is safe. Target shooting has a lower injury rate
than almost any other sport; fights between competitors are nonexis-
tent,276 and there is no known incident of one competitor harming
another in a sanctioned match. 77
Regulations that serve solely to harass adult target shooters have
no place in a rational gun control policy. The less target shooting gun
owners are allowed, the less trained and more dangerous they will be.
Zoning regulations outlawing indoor target ranges within a particular
distance of a school or a church are irrational; they simply make the
statement that guns are bad and should not exist near good
institutions.
Likewise, there is no social benefit from laws like that in New
York City, where a licensed target shooter cannot bring a guest to a
shooting range to fire even a single bullet from the licensed shooter's
gun unless the prospective guest obtains her own expensive gun per-
mit.271 Such a law is not a rational policy of gun control. It is bureau-
cratic gun prohibition, enacted simply to make a statement that the
274. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.20(a) (7) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1997) (prohibiting
children under age 12 from loading or firing a rifle or shotgun even under supervision).
275. Thomas Jefferson advised his nephew:
A strong body makes the mind strong. As to the species of exercises, I advise
the gun. While this gives a moderate exercise to the Body, it gives boldness, en-
terprise and independence to the mind. Games played with the ball, and others
of that nature, are too violent for the body and stamp no character on the mind.
Let your gun therefore be the constant companion of your walks.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr, in THE JEFFERSON CYCLOPEDIA 318 (John P.
Foley ed., 1967).
276. See Letter from M.S. Gilchrist, Director, NRA, to David B. Kopel, Research Director,
Independence Institute, Golden, Colorado 1 (Apr. 17, 1997) (on file with author). Mr.
Gilchrist states that NRA statistics "verify the contention that organized shooting is perhaps
the safest sport available to the American population. Ten years of records show that there
has not been a death or significant gun related injury having taken place during a sanc-
tioned match." Id.
277. See id.
278. See NEw YoRK, N.Y., CHARTER AND ADMINiSTRATrvE CODE § 10-303 (1996) (making it
illegal "to dispose of any rifle or shotgun to any person unless said person" holds a permit
to possess rifles and shotguns).
492 [VOL. 56:438
COMMUNITARANS, NEOREPUBLICANS, AND GUNS
government heartily disapproves of anyone other than itself having
guns.
Another simple step to encourage responsible gun use is to better
allocate funds the government already spends on civilian gun use. In
1937, Congress enacted the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act,
more commonly known as the Pittman-Robertson Act.2 79 The Act, ini-
tiated by sportsmen, levies a federal excise tax on the manufacturers,
producers, or importers of firearms, ammunition, and archery gear.
280
States receive part of the revenue based upon the ratio their popula-
tions bear to the entire United States population.2 8 1 Hunting and as-
sociated activities may receive the lion's share. 82 Putting more funds
into public shooting ranges and less into hunting would make respon-
sible gun training available and convenient for large numbers of ur-
ban gun owners.
Encouraging active sports (as opposed to mere spectating) in
which participants are not encouraged to knock down or harm each
other, and in which mental self-control is emphasized, would seem to
be an ideal communitarian program.
Beyond merely allowing sports programs, counties and states can
play a more affirmative role in promoting civic virtue relating to fire-
arms. After all, because the militia is largely a local, rather than fed-
eral, force, counties and states bear a direct responsibility for militia
oversight. Some county governments have declared by resolution the
existence of civilian militias within their jurisdictions, albeit under the
present unhappy conditions in which such resolutions are passed in
response to federal gun control legislation.28 3 There is no reason,
therefore, that these local governments, or other local governments,
279. 16 U.S.C. § 669 (1994).
280. See id. § 669b(a) (referencing §§ 4161(b) and 4181 of Title 26, which impose an
11% tax on producers, manufacturers, or importers of bows and arrows and an 11% tax on
the producers, manufacturers, or importers of firearms (other than pistols and revolvers),
shells, and cartridges, respectively).
281. See id. § 669c(b).
282. See id. § 669g(b) (allowing states to use the funds they receive pursuant to
§ 669c(b) to finance up to 75% of the costs of "hunter safety program[s] and the construc-
tion, operation, and maintenance of public target ranges, as a part of such program[s]"
provided that the states fund the remaining 25% of a specified manner).
283. One of the first county commissions to pass a militia resolution was Santa Rosa
County in Florida. See Santa Rosa County, Fla., Resolution No. 94-09 (Apr. 14, 1994). The
resolution merely restates the definition of the militia contained in Florida state law (all
able-bodied adult citizens), but invites citizens of Santa Rosa County to formally declare
themselves members of the militia, pursuant to that statutory definition. See id. Federal
gun control legislation prompted the resolution. State Commission Chairman H. Byrd
Mapoles stated: "Most folks in this county are not willing to give up their guns." Rohter,
supra note 151. The militia resolution is therefore "simply a way for us to say that Santa
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could not create firearms training programs similar to that of the
DCM. Local government oversight would also help to ensure that mi-
litias do not contain any unsavory elements.
Another way for both the state and the federal governments to
further civilian participation in the reserve militia might be to give tax
or tuition credits to those who take firearms training courses from an
accredited gun club, and subsequently provide evidence that they
have, at periodic intervals, qualified on the gun range, much as secur-
ity guards and the police do. Perhaps state governments could also
provide financial incentives to colleges and universities that offer gun
training courses as physical education electives.
4. Using the Militia to Restore Order.-It is time for a serious de-
bate on whether police forces should be supplemented (but not sup-
planted) by the civilian militia. The police should maintain their role
as protectors of the public, but obviously they cannot be everywhere at
once.
In addition to historical precedent, modern experience suggests
that the militia can make an important contribution to public safety.
In conditions of civil disaster or disorder, armed citizens have played
an important role in protecting innocent lives and preserving prop-
erty. Such was the case in the aftermath of disasters such as Hurricane
Andrew2 8 4 and the Los Angeles riots," 5 when the police or National
Guard were either unavailable or could not respond effectively. A ci-
vilian militia trained in firearms and disaster-readiness skills could
Rosa County is united and stands its ground." Id. Santa Rosa County's resolution has been
adopted by two neighboring counties. See id.
The Catron County Commission in New Mexico made explicit in its militia resolution
what the Santa Rosa County Commission did not: both the New Mexico and United States
Constitutions guarantee the right of New Mexico citizens to keep and bear arms, and
"there are forces in our country that are striving to take away our right to bear arms ....
therefore... every head of household residing in Catron County is required to maintain a
firearm of their choice, together with ammunition." Catron County, N.M., Resolution No.
007-95 (Aug. 2, 1994).
284. See Agencies Unprepared to Cope with Andrew, Storm Panel Finds, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr.
15, 1993, at 22, available in 1993 WL 9547534; Michael Fleeman, Volunteers Aid Victims of
Andrew, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRB., Sept. 6, 1992, at All, available in 1992 WL 4749291; From
Hurricane's Fury Comes Heartbreak, Help: Volunteers Working Hard at Good Works, HoUSToN
CHRON., Aug. 30, 1992, at 1, available in 1992 WL 11443165.
285. See Lynda Gorov & Tom Mashberg, Volunteers, Donations Help Residents of Riot Area,
SAN FRAN. CHRON., May 9, 1992, at AS, available in 1992 WL 6260008; Penelope McMillian,
After the Riots: The Search for Answers, LA TiMES, May 9, 1992, at 1, available in 1992 WL
2916608; Volunteers Aid L.A. Cleanup, CALGARY HERALD, May 10, 1992, at A12, available in
1992 WL 6392206.
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serve even better. 86 Indeed, riot suppression was frequently per-
formed by the militia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 7
and is one of the constitutional purposes for which the federal govern-
ment is authorized to use the militia. 8
Although Etzioni would be horrified, Glenn Harlan Reynolds
uses communitarian (albeit not Communitarian Network) reasoning
to suggest that the crime-reductive effect of using the militia could be
dramatic:
In the days prior to the invention of professional police
forces in the early part of the nineteenth century, respond-
ing to crime was not seen as vigilantism, but as a civic duty-
one backed by sanctions. The cry of "Stop Thiefl" was not
simply a cartoon cliche, but had the legal consequence of
compelling all within its hearing to aid in arresting a thief.
Individuals took turns on the "watch and ward," patrolling
cities and towns at night. Everyone was seen as having a real
stake in the maintenance of public order.
Today, with the increasing professionalization of law en-
forcement, the stock phrase is not "Stop Thief?" but "Don't
get involved." People, often encouraged by law enforcement
professionals possessing a natural desire to protect their pro-
fessional turf, have followed that advice with a vengeance....
Reversing this trend would probably do more to address our
crime problem than either compulsory handgun licensing,
or anti-assault weapon legislation.
Of course, unlike those legislative options it would re-
quire work from citizens, and from politicians, and that may
be my suggestion's biggest flaw. I have no doubt that if all
able-bodied citizens were required to put in a few days per
year walking the streets of their neighborhoods, crime would
drop substantially. Citizens could be called together for
training and equipment inspection ("mustered") and could
be required to provide themselves with the necessary equip-
286. See David D. Haddock & Daniel D. Polsby, Understanding Riots, 14 CATOJ. 147, 156-
57 (1994).
287. See, e.g., Pauline Majer, Popular Uprisings and Civil Authority in Eighteenth-Century
America, reprinted in RIOT, ROUT, AND TUMULT, supra note 246, at 38-43.
288. The Constitution empowers Congress "[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." U.S. CONsT.
art. I, § 8, cl. 15. At the Virginia Convention, James Madison cited "a riot" as one of the
situations in which the militia could be called forth. James Madison, Speech in Virginia
Convention (June 14, 1788), reprinted in THE ORIGIN OF THE SEcOND AMENDMENT, supra
note 148, at 416. Two days later, Madison reiterated: "If riots should happen, the militia
are proper to quell it, to prevent a resort to another mode [the standing army]." James
Madison, Speech in Virginia Convention (June 16, 1788), reprinted in id. at 420.
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ment, whether that included firearms or not. This would
produce direct results-in terms of law enforcement on the
streets-light-years beyond current proposals to add addi-
tional professional police, and at far lower cost. However, I
wonder whether politicians will be willing to endorse such a
requirement, in a society that struggles to get people to show
up for jury duty.
This difficulty in securing public service is one reason
why the militia system initially declined. Everyone wants to
be a free rider, and I have no illusions about the enthusiasm
of the average citizen for tramping about the streets in mid-
winter in search of crime. But the burden is not that great,
and the statutory authority for imposing it is already on the
books, both at the state and federal levels ....
We have spent the last hundred years or so expecting
steadily less from citizens in terms of public involvement and
citizen responsibilities. Not surprisingly, most citizens have
managed to live down to these expectations. Instead of try-
ing to find new ways to protect people, and society, from irre-
sponsibility through regulation, perhaps it is time to start
expecting more from people: more involvement, more re-
sponsibility, more simple goodness. We might find that peo-
ple will live up to these expectations, as they have lived down
to the current ones. The framers of our constitutions, at
both the state and federal levels, certainly thought so, and
the state of our society today suggests that they may have
known something that we have forgotten.2 8 9
Were it not for Etzioni and the Communitarian Network's antipa-
thy toward firearms, Reynolds's militia proposal might be considered
mainstream communitarianism. For example, in a book of communi-
tarian essays edited by Etzioni, each of the first three essays provides
(unintended) support for Reynolds's idea." ° Discussing jury service,
Etzioni warns that citizens cannot expect the right to ajury trial if they
are not themselves willing to undertake the responsibility of service on
ajury.291 It is impracticable, and morally indefensible, Etzioni argues,
for persons to claim benefits from communal services but not to con-
289. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Under the Tennessee Constitu-
tion: A Case Study in Civic Republican Thought, 61 TENN. L. REv. 647, 670-73 (1994).
290. See Old Chestnuts, supra note 192, at 16-34; Spragens, supra note 192, at 37-51;
Michael Walzer, The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, in NEw COMMUNiTARIAN THINKING:
PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES 52-70 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995).
291. See Old Chestnuts, supra note 192, at 20-21.
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tribute to them. 92 This point is certainly correct, and it applies just as
much to public safety as to civil dispute resolution. As communitarian
author Thomas Spragens put it: "[D]emocratic citizens should not
perceive themselves or behave as mere passive recipients of govern-
ment protection .... ,,293 The more that public safety is seen as a free
good, provided exclusively by uniformed government employees, the
less public safety will exist in the long run. In the same vein, Michael
Walzer details how "liberalism is plagued by free-rider problems, by
people who continue to enjoy the benefits of membership and iden-
tity while no longer participating in the activities that produce these
benefits."294  Communitarians are great fans of community polic-
ing,295 but simply redeploying professional safety officers misses the
larger point of getting the general public involved in public safety in
some more significant way than having a good relationship with "Of-
ficer Friendly."
There has already been some movement in the direction sug-
gested by Reynolds. "Sheriff Joe" Arpaio of Maricopa County, Ari-
zona, for example, has supplemented his professional officers with
deputized citizen patrols. 9 The 2500 members of his posse have
each received 130 hours of firearms training; about a third have
bought their own guns. 2 9 7 The posse members serve warrants, patrol
malls and streets, and track down deadbeat parents. 2 98 Former Sheriff
Richard Mack of Graham County, Arizona, unsurprisingly, organized
a local militia. 9 In Lucas County (Toledo), Ohio (not usually con-
sidered a hotbed of Second Amendment ideology), several hundred
unpaid citizens have been designated "special deputies." °0 0 These
292. See id.
293. Spragens, supra note 192, at 50.
294. Walzer, supra note 290, at 63. Walzer praises the Wagner Act as actively fostering
unionism. See id. at 65. Thus, active government involvement in creating communal orga-
nizations-such as well-regulated militias-ought to be well within the communitarian
paradigm.
295. See, e.g., William M. Sullivan, Institutions As the Infrastructure of Democracy, in NEW
COMMUNITARiAN THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES 179
(Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995) (arguing that successful community policing leads to greater
social cohesion and mutual accountability between police and the community's citizens).
296. See Sandy Banisky, Hard-Line Sheriff Seeks Ballot Lock, BALT. SUN, Feb. 17, 1996, at IA,
available in LEXIS, News Library, BALT. SUN File.
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. SeeJames Ridgeway, Road to Ruin: The Buchanan Presidential Run Could Destroy Both
Political Parties, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 5, 1996, at 22, available in 1996 WL 12535299.
300. See Lucas County Sheriff Kicks out Hundreds of Special Deputies, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Feb. 11, 1996, at 5C, available in 1996 WL 6187085.
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special deputies carry guns and badges.30~ In Washington, D.C., Mau-
rice Turner, while chief of the police department, enrolled volunteers
in a training program identical to training for new police officers.3 °2
At the end of the training program, these unpaid volunteers would be
issued badges and guns. 0 3 On graduation day for the first set of vol-
unteers, however, the program was terminated by the Washington,
D.C., City Council.3 4
Communitarian scholar Rogers M. Smith, considering the pos-
sibilities for national service, notes the history of the militia in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a forum for community ser-
vice. 30 5 He also notes that militia units of that period often fostered
racial and sexual hierarchies, such as by excluding freed slaves from
militia service.30 6 Certainly one cornerstone of twenty-first century
state and local supervision of militias should be to ensure that they are
nondiscriminatory.
This Article does not suggest details for how such a militia might
be trained and what its precise duties would be. That task is better left
to other scholars who have considered the topic. Robert Cottrol and
Ray Diamond, for example, have presented a detailed proposal for
reviving the militia in inner-city America-the area where crime is
highest and where uniformed police forces have failed most dismally
to provide adequate public safety. 0 7
Similarly, this Article does not address the pragmatic objection of
persons who object in principle to allowing citizens a role in law en-
forcement under the theory that any militia will be necessarily so in-
ept, hot-tempered, or otherwise unfit that it will endanger, rather
than enhance, public safety. The empirical issue will be answered in
time, as individual jurisdictions implement variations of the policies of
"Sheriff Joe" and former Chief Turner.
301. See id.
302. See Victoria Churchville, D.C. to Add Police Reserves: Latest Tactic Calls for Training
Volunteer Officers, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 1988, at D3, available in 1988 WL 2070387.
303. See id.
304. See Linda Wheeler, Signing up for Active Duty in Drug War: More Professionals Joining
D.C. Police Reserve Corps, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1989, at D1, available in 1989 WL 2025056.
305. See Rogers M. Smith, American Conceptions of Citizenship and National Service, in NEw
COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND COMMUNITIES 233, 240-41
(Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995).
306. See id.
307. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, In the Civic Republic: Crime, the
Inner City and the Democracy of Arms. Being a Disquisition on the Revival of the Militia at
Large, 1994 Annual James Thomas Lecture at Yale Law School (1994) (transcript on file
with author).
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For now, it is simply suggested that considering how to revive the
militia is the most appropriate policy, both for those who consider
themselves faithful adherents to the Constitution and for those who
genuinely embrace communitarian values. Not only would a revived
militia once again play a role in the defense of local and national com-
munities, but its natural political dimension, as David C. Williams has
noted, would engender in its members a sense of social and political
responsibility. 08 State and society could once again meld into a
symbiotic, "neorepublican" political order that avoids the current po-
larization between the largely inaccessible "rulers" and the largely dis-
affected "ruled."
5. Safety Education in Schools.-Assume, arguendo, that the above
scenario is too far-fetched: that the United States will never again
need the services of a civilian militia because there will never be any
more riots, hurricanes, or other disasters on American soil; that pro-
fessional forces are fully adequate for the security of the country
against domestic crime and foreign invasion; that no government-
even hundreds of years from now-could possibly tyrannize the citi-
zenry; and that a return to the republicanism of the eighteenth cen-
tury will never be realistic because twentieth- (or twenty-first-) century
Americans are hopelessly morally inferior to their revolutionary ances-
tors. Even assuming this absurd scenario, training as many Americans
as possible in the safe use of firearms is still in the interest of the
American community.
The absence of a gun education policy in a country with over 200
million guns3" is foolish. Many minors now have and will continue to
have easy access to both handguns and long guns. Neither new laws
nor wishful thinking will change the situation.
The power to set curricula lies with local, largely autonomous,
school boards. Unfortunately, school boards in the nation's urban ar-
eas-where an unfortunate mix of gun crime and political correctness
abounds-are the least likely to mandate gun education in the
schools, while those in rural areas are the most likely to do so, and
often do. Consistency demands that if it is wise to educate kids about
the potential threat to life that unsafe sex poses, then we should, at
the very least, work to maintain the decades-long trend of decline in
the rate of gun accidents involving children."' 0
308. See supra notes 210-224 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
310. See David B. Kopel, Children and Guns, in GUNS: WHo SHOULD HAVE THEM? 309, 311
(David B. Kopel ed., 1995) (citing National Safety Council data showing fatal gun accidents
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Gun education need not even involve the handling or firing of
guns. The basic rules of gun safety can be communicated effectively
by the written or spoken word. (This might be more advisable in
some urban settings.) Because about eighty-four percent of acciden-
tal shootings involve the violation of basic safety rules, safety educa-
tion addresses the vast majority of gun accidents.3 1 1 Owners of guns
involved in accidental deaths of children are unlikely to have received
safety training.31
2
Groups such as the Boy Scouts of America, 4-H, the American
Camping Association, and the NRA have long instructed children in
the safe use of sporting arms. One successful effort to promote safety
training for all children is the NRA's "Eddie Eagle" Elementary School
Gun Safety Education Program. 13 The Eddie Eagle program offers
curricula for children in grades K-i, 2-3, and 4-6, and uses teacher-
tested materials, including an animated video, cartoon workbooks,
314and fun safety activities. The hero, Eddie Eagle, teaches a simple
safety lesson: "If you see a gun: Stop! Don't Touch. Leave the Area.
Tell an Adult."" 3
Eddie Eagle includes no political content, no statements about
the Second Amendment, and nothing promoting the sporting use of
guns. 16 The program and its creator, Marion Hammer, won the 1993
Outstanding Community Service Award from the National Safety
Council.31 As ofJanuary 1996, Eddie Eagle had reached more than 7
million children. 1 8 Unfortunately, however, some persons in posi-
tions of authority over school safety programs have refused to allow
involving children aged 0-14 declining from 530 in 1970 to 227 in 1991); Joe Waldron,
"Child" Shooting Stats an Attempt to Mislead, SEArLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 11, 1996, at
A5, available in 1996 WL 6443419.
311. See United States General Accounting Office, Accidental Shootings: Many Deaths and
Injunes Caused by Firearms Could Be Prevented (Mar. 1991).
312. See Marilyn Heins et al., Gunshot Wounds in Children, 64 AM.J. PUB. HEALTH 326, 327
(1974).
313. See NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, "PROMOTE GUN SAFETY' WITH ME": THE EDDIE EA-
GLE GUN SAFETY PROGRAM (1995) [hereinafter EDDIE EAGLE].
314. See id.
315. Id.
316. See id.
317. See Laurie Cassady, Shorstein, NRA Aim to Save Kids, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Nov. 2, 1994,
at B2.
Eddie Eagle has been adopted in most Florida counties and has been endorsed by the
Police Athletic League. See EDDIE EAGLE, supra note 313. Even the Washington Post calls
Eddie Eagle: My Gun Safety Book a "must for any parent who keeps a gun in the home."
William Barnhill, Safe Aims, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 1992, at B5, available in 1992 WL 2968139.
318. See Pat Schneider, NRA Material in Schools Here, CAPITAL TIMES, Jan. 13, 1996, at 3A,
available in 1996 WL 7068469.
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Eddie Eagle to be used in their schools, because they disagree with the
NRA's position on policy questions. 319
6. Virtue Is Good.-While we have listed various virtue-promoting
programs that relate directly to community-minded, responsible fire-
arms use, it should be acknowledged that responsible attitudes toward
firearms depend ultimately upon a citizenry that is responsible about
much more than firearms. This Article is not the place for a discus-
sion of the many programs that have been suggested to promote fam-
ily, community, and individual responsibility. It should be noted,
however, that in addition to the other benefits flowing from these pro-
grams, a reduction in firearms injuries might be one important result.
It should also be kept in mind that disarming the populace could
promote civic disorder. The revolutionary generation had read Sir
Thomas More's The Utopia,32° which stated that when people relied on
uniformed forces for their protection, rather than defending them-
selves and their nation, the people's character was corrupted." 1 Sir
Thomas More thought that the introduction of a standing army had
caused moral decline in France, Rome, Carthage, and Syria. 22 The
Continental Congress compared Americans, "trained to arms from
their infancy and animated by love of liberty," with the "debauched,"
dissipated, and disarmed British. 23
In the cities with severe gun control-New York, Washington,
Chicago, or London-citizens have retreated into a personal security
shell; they rarely come to the aid of their fellow citizens who are being
attacked by criminals. 24 The predictions of More seem vindicated-
319. See Mark Spencer, Board Selects New Gun Safety Videos, HARTFORD COURANr, Oct. 16,
1996, at B6, available in 1996 WL 12661602.
320. SIR THOMAS MORE, THE UTOPIA (Jack Hexter ed., 1965).
321. See id. at 13, cited in "No STANDING ARMIES!": THE ANTIARMY IDEOLOGY IN SEVEN-
TEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 16 (Lois G. Schwoerer ed., 1974).
322. See id.
323. See Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REv. 204, 237 n.144. (1983) (internal quotations omitted).
324. See, e.g., Editorial, The Genovese Syndrome, PHOENIX GAZETTE, May 27, 1995, at B10,
available in 1995 WL 2797236 (discussing cases in which individuals observed crimes being
committed without intervening, including the highly publicized case of Catherine "Kitty"
Genovese who was murdered in front of her apartment building in front of at least 37
witnesses); Douglas Martin, About New York; Kitty Genovese: Would New York Still Turn Away?,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (discussing a similar
incident in which a crowd watched a murderer stalk and attack a woman-on three sepa-
rate occasions-until she was dead); Sam Roberts, Routine Murders in a Hurried City Numb to
Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1991, at BI, available in LEXIS News Library, NYT File (discussing
a similar incident in which witnesses to a murder failed to come forward or call the police);
Myron Stokes, The Shame of the City, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 4, 1995, at 26, available in 1995 WL
14497306 (discussing another incident in which a woman was beaten on a bridge in De-
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when a people cannot protect themselves, civic virtue declines. Psy-
chologists have noted the phenomenon of "diffusion of responsibil-
ity"S2 5 -if several bystanders witness an emergency, they are less likely
to respond than if only one person witnesses the accident.3 26 If the
police are official monopolists of public safety and if citizens are told
that they are too clumsy and unstable to be trusted with guns, then
citizens will naturally develop a "don't get involved" attitude toward
public safety.
The Communitarian Agenda rightly emphasizes the responsibility
of people to take care of their communities, rather than relying on
anonymous third parties to do so.3 27 Americans are already much
more likely to join and to contribute unpaid labor to voluntary organi-
zations than are the people of other democratic nations where the
government is expected to provide most of the necessities of life.3 28
Community self-help is important not just because a given task can
usually be accomplished more efficiently with local volunteers than
with a federal program, but, more fundamentally, because exclusive
reliance on external assistance weakens the cohesion and the virtue of
the community.
IV. GUNS AND PUBLIC SAFETY
The presumption of Domestic Disarmament is that if there were
fewer weapons there would be less violence. 29 As opposed to some
advocates of gun control, who merely want to disarm particularly dan-
gerous types of persons, the Communitarian Network apparently be-
lieves that a reduction (or better yet, a complete elimination) in the
number of firearms among the population as a whole would necessar-
ily lead to a major reduction in violence.3 3 1 Less guns, less gun vio-
troit and jumped to her death while a crowd witnessed the entire scene). But see Phillip
Burton, What's a Cop's Off-Duty Duty? The Chilling Message of a Rockville Case: Don't Get In-
volved, WASH. Posr, Dec. 11, 1988, at C5, available in 1988 WL 2013058 (discussing a case in
which a police officer is charged with assault for intervening, while off duty, in what he
mistakenly, although reasonably, thought was a rape).
325. See Jack Wenik, Forcing the Bystander to Get Involved: A Case for a Statute Requiring
Witnesses to Report Crime, 94 YALE L.J. 1787, 1787 (1985).
326. See id.
327. See Platform, supra note 5, at 11.
328. See UIPSET, supra note 38, at 278-79 (comparing the United States with Canada,
France, West Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan).
329. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 5-6.
330. Id. at 9.
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lence. This theory is known as the "weapons-violence hypothesis"-
where there are more weapons, there will be more violence."' 1
The problem with the weapons-violence hypothesis is that it is
readily disproven. If the only or main variable were guns, then Swit-
zerland should be one of the most violent nations on earth, because
its militia system requires nearly every household to keep a fully auto-
matic firearm and a store of ammunition .3 3  Furthermore, Switzer-
land has, by European standards, very permissive handgun laws, laws
that are less restrictive than those of many American states. 333 Swiss
citizens can buy anything from small handguns to antiaircraft rockets
and antitank weapons with less trouble than a New Yorker can get a
permit to install a new sink.1 4 Awash in guns, Switzerland is one of
the least violent countries in the world, far less violent than the United
Kingdom, Germany, or other European nations with severe gun con-
trols or prohibitions.3 35
If the weapons-violence hypothesis were true, there would be a
higher level of violence in America's rural areas, where a dispropor-
tionate number of America's guns are owned. 3 6 In fact, the level of
gun-related violence in those regions is considerably lower than in ur-
ban areas, where there are fewer guns and more gun control.337 The
per capita rate of firearms deaths is far lower in rural areas, even
though urban areas have the advantage of trauma centers within a few
miles (at most) of the site of any firearms injury, a high density of
hospitals and ambulances, as well as much higher police density to
prevent shootings in the first place. 3 8
The facts suggest that cultural or socioeconomic variables figure
much more heavily into the violence phenomenon than does access to
firearms. The relatively low incidence of violence that marks both
331. Id. ("[T]he unavailability of guns makes violent crime simply-yes it is simple-
much less likely .... ").
332. See KoPEL, supra note 13, at 278-94.
333. See id. at 283-84.
334. See id.
335. See id. at 286.
336. See Witkin, supra note 77, at 31. Persons residing in the Northeast are the "[I]east
likely to own gun[s]," whereas Southerners are the "[m]ost willing to shoot to kill," and
Westerners are the "[miost sure guns deter crime." Id.
337. See KLci, supra note 40, at 430 ("Levels of general gun ownership appear to have
no significant net effect on rates on homicide, rape, robbery, or aggravated assault, even
though they do apparently affect the fraction of robberies and assaults committed with
guns.").
338. See Lois A. Fingerhut et al., Firearm and Nonfirearm Homicide Among Persons 15
Through 19 Years of Age: Differences by Level of Urbanization, United States, 1979 Through 1989,
267JAMA 3048 (1992); cf. KLECK, supra note 40, at 23 (stating that gun ownership is higher
and the violent crime rate is lower in rural areas).
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armed Switzerland and the several largely disarmed nations touted by
gun control advocates is due mainly to internal social controls that
restrain citizens from committing violent acts against their neigh-
bors. 3 9 Japan, for example, has one of the most homogeneous and
law-abiding populations in the world, unlike America. 340 Also unlike
America, Japan is one of the most anti-individualist nations on earth, a
fact that results in a political system most Americans would consider
oppressive.3 4 ' The low level of violence in Japan is not primarily due
to austere gun control laws, but to internalized moral restraints that
have marked that society for centuries.142 Indeed, in most of the
countries touted by American gun prohibitionists as models, armed-
violence rates were far lower at the turn of the century, when the
countries had almost no gun laws, than at the end of this century,
when increased gun controls have proven a poor substitute for self-
control and social control.3 43
The Communitarian Network's hypothesis is that individuals
(gun owners) must sacrifice their (supposed) rights for the greater
good of public safety.3 " A significant body of evidence suggests, how-
ever, that the Communitarian Network may have the facts backwards:
gun ownership may make a positive impact on public safety and may
benefit all persons, not just gun owners. In other words, one of the
communitarian objectives-enhancement of public safety through re-
sponsible actions that benefit the entire community, not just an indi-
vidual-is already in place through the mechanism of individual gun
ownership.
There is copious evidence that a significant number of crimes are
deterred every year by gun-wielding Americans. One of the first mea-
surable pieces of evidence that criminals are deterred by the mere
perception that potential victims may be armed dates back to the late
1960s, when the Orlando Police Department sponsored firearms
safety training for women 4.34  The police instituted this program when
it became evident that many women were arming themselves in re-
sponse to a dramatic increase in sexual assaults in the Orlando area in
339. See KOPEL, supra note 13, at 290-92.
340. See id. at 22.
341. See id. at 23.
342. See id. at 27-39.
343. See generally id. (examining the history of Japan, Great Britain, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, Jamaica, Switzerland, and the United States with respect to crime and gun
control laws).
344. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 6.
345. See Gary Kleck & DavidJ. Bordua, The Factual Foundation for Certain Key Assumptions
of Gun Control 5 L. & POL'Y Q. 271, 284 (1983).
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1966.46 The year following the well-publicized safety training pro-
gram witnessed an 88% drop in the number of rapes in Orlando. 47
As Gary Kleck and David Bordua note: "It cannot be claimed that this
was merely part of a general downward trend in rape, since the na-
tional rate was increasing at the time. No other U.S. city with a popu-
lation over 100,000 experienced so large a percentage decrease in the
number of rapes from 1966 to 1967 .... ,"48 Furthermore, that same
year, rape increased by 5% in Florida and by 7% on the national
level.3 49
According to Kleck and Bordua, the gun training program "af-
fected the behavior of potential rapists primarily because it served to
inform or remind them of widespread gun ownership among women,
and thereby increased the perceived riskiness of sexual assaults."133
The rape rate, after plummeting, did increase during the next five
years, but this may be because the safety training courses no longer
received the same degree of media attention as when first initiated.3 1
Nonetheless, at the end of that five year period, the Orlando rape rate
was still 13% below the 1966 level, when the classes were first publi-
cized. 5 The rate of sexual assault increased 96.1% in Florida and
64% nationwide during that same five-year period. 53 It is also inter-
esting that rape in the area immediately surrounding Orlando in-
creased by 308% during the same period. 54
Having heard about the Orlando experience, Detroit Chief of Po-
lice Bill Stephens began a similar program in 1967, in the face of an
epidemic of armed robberies. 5  Within months of the Detroit pro-
gram's initiation, which like the Orlando program was widely publi-
cized, the rate of armed robberies had dropped by 90%.356
In 1982, the Atlanta exurb of Kennesaw passed an ordinance-in
symbolic response to the handgun ban of Morton Grove, Illinois-
requiring all residents (with certain exceptions, including conscien-
346. See id.
347. See id.
348. Id.
349. See Don B. Kates, Jr., The Value of Civilian Handgun Possession As a Deterrent to Crime or
Defense Against Crinme, 18 AM.J. CiuM. L. 113, 153 (1991).
350. Kleck & Bordua, supra note 345, at 287-88.
351. See Kates, supra note 349, at 153.
352. See id. at 153-54.
353. See id. at 154.
354. See id.
355. See id. (citing Neal Knox, Should You Have a Home Defense Gun?, in GUNS AND AMMO
GUIDE TO GUNS FOR HOME DEFENSE 108 (G. James ed., 1975)).
356. See id.
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tious objectors) to keep firearms in their homes.3 5 7 In the seven
months following enactment of the ordinance there were only five
burglaries, compared to forty-five in the same period the preceding
year, constituting an 89% decrease in residential burglary.35 8 Kleck
and Bordua maintain that "the publicized passage of the ordinance
may have served to remind potential burglars in the area of the fact of
widespread gun ownership, thereby heightening their perception of
the risks of burglary. " "'
Studies of prison inmates confirm that criminals are deterred
when they believe their potential victims are armed. Criminologists
James Wright and Peter Rossi, who at one time had been proponents
of severe gun control, concluded that an armed citizenry functions as
an important deterrent to crime." Of the prison inmates inter-
viewed, nearly 37% had encountered an armed victim during their
criminal careers." 1 Approximately the same percentage (40%) re-
ported that they had not committed a particular crime because they
feared their potential victims were armed. 62
One form of deterrence is termed "confrontation deterrence,"
whereby a criminal actually confronts a potential victim and is
thwarted by that victim. Gary Kleck has conducted the most thorough
criminological studies regarding confrontation deterrence. Dr.
Kleck's initial research, based upon a 1981 Peter Hart survey con-
ducted for a gun control group, suggested that there are roughly
645,000 instances of confrontation deterrence involving handgun-
wielding citizens every year.363 That figure climbs to about 740,000
when all types of firearms are considered.3" The figures are broadly
consistent with data from several other state and national surveys.36 5
As Kleck stated:
Much of the social order in America may depend on the fact
that millions of people are armed and dangerous to each
other. The availability of deadly weapons to the violence-
prone may well contribute to violence by increasing the
357. See Kleck & Bordua, supra note 345, at 288.
358. See id.
359. Id.
360. See WRIGHT & Rossi, supra note 61, at 237 ("More generally, the presence of fire-
arms among a felon's associates and potential victims is probably a much greater threat to
his well-being than the prospects of an extra 1 or 2 years in prison.").
361. See id. at 155.
362. See id.
363. See KLEcK, supra note 40, at 106.
364. See id. at 107.
365. For more information on the surveys, see id. at 104-11 & tables 4.1, 4.2.
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probability of a fatal outcome of combat. However, it may
also be that this very fact raises the stakes in disputes to the
point where only the most incensed or intoxicated dispu-
tants resort to physical conflict, with the risks of armed retali-
ation deterring attack and coercing minimal courtesy among
otherwise hostile parties. Likewise, rates of commercial rob-
bery, residential burglary injury, and rape might be still
higher than their already high levels were it not for the dan-
gerousness of the prospective victim population. Gun own-
ership among prospective victims may well have as large a
crime-inhibiting effect as the crime-generating effects of gun
possession among prospective criminals .... [T]he two ef-
fects may roughly cancel each other out."'
"The failure to fully acknowledge this reality," Kleck concluded, "can
lead to grave errors in devising public policy to minimize violence
through gun control."3 6 7 If Kleck is correct, and if attempts to imple-
ment drastic gun control policies, such as domestic disarmament, are
ever successful, the result will likely only harm America's
communities.
Although Kleck's research was consistent with nine other studies
of the same topic,368 he was subjected to intense attack by gun control
proponents.3 69 Kleck responded by conducting a much more thor-
ough survey that took into account every criticism directed at his find-
ing of 645,000 instances of confrontation deterrence involving armed
citizens per year. For example, respondents who indicated that they
had used a gun for self-defense were queried in detail about the actual
use in order to sort out persons who might label as self-defense merely
grabbing a gun when something went bump in the night, even if there
were no confrontation with a criminal.
The new survey did show that Kleck had been wrong. The most
thorough study of defensive gun use found that firearms are used for
protection approximately 2.5 million times a year.370 Shots were usu-
366. Id. at 143 (citations omitted).
367. Id.
368. See supra note 365.
369. Cf. Don B. Kates et al., Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Violence or Pandemic of
Propaganda?, 62 TENN. L REv. 513, 543, 546, 548 (1995) (discussing how "health sages"
refuse to cite or give credit to KLECK, supra note 40).
370. The revised figure comes from the National Self-Defense Survey, conducted in the
spring of 1993 by Kleck and Dr. Marc Gertz. See Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance
to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86J. CuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
150, 164 (1995).
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ally not fired; merely drawing the gun apparently drove off many
would-be assailants. 37'
Notably, Marvin E. Wolfgang, one of the most eminent criminolo-
gists of the twentieth century, and a strong supporter of gun control,
reviewed Kleck's findings. Announcing that he found Kleck's implica-
tions disturbing, Wolfgang wrote that he could find no methodologi-
cal flaw, nor any other reason to doubt the correctness of Kleck's
figure.3 7
2
One public policy aimed at crime control that an increasing
number of states are exploring and adopting is the liberalization of
concealed carry laws.373 Data suggest that concealed carry laws may
reduce homicide and aggravated assault rates.3 74 The data are clear
that liberalized concealed carry does not lead to gunfights on the
streets between licensees.37 ' This is because those who go through
the rigorous background check usually required under the liberalized
law are precisely those most apt to use guns responsibly in the first
place. The predictions of those who oppose concealed carry have
been proven false in every state where the law has been liberalized:
concealed carry does not a John Rambo make.376
Because many criminals avoid victimizing people they think may
be armed, what might happen to the violent crime rate if more people
were armed and possibly carrying a firearm under their coat or in
their purse as they walked down the street? Domestic violence would
not likely be affected by concealed carry reform (except for stalking
cases), but the incidence of "outdoor" crime would likely diminish. In
371. See id. at 175.
372. See Marvin E. Wolfgang, A Tribute to a View I Have Opposed, 86J. CIM. L. & CuMi-
NOLOGY 188 (1995).
I am as strong a gun-control advocate as can be found among the criminolo-
gists in this country .... I would eliminate all guns from the civilian population
and maybe even from the police. I hate guns ....
Nonetheless, the methodological soundness of the current Kleck and Gertz
study is clear....
The Kleck and Gertz study impresses me for the caution the authors exercise
and the elaborate nuances they examine methodologically. I do not like their
conclusions that having a gun can be useful, but I cannot fault their methodol-
ogy. They have tried earnestly to meet all objections in advance and have done
exceedingly well.
Id. at 188, 191-92.
373. See generally Clayton E. Cramer & David B. Kopel, "Shall Issue": The New Wave of
Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REv. 679 (1995) (discussing the history of con-
cealed handgun permits and analyzing the effects of such laws in fourteen states).
374. See id. at 686; Lott & Mustard, supra note 54.
375. See Cramer & Kopel, supra note 373, at 736-37.
376. For a state-by-state comparison of results of concealed carry laws, see id. at 687-709.
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situations in which a high fraction of the population is armed (in con-
trast to the one to four percent typical today in states that issue con-
cealed handgun permits), predatory crime is virtually nonexistent.377
Gun ownership provides a crime-inhibiting force of some magni-
tude, although the exact size is subject to legitimate dispute. If do-
mestic disarmament is adopted and is largely obeyed, it will destroy
that socially beneficial force. Criminals will generally not disarm, and
the perception will be created among them that there is less of a
chance of encountering an armed victim. This will embolden many
criminals to commit crimes they would have been deterred from com-
mitting when gun ownership was legal.
Accompanying the plainly false presumption of Domestic Disarma-
ment that guns in the right hands make absolutely no positive contri-
bution to public safety is the assumption that "all people"-not just
people with felony records, or alcoholics, or other troubled individu-
als-"kill and are much more likely to do so when armed than when
disarmed."17 ' There exists thorough criminological refutation of this
assumption that the average citizen is a walking time-bomb, a poten-
tial murderer kept in check only by the absence of a firearm. 379 In
377. See ROGER McGRATH, GUNFIGHTERS, HIGHWAYMEN, & VIGILANTES: VIOLENCE ON THE
FRONTIER (1984) (investigating the crime rates of Sierra Nevada mining towns in late nine-
teenth century); see also Daniel D. Polsby, The False Promise of Gun Control, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1994, at 57, 57-70 (refuting the idea that more handguns means more
violence).
378. Platform, supra note 5, at 71.
379. See Don B. Kates, Jr. et al., Bad Medicine: Doctors and Guns, in GuNs: WHO SHOULD
HAvE THEM? (David B. Kopel ed., 1995).
The mythology of murderers as ordinary citizens contrasts starkly with the
consistent findings of homicide studies dating back to the 1960s: that about sev-
enty-five percent of murderers have adult criminal records; that when the murder
occurred about 11 percent of murder arrestees were actually on pretrial release,
i.e. they were awaiting trial for another offense; and that murderers average a
prior adult criminal career of six or more years, including four major adult felony
arrests.
We emphasize that these are adult records so that readers will not be misled
into accepting the claim of Webster et al. (most murderers "would be considered
law-abiding citizens prior to their pulling the trigger") as to the roughly twenty-
five percent of murderers who lack adult records. The reason over half of those
25 percent do not have adult records is that they are juveniles. Juvenile criminal
records might show these murderers to have extensive serious crime history. The
research literature on characteristics of those who murder yields a profile of of-
fenders that indicates that many have histories of committing personal violence in
childhood against other children, siblings, and small animals. (Likewise, the juve-
nile crime records of the 87 percent of murderers who are adults might show
crime careers averaging far more than six adult years with significantly more than
just four major felony priors.)
Id. at 267.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
truth, the vast majority of gun owners handle their firearms
responsibly.38 0
If, on the other hand, Etzioni is right, and a huge fraction of the
American population would commit murder at some point-given
the combination of an upsetting event and a murder instrument-it is
hard to imagine how such a population could be considered fit for
self-government. The argument that Americans (or people in gen-
eral) are too hot-tempered, clumsy, and potentially murderous to be
trusted with dangerous objects such as firearms might be a good argu-
ment for an elitist (of the left-wing or right-wing variety) who believes
that "the masses" need to be controlled by the firm hand of a powerful
government of their betters. Whatever else might be said about that
type of argument, it is thoroughly out-of-place coming from a commu-
nitarian, whose philosophy presumes that the American people are
fully capable of virtue, responsibility, and self-government.
V. THE RIGHT GUARANTEED BY THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A
CRITIQUE OF DOMESTIC DisARAfAmsr's LEGAL ANALYSIS
In support of the legality of confiscating all firearms, the Commu-
nitarian Network sets forth the "exclusively collective right" interpreta-
tion of the right to keep and bear arms.3 8' Like "collective property"
in a communist nation, the collective right to keep and bear arms
supposedly belongs to the people as a whole, rather than to people as
individuals, but in fact belongs exclusively to the government.38 2 Yet,
as antigun writer Ralph J. Rohner acknowledges, the argument that
there is a community right to keep and bear arms, but not an individ-
ual one, raises the "metaphysical difficulty of how something can exist
in the whole without existing in any of its parts."38 3 If the right to
keep and bear arms inheres in the universal (the people), then it must
also inhere in the particulars (individual persons).
Although the collective right theory has no support from the
United States Supreme Court,3 84 and precious little from legal schol-
arship, it does receive some support in dicta in lower federal court
opinions (often cases in which gun criminals raise frivolous Second
380. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
381. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 6 ("[T]he notion ... that there is a right
to bear arms by private individuals is not to be found in the Constitution.").
382. Id. at 29-35.
383. Ralph J. Rohner, The Right to Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitutional Histoiy, 16
CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 55 n.10 (1966).
384. See infra notes 451-635 and accompanying text.
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Amendment defenses).85 After his retirement from the bench, the
late Chief Justice Warren Burger also endorsed the collective right
theory."' 6 In addition, there is certainly no shortage of members of
what Sanford Levinson calls the "elite bar,"" 7 who, having never read
a law review article or legal case about the Second Amendment, confi-
dently maintain to their less-educated fellow citizens that the Second
Amendment does not protect an individual right to own guns. On
this intellectual foundation, the Communitarian Network's supporters
"join with those who read the Second Amendment" as a guarantee of
an exclusively collective right, that is, "as a communitarian clause, call-
ing for community militias, not individual gun slingers. "388
This section analyzes in detail the Communitarian Network's case
for the Second Amendment as an exclusively collective-nonexis-
tent-right. Domestic Disarmament is one of the most recent presenta-
tions of the collective right thesis, and thus provides a useful vehicle
for inquiry into the meaning of the Second Amendment. If, contrary
to the thesis of Domestic Disarmament, the Second Amendment does
guarantee an individual right, much of the remaining argument of
that position paper is rendered irrelevant; the tradition of civil liberta-
rianism in this country is one in which individual rights are protected
even when they exact a toll on society or when the majority happens
to be hostile to the exercise of those rights. 89
On the other hand, if the Communitarian Network is right about
the Second Amendment, there are several constitutional issues that
could present obstacles to Domestic Disarmament's proposal for total
gun confiscation. In particular, forty-three states have constitutional
provisions protecting the right to keep and bear arms, which,
although not a barrier to federal legislation, would prevent the re-
gional implementation of gun confiscation proposed by Domestic Dis-
385. See infra notes 567-635 and accompanying text.
386. Warren E. Burger, The Right to Bear Arms, PARADE, Jan. 14, 1990, at 4.
387. Levinson, supra note 147, at 639 n.13. Levinson does not use this term in a pejora-
tive sense, but merely as a description of the eminentjurists and legal scholars who mistak-
enly believe that the collective-right view is the established doctrine. See id.
388. Platform, supra note 5, at 21.
389. The very point of a written constitution is that it remains law until amended. With
reference to the threat of what some have called the "tyranny of the majority," James
Madison warned:
Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppres-
sion. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community,
and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of
Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the
Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents
5 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 272 (G. Hunt ed., 1904).
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armament.39 °  Second, the Fifth Amendment to the United States
390. Alabama: "That every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the
state." ALA. CONST. art. I, § 26.
Alaska: "A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." ALASKA CONST. art. I,
§ 19.
Arizona: "The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself or the
State shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing
individuals or corporations to organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of men."
ARiz. CONST. art. 2, § 26.
Arkansas: "The citizens of this State shall have the right to keep and bear arms for
their common defense." ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 5.
Colorado: "The right of no person to keep and bear arms in defense of his home,
person and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall be
called in question; but nothing herein contained shall be construed to justify the practice
of carrying concealed weapons." COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 13.
Connecticut "Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the
state." CONN. CONsT. art. I, § 15.
Delaware: "A person has the right to keep and bear arms for the defense of self,
family, home and state, and for hunting and recreational use." DEL. CONSr. art. I, § 20.
Florida: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and
of the lawful authority of the state shall not be infringed, except that the manner of bear-
ing arms may be regulated by law." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Georgia: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed, but
the General Assembly shall have the power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be
borne." GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. V.
Hawaii: "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." HAW. CONST. art. 1,
§ 15.
Idaho: "The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right shall not be
abridged; but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to govern the carrying of
weapons concealed on the person nor prevent passage of legislation providing minimum
sentences for crimes committed while in possession of a firearm, nor prevent the passage
of legislation providing penalties for the possession of firearms by a convicted felon, nor
prevent the passage of any legislation punishing the use of a firearm. No law shall impose
licensure, registration or special taxation on the ownership or possession of firearms or
ammunition. Nor shall any law permit the confiscation of firearms, except those actually
used in the commission of a felony." IDAHO CONSr. art. I, § 11.
Illinois: "Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep
and bear arms shall not be infringed." ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
Indiana: "The people shall have a right to bear arms, for the defense of themselves
and the State." IND. CONST. art. 1, § 32.
Kansas: "The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but
standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be tolerated, and
the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power." KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights,
§ 4.
Kentucky: "All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and
inalienable rights, among which may be reckoned: ... Seventh: The right to bear arms in
defense of themselves and of the State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to
enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons." Ky. CONST. § 1, para. 7.
Louisiana: "The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be abridged, but
this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons
concealed on the person." LA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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Maine: "Every citizen has a right to keep and bear arms for the common defense; and
this right shall never be questioned." ME. CONsT. art. I, § 16.
Massachusetts: "The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common de-
fence. And as, in times of peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be
maintained without the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall always be
held in an exact subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it." MASS. CONsr.
Pt. I, art. XVII.
Michigan: "Every person has a right to keep and bear arms for the defense of himself
and the state." MICH. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
Mississippi: "The right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home,
person, or property, or in aid of the civil power where thereto legally summoned, shall not
be called in question, but the legislature may regulate or forbid carrying concealed weap-
ons." Miss. CONST. art. 3, § 12.
Missouri: "That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his
home, person and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not
be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of concealed Weapons." Mo. CONsr.
art. 1, § 23.
Montana: "The right of any person to keep or bear arms in defense of his own home,
person, and property, or in aid of the civil power when thereto legally summoned, shall not
be called in question, but nothing herein contained shall be held to permit the carrying of
concealed weapons." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12.
Nebraska: "All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain inher-
ent and inalienable rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and
the right to keep and bear arms for security or defense of self, family, home, and others,
and for lawful common defense, hunting, recreational use, and all other lawful purposes,
and such rights shall not be denied by the state or any subdivision thereof. To secure these
rights, and the protection of property, governments are instituted among people, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed." NEB. CONST. art. I, § 1.
Nevada: "Every citizen has the right to keep and bear arms for security and defense,
for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful purposes." NEv. CONST. art. 1,
§ 11, ci. 1.
New Hampshire: "All persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense of
themselves, their families, their property, and the State." N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 2-a.
New Mexico: "No law shall abridge the right of the citizen to keep and bear arms for
security and defense, for lawful hunting and recreational use and for other lawful pur-
poses, but nothing herein shall be held to permit the carrying of concealed weapons. No
municipality or county shall regulate, in any way, an incident of the right to keep and bear
arms." N.M. CONsr. art. II, § 6.
North Carolina: "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; and, as stand-
ing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained, and the
military shall be kept under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.
Nothing herein shall justify the practice of carrying concealed weapons, or prevent the
General Assembly from enacting penal statutes against that practice." N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 30.
North Dakota: "All individuals are by nature equally free and independent and have
certain inalienable rights, among which are those enjoying and defending life and liberty;
acquiring possessing and protecting property and reputation; pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness; and to keep and bear arms for the defense of their person, family,
property, and state, and for lawful hunting, recreational, and other lawful purposes, which
shall not be infringed." N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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Constitution3 91 generally requires "just compensation" when the gov-
Ohio: "The people have the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but
standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be kept up; and
the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power." OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4.
Oklahoma: "The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home,
person, or property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally summoned, shall
never be prohibited; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the Legislature from reg-
ulating the carrying of weapons." OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 26.
Oregon: "The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves,
and the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power." OR.
CONST. art. I, § 27.
Pennsylvania: "The right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the
State shall not be questioned." PA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
Rhode Island: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed."
R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 22.
South Carolina: "A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. As, in times of
peace, armies are dangerous to liberty, they shall not be maintained without the consent of
the General Assembly. The military power of the State shall always be held in subordina-
tion to the civil authority and be governed by it. No soldier shall in time of peace be
quartered in any house without the consent of the owner nor in time of war but in the
manner prescribed by law." S.C. CONST. art. I, § 20.
South Dakota: "The right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and
the state shall not be denied." S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 24.
Tennessee: "That the citizens of this State have a right to keep and bear arms for their
common defense; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of
arms with a view to prevent crime." TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26.
Texas: "Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defence
of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing
of arms, with a view to prevent crime." TEx. CONST. art. I, § 23.
Utah: "The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes,
shall not be infringed; but nothing here shall prevent the legislature from defining the
lawful use of arms." UTAH CONST. art. I, § 6.
Vermont: "That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves
and the State-and as standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they
ought not to be kept up; and that the military should be kept under strict subordination to
and governed by the civil power." VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 16.
Virginia: "That a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained
to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state, therefore, the right of the
people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; that standing armies, in time of
peace, should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should
be under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power." VA. CONST. art. I, § 13.
Washington: "The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or
the state, shall not be impaired, bitt nothing in this section shall be construed as authoriz-
ing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain, or employ an armed body of Men."
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 24.
West Virginia: "A person has the right to keep and bear arms in defense of self, family,
home and state, and for lawful hunting and recreational use." W.VA. CONST. art. III, § 22.
Wyoming: "The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and of the state
shall not be denied." WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 24.
391. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
"[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." Id.
COMMUNITARIANS, NEOREPUBLICANS, AND GUNS
emnment confiscates private property, although the destruction of
contraband may in some cases fall outside the compensation require-
ment. 92 Finally, some courts, including the United States Supreme
Court, have been unwilling to treat the congressional power to regu-
late "Commerce... among the several States" 3 9 3 as a carte blanche to
regulate or ban the mere intrastate possession of a firearm or other
object.3 94
The Second Amendment issue is important notjust because most
policy advocates would not wish to propose a law that would be de-
clared unconstitutional. No matter how persuasive a reader might
find the Second Amendment exposition that follows, there is no guar-
antee that the federal courts would strike down a gun confiscation
law. If gun confiscation actually garnered enough support to pass
both houses of Congress and to be signed into law by the president, it
is far from certain that the Supreme Court-no matter how clear the
original intent of the Constitution's Framers and relevant prece-
dent-would interpose itself. For example, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 95 was quite under-enforced by
federal courts until the 1950s;396 the First Amendment397 was given
little judicial protection until after World War IV9
Yet law is more than a prediction of what the courts may do.
Nothing can change the history of the creation of the Second Amend-
ment, and nothing can erase the Supreme Court decisions on the sub-
ject up to the present. America's gun owners, particularly those that
are politically active, have not memorized every comma in Patrick
392. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 996-1001 (1996).
393. The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have the power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
394. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) (holding that the Gun-Free
School Zones Act exceeded congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
395. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State
shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
396. SeeJulius L. Chambers, Thurgood Marshall's Legacy, 44 STAN. L REv. 1249, 1252
(1992) (describing the NAACP's litigation strategy to use "the previously unenforced Re-
construction Amendments to the Constitution" to advance the rights of African
Americans).
397. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
398. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) (stating that the Court did
little to protect free speech prior to Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)); see a/so
David Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 237 (David Kairys ed., 1990)
("[S]hortly [after World War I] speech was legally protected by the Supreme Court.").
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Henry's speeches, nor can they give the page cites for United States v.
Miller.3  Many gun owners, however, do know the general outlines of
the legal history of the right to keep and bear arms in the United
States. A harmonious communitarian society must be founded on
popular acceptance of the legitimacy of the law. For the Supreme
Court to uphold domestic disarmament would not, in the eyes of
many millions of gun owners, delegitimize gun ownership; instead,
such a decision would delegitimize the Supreme Court, the federal
government, and the citizenry's obligation to obey the law.4 00 Should
the Supreme Court ever rule that ordinary citizens have no legal pro-
tection from gun confiscation, the decision would, quite literally, be
considered by many millions of armed citizens to be a repudiation of
the Constitution and the social contract, and to be a declaration of
war.
A. The Origins of the Second Amendment
The right to keep and bear arms in America is rooted in both
English common law and the philosophy of natural law that the Fram-
ers viewed as superior to the common law. Historian Robert Shalhope
observes that the Framers drew upon state constitutions setting forth
rights rooted in nature as well as in the traditional rights of English-
men as sources for the content of a national bill of rights."°
Shalhope writes:
[T] hese sources continually reiterated four beliefs relative to
the issues eventually incorporated into the Second Amend-
ment: the right of the individual to possess arms [for self-
defense], the fear of a professional army, the reliance on mi-
litias controlled by the individual states, and the subordina-
tion of the military to civilian control." 2
399. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). For a discussion of United States v. Miller, see infra notes 507-
540 and accompanying text.
400. In this connection, Randy Barnett warns:
When courts... distort the Constitution to rationalize the ultra vires actions of
government, and when academics and political activists aid and abet them in this
activity by devising ingenious rationalizations for ignoring the Constitution's
words, they are playing a most dangerous game. For they are putting at risk the
legitimacy of the lawmaking process and risking the permanent disaffection of
significant segments of the people .... [T]hen they must rely solely on intimida-
tion and punishment to obtain compliance with the law.
Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Guns, Militias, and Oklahoma City, 62 TENN. L. REV. 443, 458
(1995).
401. See Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. AM.
Hisr. 599, 608 (1982).
402. Id. Among these state right-to-arms provisions is that found in the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of 1776, which affirms:
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The right to self-defense (and the corresponding right to arms) has
long been considered a natural right in the political traditions of
Western culture403 and was affirmed to be one of the rights of English-
men under the 1689 British Constitution.4 °4
Not only is there a long-standing right to self-defense at common
law, but the widespread belief in the duty of an individual arms-
bearer's participation in the common defense dates back beyond the
Middle Ages.4" 5 Prior to the Norman Conquest, citizens of England
That the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the
state; and as standing armies in the time of peace are dangerous to liberty, they
ought not to be kept up; And that the military should be kept under strict subor-
dination to, and governed by, the civil power.
5 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS,
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now HERETOFORE
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3083 (1909) (reprinting the Pennsylvania Consti-
tution of 1776).
Language affirming the right of the people to keep and bear arms "in defense of
themselves and the state," or similar language, is found in most state constitutions today.
See supra note 390. Under American political theory, these constitutional provisions do not
create the right to keep and bear arms; they only serve to guarantee them explicitly, as
rights antecedent to the Constitution that are rooted in nature, common law, or both.
403. That one may defend oneself with deadly force seems to be taken for granted by
ancient cultures. Cicero, one of the Roman orators held in high esteem by America's
Founders, wrote:
And indeed, gentlemen, there exists a law, not written down anywhere but inborn
in our hearts; a law which comes to us not by training or custom or reading but by
derivation and absorption and adoption from nature itself; a law which has come
to us not from theory but from practice, not by instruction but by natural intui-
tion. I refer to the law which lays it down that, if our lives are endangered by plots
or violence or armed robbers or enemies, any and every method of protecting
ourselves is morally right. When weapons reduce them to silence, the laws no
longer expect one to await their pronouncements. For people who decide to wait
for these will have to wait for justice too-and meanwhile they must suffer injus-
tice first. Indeed, even the wisdom of the law itself, by a sort of tacit implication,
permits self-defense, because it does not actually forbid men to kill; what it does,
instead, is to forbid the bearing of a weapon with the intention to kill.
Cicero, In Defense of Titus Annius Milo, reprinted in SELECTED POLTIC.AL SPEECHES 222 (M.
Grant trans., 1969), cited in Richard E. Gardiner, To Preserve Liberty: A Look at the Right to
Keep and Bear Arms, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 63, 66-67 (1982).
404. See HALBROOK, supra note 148, at 38.
405. In an effort to end the practice of relying on foreign mercenaries, the Byzantine
Emperor Maurice handed down the following directive circa 579 A.D.: "We wish that every
young Roman [subject of Byzantium] of free condition should learn the use of the bow,
and be constantly provided with that weapon and with twojavelins." Strategikon, reprinted in
I THE ART OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 178-79 (C. Oman trans., 1924), cited in DENOJOHN
GEANAKOPLOS, BYzANrIUM: CHURCH, SOCIETY, AND CIVLIZATION SEEN THROUGH CONTEMPO-
RARY EYES 98 (1984).
In the ninth century, Emperor Leo VI urged, in essence, the creation of a popular
militia skilled in guerrilla warfare:
We therefore wish that those who dwell in castle, countryside, or town, in short,
every one of our subjects, should have a bow of his own. Or if this be impossible,
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were legally obligated to keep and bear privately owned arms to en-
sure their preparation in the event that they were called upon to de-
fend their country." 6 Freemen in England served in the "fyrd," a
people's militia whose duty it was to defend against invasion, to sup-
press insurrections, and to perform citizens' arrests. °7 Later, "assizes
of arms" were required by English kings."° The Assize of Arms of
Henry 11,409 issued in 1181, required the whole body of freemen to
possess arms.41 ° Subsequent assizes expanded the responsibilities of
the populace in keeping and bearing their arms for defense against
criminals and invaders. 41 ' This state of affairs rendered a standing
army unnecessary for national defense.4 12
The right of resistance also became a component of the right to
keep and bear arms in England. In the thirteenth century, the tyr-
anny of King John led to the revolt of his subjects, culminating in the
obtrusion of the Magna Carta upon him for his signature.413
Although the Magna Carta was first won in the battle of Runnymeade,
it repeatedly had to be defended with force, as did lesser-known re-
forms, such as the Provisions of Oxford (1258), which were also reluc-
tantly signed by a king who was confronted with armed force.4 14 The
first of these rebellions, rebellions that eventually included two full-
scale civil wars, began only a few months after the Magna Carta was
signed.41 5 In 1264 Simon de Montfort led an uprising, known as the
Baron's War, against John's son, King Henry 111.416 The uprising in-
let every household keep a bow and forty arrows, and let practice be made with
them in shooting both in the open and in broken ground and in defiles and
woods. For if there come a sudden incursion of enemies into the bowels of the
land, men using archery from rocky ground or in defiles or in forest paths can do
the invader much harm; for the enemy dislikes having to keep sending out de-
tachments to drive them off, and will dread to scatter far abroad after plunder, so
that much territory can thus be kept unharmed, since the enemy will not desire to
be engaging in a perpetual archery skirmish.
Tactica, reprinted in I THE ART OF WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES 179 (C. Oman trans., 1924), cited
in DENO JOHN GEANAKOPLOS, BYZANTIUM: CHURCH, SOCIETY, AND CIVILIZATION SEEN
THROUGH CoNTEMPoRARY EYES 98-99 (1984).
406. See HALBROOK, supra note 148, at 37-54.
407. See id. at 38.
408. See id.
409. Assize of Arms, 27 Hen. 2, art. 3 (1181), repinted in SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITU-
TIONAL HISTORY 85 (Carl Stephenson & Frederick George Marcham eds. & trans., 1937).
410. Id.
411. See Gardiner, supra note 403, at 66.
412. See id. at 67.
413. See THOMAS B. CosTAIN, THE CONQUERING FAMILY 253-61 (1962).
414. See THOMAS B. COSTAIN, THE MAGNIFICENT CENTURY 197-203 (1962).
415. See id. at 217-53.
416. See id.
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volved not only knights in armor but also commoners bringing their
own weapons to battle.41 7 After initial victory, the uprising was eventu-
ally defeated.41 s The losers nevertheless carried on resistance from
sanctuaries in forests, fens, and castles.41 9 The Magna Carta and other
reforms, such as the Provisions of Westminster, were finally accepted
as binding upon a monarchy which acknowledged that the king him-
self was subject to the rule of law.420 Because the people of Wales and
Scotland often engaged in armed resistance to the English military,
they maintained substantially more autonomy than they would other-
wise have enjoyed.421
Thomas Jefferson's dictum-"the tree of liberty must be re-
freshed from time to time with the blood of patriots & tyrants"
422
could be a rough summary of the violent history of medieval England.
As Stuart Hays observes: "Thus the right of lawful revolution was born
into the constitutional law of England. This is of major import be-
cause without the right to revolt there is less reason to preserve the
right to bear arms."42  Great Britain also saw numerous instances of
guerrilla or revolutionary uprisings against invading foreign armies,
including the guerrilla war of "Wiliken of the Weald" against French
invaders in southern England,424 and the revolt led by William Wal-
lace of Scotland, which, in the long run, secured independence for
Scotland against the claims of English monarchs.
425
Incipient theories of political resistance were advanced by medie-
val theologians such as Manegold of Lautenbach.426 The libertarian-
ism of Manegold and others was further shaped during the Protestant
417. Swid.
418. See id. at 271-72.
419. See id. at 217-53.
420. See id.
421. See id. at 53-58.
422. See supra note 150.
423. Stuart R. Hays, The Right to Bear Arms: A Study in Judiciol Misinkypretation, 2 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 381, 385 (1960).
424. See THOMAS B. COSTAIN, THE THREE EDWARDS 61 (1962).
425. See COSTAIN, supra note 414, at 59-71, 78-84. The revolt of the Scottish hero, Wil-
liam Wallace, against King Edward I has recently been brought to American consciousness
in the movie Braveheart. BRAVEHEART (Paramount 1995). For discussion of the life of Wil-
liam Wallace, see CosrmN, supra note 414, at 59-71, 78-84.
426. Manegold is one of a number of medieval "libertarians" who wrote extensively on
the right to resist a despotic ruler. In language that prefigures the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, he argued that:
[I]f the king ceases to govern the kingdom, and begins to act as a tyrant, to de-
stroy justice, to overthrow peace, and to break his faith, the man who has taken
the oath is free from it, and the people are entitled to depose the king and to set
up another, inasmuch as he has broken the principle upon which their mutual
obligation depended.
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Reformation by both Lutherans and Calvinists, but especially by the
latter. This new "liberation theology" was to undergo a process of re-
finement during the following centuries, culminating in the English
Civil War, the political philosophy ofJohn Locke (on which the Decla-
ration of Independence was later to be largely based), the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, and, finally, the American Revolution.4"7 The
provision regarding the right to keep and bear arms in the Declara-
tion of Rights that issued from the Glorious Revolution is the immedi-
ate forebear of the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution." 8 It was the British government's attempt to seize arms
that sparked violent resistance and the beginning of the American
Revolution, not only at Lexington and Concord,429 but also in
Virginia.43 °
IV A.J. CA_.RLE, MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEORY IN THE WEST 164 (1950) (translating and
paraphrasing Manegold's Latin text in AD GEBEHARDUM).
427. It has been noted by several church scholars that American resistance theory was
directly influenced by Protestant resistance theories, and that the fiery Scottish reformer
John Knox "was a key link in the development of the political ideology that culminated in
the American Revolution." RaCHARD GREAVES, THEOLOGY AND REVOLUTION IN THE SCOTTISH
REFORMATION: STUDIES IN THE THOUGHT OF JOHN KNox 126-56 (1980). The Protestant
contribution to American political theory actually began with Martin Luther andJohn Cal-
vin, and can be traced "fromJohn Calvin to Phillipe de Duplessis-Mornay, from Phillipe de
Duplessis-Mornay to John Knox, from John Knox to John Milton, from John Milton to
John Locke, and from John Locke to Alexander Hamilton." R.H. MURRAY, THE POLITICAL
CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORMATION 105 (1960).
428. SeeJoyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of People to Keep and Bear Arms: The Common Law
Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285, 313-14 (1983).
429. See Stephen P. Halbrook, Encroachments of the Crown on the Liberty of the Subject: Pre-
Revolutionary Origins of the Second Amendment, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 91, 112 n.107 (1989);
EssEx GAZETTE, supra note 143.
430. After the Americans routed the Redcoats at Concord, William Pitt urged the House
of Lords to attempt reconciliation with the Americans, instead of attempting to subjugate
them by force, and warned that the armed American people were a formidable opponent:
"My Lords, there are three millions of whigs. Three millions of whigs, my Lords, with arms
in their hands, are a very formitable body. 'twas the whigs my Lords, that set his Majesty's
royal ancestors upon the throne of England." 1 WILLIAM GORDON, THE HISTORY OF THE
RISE, PROGRESS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 443
(1788, reprint 1964), quoted in DAVID T. HARDY, ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SECOND
AMENDMENT 60 (1986). Later, during the war, Pitt told the House of Lords: "If I were an
American, as I am an Englishman, while a foreign troop was landed in my country, I would
never lay down my arms - never - never - NEVER! You cannot conquer America."
William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, Speech in the House of Lords (Nov. 18, 1777), quoted in
KOPEL, supra note 13, at 352 n.73.
Shortly before the outbreak of war, one of Britain's leading political philosophers
blamed the royal governors' oppression of the American colonists upon the fact that the
governors were emboldened by the presence of a standing army. See 2JAMES BURGH, POLIT-
ICAL DISQUISITIONS 473, 476 (1775), quoted in HARDY, supra, at 49. Burgh's book was enor-
mously influential in America. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 41 (1967).
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Domestic Disarmament makes no mention of the numerous, extant
political writings from eighteenth-century America that expound
upon the right to keep and bear arms. These writings posit that bear-
ing arms is an individual right based upon English common law and
natural law, a right that is a logical corollary to the natural right of
self-defense. 43 1 A necessary implication of the right of self-defense, in
the view of the eighteenth-century American, was the right to resist
tyranny with force of arms, a right also rooted in the common law of
England.4"2 The right to revolution lies at the heart of the Second
Amendment's guarantee of the right to keep and bear arms.
This is clearly evident in the words of James Madison, the drafts-
man of the Second Amendment. In Federalist No. 46, Madison defines
the militia as the totality of armed civilians.4"' In response to the Anti-
Federalists' fear that the proposed power of Congress to raise a stand-
ing army could lead to federal tyranny, Madison responded that any
misuse of the army "would be opposed [by] a militia amounting to
near half a million citizens with arms in their hands"43 4 (the total
adult white male population at the time), and that such a democratic
counterforce would be well able to meet the threat. In contrast to the
Communitarian Network's wistful notions about adopting European
gun control models for America, Madison wrote of "the advantage of
being armed, which the Americans possess over the people of almost
every other nation. ""' If the Europeans enjoyed this right, he added,
"the throne of every tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned,
in spite of the legions which surround it."4" 6
Madison's personal notes, prepared for a speech he later deliv-
ered before Congress, describe the Bill of Rights, stating that "they
relate first to private rights."4 7 Thus, the Second Amendment pri-
marily protects a "private" right to arms, not a "public" or "collective"
one. Madison's notes also contain a reference to the English Bill of
Rights, which he had used in the process of drafting America's Bill of
Rights.4"' Madison listed certain objections to the English Bill of
431. See Kates, supra note 228, at 89-94.
432. See id. at 101-02 ("In America from the immediate pre-Revolutionary period
through the debates over the Constitution, this equation of personal self-protection with
resistance to tyranny... recurs again and again.").
433. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 90 (James Madison) (Neill H. Alford, Jr. et al. eds.,
1983).
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 91.
437. James Madison, JM. 's Notes for Speaking for Amendmts [sic] in Congress 1789, reprinted
in HARDY, supra note 430, at 73.
438. See id.
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Rights, noting that they were too narrow, because they restricted
"arms to Protestants."43 9 The new Federal Bill of Rights would guaran-
tee the right to keep and bear arms to all Americans, not just to a
select group such as Protestants, or to select federal forces such as the
National Guard and the army.44 0
The early American concept of a militia-of-the-whole was one
whose arms are individually possessed and used to deter both crime
and tyranny.4" The writings of both Federalists and Anti-Federalists
belie the Communitarian Network's position that the term "well-regu-
lated militia" must necessarily refer to a "select militia" of uniformed
government employees.
The works of early American political authors on the right to
arms illuminate the connection in the text of the Second Amendment
between the preservation of the well-regulated militia and the right of
the people, as the aggregate of American citizens, to keep and bear
arms. Furthermore, the Founders did not tie the right exclusively to
the militia, for many of their writings take for granted the common
law right to keep and bear arms for self-defense." Corroborative evi-
dence that they believed in the right to arms for self-defense is also
found in records pertaining to floor debate of the Second Amend-
ment, in which the Senate rejected an amendment to add the words
"for the common defence" following "bear Arms."44
The above paragraphs are, of course, only a brief sketch of the
extensive body of historical evidence about the original intent of the
Second Amendment that has been published over the last two de-
cades. A few facts related to that corpus of scholarly literature are
relevant here. First, the corpus has by now grown quite large. Sec-
ond, as Glenn Harlan Reynolds observes, the nearly unanimous "stan-
439. Id.
440. Perhaps the oddest reinterpretation of the original intent of the Second Amend-
ment is Garry Wills's theory that the Second Amendment, rather than guaranteeing a right
of individuals, or a right of state governments, actually means nothing at all. See Garry
Wills, The New Revolutionaries, N.Y. REv. Booms, Aug. 10, 1995, at 50. The Second Amend-
ment has no content whatsoever, Wills argues, and was a conscious fraud perpetrated on
the American public by James Madison, who used clever draftsmanship to render the
Amendment meaningless. See id. Further, according to Wills, Madison's secret intention
about the Second Amendment (never before discerned by any scholar other than Wills)
should control over the intent of the state legislatures that ratified the Amendment, naively
thinking that they were ratifying the right of the American people to keep and bear arms.
See id.
441. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
442. See HALBROO,, supra note 148, at 51, 64-66, 81; Kates, supra note 228, at 87.
443. United States Senate, Proceedings on Amendments Proposed by the House (ex-
cerpt), Sept. 9, 1789, reprinted in THE ORuGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 148, at
712.
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dard model"' 4 of the Second Amendment among scholars who have
actually investigated the issue is that the Second Amendment was in-
tended to guarantee an individual right to keep and bear arms.' 5
444. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendmen 62 TENN. L. REV.
461, 463 (1995).
445. See, e.g., SENATE SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
97th Cong., 2d Sess., THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (1982); E. FONER &J. GARRITY,
THE READER'S COMPANION TO AMERICAN HISTORY 477-78 (1991) (entry on "Guns and Gun
Control"); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF
RIGHTS AND CONSTIrTIONAL GUARANTEES 48 (1989); LEONARD W. LEvY, ORIGINAL INTENT
AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 341 (1988); MALCOLM, supra note 161, at 164; THE OX-
FORD COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 763-64 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds.,
1992) (entry on the Second Amendment); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Four-
teenth Amendment, 101 YALE LJ. 1193, 1284 (1992); Amar, supra note 232, at 1164; Charles
L. Cantrell, The Right to BearArms, 53 Wis. B. BULL. 21 (1980); David Caplan, The Right of the
Individual to Bear Arms, 1982 DET. L REv. 789 (1982); Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 148,
at 314-17; RobertJ. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Public Safety and the Right to Bear Arms,
in THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA AFTER 200 YEARS (David J. Bodenhamer &
James E. Ely, Jr. eds., 1993); Robert Dowlut, The Current Relevancy of Keeping and Bearing
Arms, 15 U. BALT. L.F. 32 (1984); Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or
the Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 65 (1983); Richard Gardiner, To Preserve
Liberty: A Look at the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 63 (1982); Halbrook,
supra note 429; Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of the People or the Power of the State: Bearing
Arms, Arming Militias and the Second Amendment, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 131 (1991); David T.
Hardy, Armed Citizens, Citizen Armies: Toward aJurisprudence of the Second Amendment, 9 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559 (1986); David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography of
the Bill of Rights, 4J.L. & POL'V 1 (1987); Kates, supra note 323, at 204; Don B. Kates, Jr.,
Second Amendment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1639-40 (Karst &
Levi eds., 1986); Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 143 (1986); Kates, supra note 228, at 87; Stephanie A. Levin, Grassroots Voices: Local
Action and National Military Policy, 40 BUFF. L. REv. 321, 346-47 (1992); Levinson, supra note
147, at 637; Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty and the Right to Self-Preserva-
tion, 39 ALA. L. REv. 103 (1987);Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right of the People to Keep and Bear
Arms: The Common Law Tradition, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285 (1983); Marina, supra note
157, at 417; James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the
American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287, 328 (1990); Reynolds, supra note 289,
at 670-73; Elaine Scarry, War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right
to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1257 (1991); Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the
Early Republic, 49 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1986, at 125; Shalhope, supra note 401,
at 599; William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE
LJ. 1236 (1994); David Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REv.
2007 (1994); RobertJ. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104 YALE
L.J. 995 (1995) (reviewing MALCOLM, supra note 161); F. Smith Fussner, Book Review, 3
CONsT. COMMENTARY 582 (1986) (reviewing HALBROOK, supra note 148); Joyce Lee Mal-
colm, Book Review, 54 GEO. WASH. U. L. REv. 582 (1986) (reviewing HALBROOK, supra note
148); cf Nicholas J. Johnson, Beyond the Second Amendment: An Individual Right to Arms
Vzewed Through the Ninth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS Lj. 1 (1992);John Choon Yoo, OurDeclar-
atoy Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967 (1993). But see, e.g., Cress, supra note 199; Keith
A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You
Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 5 (1989); Samuel Fields, Guns, Crime and the
Negligent Gun Owner, 10 N. Ky. L. REv. 141 (1982); Henigan, supra note 151, at 107; Warren
Spannaus, State Firearms Regulation and the Second Amendment, 6 HAMLINE L. REv. 383 (1983).
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The more persuasive, serious scholarship arguing that the Second
Amendment is not an individual right argues on the basis of changed
circumstances, 446 rather than claiming that the Second Amendment
was meant only to protect governments.4 7
One can find proponents of the type of gun policy advocated by
the Communitarian Network, but these advocates were precisely the
individuals against whom the Americans were revolting. For example,
when British victory appeared in sight in 1777, Colonial Undersecre-
tary William Knox authored a plan-"What Is Fit to Be Done in
America?" 448 Knox suggested establishment of a state church, unlim-
ited tax power, a governing aristocracy, a standing army, repeal of the
militia laws, a ban on arms manufacture, a ban on arms imports with-
out a license, and that "the Arms of all the People should be taken
away." 449
Domestic Disarmament does not, however, argue that the standard
model of the Second Amendment is wrong. Domestic Disarmament sim-
446. See Donald L. Beschle, Reconsidering the Second Amendment: Constitutional Protection
for a Right of Security, 9 HAMLINE L. Rav. 69, 103 (1986); Williams, supra note 6. at 551-615.
447. See HALBROOK, supra note 148, at 83. Halbrook observes:
If anyone entertained this [government-only] notion in the period during which
the Constitution and Bill of Rights were debated and ratified, it remains one of
the most closely guarded secrets of the eighteenth century, for no known writing
surviving from the period between 1787 and 1791 states such a thesis.
Id. One need only read the editorials, letters, speeches, and other documents that survive
from the revolutionary era and the early republic to see how deeply the creators of the
United States and of the Second Amendment viewed arms as a positive good, and an
armed people as a sign of civic virtue. One excellent place to begin such an exploration is
THE OIGIN OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 148, a collection of all known source
documents relating to the right to arms, from the opening of the Constitutional Conven-
tion to the ratification of the Second Amendment.
448. See Halbrook, supra note 429, at 118-19.
449. 1 SouRcEs OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 176 (1978); see Halbrook, supra note 429, at
118-19. It is not unfair to note that the Communitarian agenda is not entirely inconsistent
with the nongun portion of Knox's agenda. It is the "paranoid" gun groups that Etzioni
mocks which have been among the most concerned about the use of the standing army in
domestic law enforcement (such as the "drug war"), while the Communitarian Network
has never written a word of objection to such a gross violation of the standards of civil
society. See, e.g., Gun Owners of America, Dole Still Spinning the News-Callers Bring out More
Contradictions, June 19, 1995 (quoting Sen. Feingold's opposition to the military's assuming
internal law enforcement responsibilities); The NRA Institute for Legislative Action, The
Right and the Left Have Met in the Middle, NRA BULLET POINTS, Oct. 30, 1995 (noting that a
coalition, including the NRA, ACLU, and other civil rights organizations recommended to
Congress that the military never be misused in a domestic law enforcement role). More-
over, the Communitarian Network is not any ally of the tax limitation movement.
Although the Communitarian Network certainly is not an advocate of a British-style heredi-
tary aristocracy, much of the movement's thrust does involve a preference for imposing
order by a political and intellectual elite, and a snide contempt for the political beliefs of
ordinary Americans. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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ply ignores it entirely, brushing it off with the observation that there
are diverse opinions about what the Second Amendment means.45
There are certainly diverse opinions about the scope of the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms, but in the scholarly world at
least, there is little diversity as to what the Second Amendment is fun-
damentally about.
The ratification period discourses and commentaries on the right
to keep and bear arms (too numerous to cite here) stand in stark
opposition to the exclusively collective tight interpretation. Unfortu-
nately, Domestic Disarmament fails to deal with the issue of the Framers'
original intent. Instead, Domestic Disarmament is based solely on dubi-
ous interpretations of several United States Supreme Court cases in
which, allegedly, the Court "has repeatedly ruled, for over a hundred
years, that it does not prevent laws that bar guns."451 A closer analysis
of these cases yields a quite different conclusion.
B. The United States Supreme Court and the Right to Keep and
Bear Arms
The Second Amendment reads: "A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."4 52 Domestic Disarmament's legal
analysis, written by law student Linda Abdel-Malek, begins with the
assertion that the "Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that [the right-to-
keep-and-bear-arms clause] is just a portion of the entire amendment, and
should not be taken out of context."45 Abdel-Malek confidently states that
the High Court, "looking at the Second Amendment as a whole, has
repeatedly ruled that it refers to the desire of the constitutional Framers
to protect state militias from disarmament by the federal government,
not to protect individual citizens against disarmament by the
states.
" 4 5 4
In support of this position, Abdel-Malek cites the four United
States Supreme Court cases typically relied upon by advocates of gun
prohibition: United States v. Cruikshank,4 55 Presser v. Illinois,456 Miller v.
450. DoMisTC DISARMAMENr, supra note 1, at 10.
451. See Platform, supra note 5, at 21.
452. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
453. DOMESTiC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 29.
454. Id.
455. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
456. 116 U.S. 252 (1886). Abdel-Malek consistently mislabels the case "Pressner" v. Ili-
nois. See DomEsTic DiSARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 30, 32, 34, 38.
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Texas,457 and United States v. Miller.458 In addition, Domestic Disarma-
ment references three recent actions of the High Court-Lewis v.
United States,45 9 Quilici v. Morton Grove,"0 and Farmer v. Higgins461 -to
buttress the assertion that "the Supreme Court has [recently] main-
tained its strong stance against interpreting the Second Amendment
as a protection of an individual citizen's right to possess weapons. "462
Much of the remainder of this Article discusses the cases cited by Do-
mestic Disarmament, as well as other Supreme Court cases that Domestic
Disarmament fails to cite.
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford and Its Aftermath.-The infamous 1857
decision of Dred Scott v. Sandford463 held that free blacks are not citi-
zens. '  If blacks were actually citizens of the United States, the Court
warned, they would enjoy the right to "the full liberty of speech... ;
[and the rights] to hold public meetings upon political affairs, and to
keep and carry arms wherever they went." "
In the years following the Civil War, the South engaged in a sys-
tematic program to deprive freedmen of their civil rights, including
the right to keep and bear arms.466 Senator Henry Wilson supported
civil rights legislation aimed at curbing these injustices by voiding all
laws that mandated inequality of rights based on race." 7 Senator Wil-
son explained: "In Mississippi, rebel State forces, men who were in
the rebel armies, are traversing the State, visiting the freedmen, dis-
arming them .... ,468 Several Congressmen argued that the scheme
457. 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
458. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
459. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
460. 464 U.S. 863 (1983), denying cert. to 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), aff'g 531 F. Supp.
1169 (N.D. Il1. 1981).
461. 498 U.S. 1047 (1991), denying cert. to 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990).
462. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 32.
463. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
464. Id. at 404 ("We think [blacks] are not included, and were not intended to be in-
cluded, under the word 'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the
rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the
United States.").
465. Id. at 417.
466. See MORISON, supra note 101, at 705-25.
467. See Stephen P. Halbrook, Personal Security, Personal Liberty, and "The Constitutional
Right to Bear Arms". Visions of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, 5 SETON HALL CONST.
L.J. 341, 351 (1995).
468. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 674 (1866), cited in Stephen P. Halbrook, The
Jurisprudence of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 4 GEO. MASON U. L REv. 1, 21 (1981).
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to disarm blacks was contrary to the Second Amendment, with which
the southern states should be forced to comply." 9
It was in response to this version of "domestic disarmament" and
other unconstitutional abuses that the Civil Rights Act of 1866471 was
passed. 71 Later, Congress sought to bolster the provisions of that leg-
islation through the Fourteenth Amendment.4 72 The debates over
that Amendment clearly reveal that its drafters wanted to ensure that
the Second Amendment's guarantee of an individual right to keep
and bear arms would apply to all United States citizens. During the
debate, Senator Jacob Howard (R., Mich.) referenced "the personal
rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight amendments of the
Constitution; such as freedom of speech and of the press; . . . [and]
the right to keep and bear arms."473 He added: "The great object of
the first section of (the Fourteenth) amendment is, therefore, to re-
strain the power of the States and compel them at all times to respect
these great fundamental guarantees.
This evidence of legislative intent directly contradicts the Com-
munitarian Network's notion that the Second Amendment does not
guarantee an individual right. These quotations illustrate that the Re-
construction Congress, which enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and
later the Fourteenth Amendment, meant to protect freedmen against
deprivation of their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms,
in effect reversing the result of Dred Scott. Clearly, the High Court in
Dred Scott also believed the Second Amendment to be a guarantee of
an individual right to keep and bear arms, although not a right that
469. Representative Henry Raymond (R., N.Y.), for example, stated: "Make the colored
man a citizen of the United States and he has every right which you or I have as citizens of
the United States under the laws and Constitution of the United States.... [among which
is] a right to bear arms." Id. at 23. Representative Roswell Hart (R., N.Y.) argued during
these debates that the Constitution established a "republican form of government" in
which "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." Id. Hart
contended that it was the duty of the federal government to guarantee that the states main-
tain a similar form of government. See id. Complaining of the actions of the white Missis-
sippi militia, Representative Sidney Clarke (R., Kan.) declared: "Sir, I find in the
Constitution of the United States an article which declares that 'the right of the people to
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.' For myself, I shall insist that the reconstructed
rebels of Mississippi respect the Constitution in their local laws." Id.
470. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982 (1994)).
471. See Halbrook, supra note 467, at 347-51.
472. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
473. CONGc. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866), cited in Halbrook, supra note 468,
at 24.
474. Id.; see also Amar, supra note 445, at 1225.
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extended beyond the white population.475 Unfortunately, Domestic
Disarmament devotes the same consideration (none) to evidence of the
original intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment as it pays
to the original intent behind the Second Amendment.
2. United States v. Cruikshank.-Perhaps no Supreme Court
case relating to the Second Amendment is as violently ripped out of
context by Domestic Disarmament (or by other gun-prohibition advo-
cates) as United States v. Cruikshank.47 6 Cruikshank involved the prose-
cution of white terrorists for infringing the First and Second
Amendment rights of blacks in Louisiana.477 The Court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment granted Congress no power to legislate
against private actors who were interfering with the exercise of consti-
tutional rights.47 Consistent with the then-recently decided Slaughter-
House Cases,479 the Court stated in dicta that the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 4 ° did not protect Ameri-
cans against state or local infringement of most federal constitutional
rights. 48 ' Cruikshank stands for the proposition that the Bill of Rights
operates as a restraint upon the government only, and not upon pri-
vate citizens.
If the Communitarian Network were merely citing Cruikshank for
the proposition that the Second Amendment does not protect Ameri-
cans against state (rather than federal) gun confiscation, it would have
a respectable argument. The Communitarian Network, however,
reads Cruikshank as proving far more-that there is no individual right
at all in the Second Amendment.4 2 Having criticized standard model
Second Amendment theorists for taking the Amendment's phrase
"the right of the people to keep and bear Arms" out of context,48 '
Abdel-Malek's Domestic Disarmament performs a brazen decontextual-
ization of its own. She writes that the Court in Cruikshank opined that
475. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856).
476. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
477. Id. at 550.
478. Id. at 554.
479. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
480. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"[no] State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
481. Dicta in several modem Supreme Court cases suggest that the Court views the Sec-
ond Amendment as one of the "specifically enumerated" guarantees in the Bill of Rights
that are protected by incorporation through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See infra notes 549-552, 555-565 and accompanying text.
482. DoMESTIc DISARMAMtENT, supra note 1, at 30.
483. Id. at 29-30.
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the right to keep and bear arms "'is not a right granted by the Consti-
tution."' 4 Therefore, Abdel-Malek asserts, it is not an individual
right.48
The Supreme Court reached no such conclusion. Nothing in
Cruikshank states that the right to arms is not protected against federal
infringement; a review of that section of the opinion in which this
quote is found makes this clear:
The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful pur-
poses existed long before the adoption of the Constitution of
the United States. In fact, it is, and always has been, one of
the attributes of citizenship under a free government. It "de-
rives its source," to use the language of Chief Justice Mar-
shall, in Gibbons v. Ogden, "from those laws whose authority is
acknowledged by civilized man throughout the world." It is
found wherever civilization exists. It was not, therefore, a right
granted to the people by the Constitution. The government of the
United States when established found it in existence, with
the obligation on the part of the States to afford it
protection.486
Similarly, the Court added:
The right ... of "bearing arms for a lawful purpose" . . . is
not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any
manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The sec-
ond amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but
this.., means no more than that it shall not be infringed by
Congress... leaving the people to look for their protection
against any violation by their fellow-citizens [not by Con-
gress] to what is called... the "powers which relate to merely
municipal legislation ... ,487
When the Supreme Court in Cruikshank opined that the right to
keep and bear arms "is not a right granted by the Constitution, "488 it
was stating that the right to arms (like the right to assembly) existed
prior to the Constitution. Hence, the right is not "granted" by the
Constitution. The Constitution does not "grant" the right to keep and
bear arms any more than it grants the right to peaceably assemble.
This is so because under American political theory the Bill of Rights
does not grant any rights; the Bill of Rights merely gives explicit recog-
484. Id. at 30 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875)).
485. Id.
486. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
487. Id. at 553 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
488. Id.
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nition to preexisting common law or natural law rights, many of which
were previously enumerated in state constitutions. 489 Reading the ac-
tual language of Cruikshank leaves no room for Domestic Disarmament's
assertion that there is no such thing as a right to arms guarantee in
the Constitution.
3. Presser v. Illinois.-Domestic Disarmament cites Presser v. Ili-
nois 9 as an instance in which the High Court reaffirmed Cruikshank.
The issue in Presser, however, had nothing to do with whether the Sec-
ond Amendment protected an individual right, but rather the consti-
tutionality of a particular gun control measure-a ban on parading a
privately formed, armed group down public streets.4 9 1
The Court had no difficulty upholding the law. First, it ruled that
that type of legislation does not infringe upon the right of the people
to keep and bear arms.492 In addition, as Cruikshank made clear, the
Second Amendment "is a limitation only upon the power of Congress
and the National government, and not upon that of the States."493
(Presser and Cruikshank, of course, far predate the Supreme Court's
enforcement of provisions of the Bill of Rights against state govern-
ments by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment.)
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress certain
powers over the militia.494 In dicta, the Court in Presser noted that,
489. Under the Cruikshank Court's theory, preexistent natural rights, such as peaceable
assembly and the bearing of arms, were not among the privileges and immunities of Ameri-
can citizens protected by the Fourteenth Amendment; privileges and immunities consisted
only of the small class of rights that actually were created-not just recognized-by the
Constitution, such as the right of interstate travel. See id. at 551-53.
Having written on the gun issue for over a decade, the authors of this Article must
emphasize their frustration at the frequency with which gun prohibition advocates take the
phrase from Cruikshank out of context, citing it for the opposite of its original meaning.
Perhaps this is poetic justice for the Slaughter-House Cases/Cruikshank Court, which just as
blithely (but somewhat more artfully) inverted the intended meaning of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
490. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
491. Id. at 254.
492. Id. at 265-66. Arguably, the Court was wrong in its brusque conclusion, but the
Court's determination that a particular law does not infringe upon the right to bear arms is
not relevant to the issue of whether there is any right at all.
493. Id. at 265.
494. Article I, Section 8, Clause 15 of the Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress Insurrec-
tions and repel Invasions." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. In addition, Article I, Section 8,
Clause 16 gives Congress the power to
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserv-
ing to the states respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority
of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
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even if there were no Second Amendment, the states could not disarm
their citizens, because such disarmament would deprive Congress of
its Article I power to regulate militia training and, in certain circum-
stances, to call forth the militia: "[T] he States cannot, even laying the
constitutional provision in question [the Second Amendment] out of
view, prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms ....
The "militia," furthermore, is not a term that refers to a select fighting
force, such as the National Guard, but instead to "all citizens capable
of bearing arms. " '
Once again, a case cited by the Communitarian Network in sup-
port of the proposition that the government may totally disarm indi-
viduals sets forth exactly the opposite proposition.
4. Miller v. Texas.-Domestic Disarmament cites Miller v. TexaS497
in support of the proposition that "a state law forbidding the carrying
of dangerous weapons on the person... does not abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States,"498 and seizes
upon this language in a further attempt to support the exclusively col-
lective right interpretation.
Miller v. Texas arose from a criminal proceeding in which a resi-
dent of Texas had been convicted of and sentenced to death for mur-
der.499 Having lost in state district and appellate courts, the
defendant appealed to the United States Supreme Court, "assigning
as error" that his Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights had been violated.5"
Consistent with Cruikshank and Presser, the Court stated that "the
restrictions of these amendments operate only upon the Federal
power."50 1 Yet the Court also appeared to view the incorporation is-
sue as not entirely resolved, but also not appropriately before the
Court in the instant case: "[I]f the Fourteenth Amendment limited
the power of the States as to such rights, as pertaining to citizens of
the United States, we think it was fatal to this claim that it was not set
up in the trial court."5"2
U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
495. Prsser, 116 U.S. at 265.
496. Id.
497. 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
498. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENr, supra note 1, at 31 (citing Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535
(1894)).
499. Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. at 535.
500. Id. at 535-36.
501. Id. at 538.
502. Id.
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As with Cruikshank and Presser, there is absolutely nothing in Miller
v. Texas to support Domestic Disarmament's assertion that the Second
Amendment is not an individual right.
5. Robertson v. Baldwin.-Three years after Miller v. Texas, the
Supreme Court in Robertson v. Baldwin,5" 3 consistent with Dred Scott,
Cruikshank, Presser, and Miller v. Texas, indicated in dicta that the Sec-
ond Amendment guarantees an individual right, albeit not an unlim-
ited right. Referring to the "fundamental law" as reflected in the Bill
of Rights, the Court noted:
The law is perfectly well settled that the first ten amend-
ments to the Constitution, commonly known as the Bill of
Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel principles of
government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and
immunities which we had inherited from our English ances-
tors, and which had from time immemorial been subject to
certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessi-
ties of the case.' ° 4
The Court added that these exceptions constituted such things as leg-
islation prohibiting libel, which the Court observed does not abridge
the First Amendment right to freedom of speech, and the prohibition
of carying concealed weapons, which does not abridge the Second
Amendment right to keep and bear arms.50 5 The latter statement
reveals that the Court believed the Second Amendment protects an
individual right, for there were no statutes prohibiting state militias
from carrying concealed weapons. Concealed carry proscriptions are
aimed only at private citizens, not at militias.5 °6
Domestic Disarmament does not discuss Robertson v. Baldwin, which,
obviously, is fatal to the assertion that the Supreme Court has always
treated the Second Amendment as less than an individual right.
6. United States v. Miller.-The 1939 case of United States v.
Mille507 is the most recent Supreme Court decision addressing in
depth the Second Amendment. Domestic Disarmament devotes one par-
503. 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
504. Id. at 281.
505. Id. at 281-82.
506. Cf Cramer & Kopel, supra note 373, at 685-86 ("Since 1987, states have increasingly
adopted a new breed of concealed handgun permit laws that make easier the process for
many adults to get a permit to carry a concealed handgun. While most residents of these
states are unlikely ever to apply for a concealed weapon permit, the process is a matter of
choice." (footnotes omitted)).
507. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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agraph to the case, seizing, as it did with Cruikshank, on a single
phrase from the opinion and turning that phrase into meaning its
opposite.108 United States v. Miller deserves more thorough analysis.
This decision is "[t]he nearest the U.S. Supreme Court has come to a
direct construction of the Second Amendment."5 0 9
In United States v. Miller, defendant bootleggers Jack Miller and
Frank Layton were arrested for carrying an unregistered sawed-off
shotgun, 51° a weapon controlled by the National Firearms Act of 1934
(NFA) .511 In the trial court, the defendants alleged, inter alia, that the
NFA violated the Second Amendment.5" 2 The federal district court
agreed and quashed the indictment. 515 The government petitioned
the Supreme Court for review of the case, which was granted.5 14
One corollary of Article III's requirement that federal courts hear
only "cases or controversies" is that litigants must have standing.51 5
Thus, a defendant in a criminal case cannot object to evidence discov-
ered as a result of an illegal search of someone else's property. If the
Second Amendment guaranteed only a right of states to have their
militias, the Supreme Court could have resolved the case in a single
paragraph by observing that Layton and Miller were not the govern-
ments of Oklahoma or Arkansas and, therefore, had no standing to
bring the case. Alternatively, if the Second Amendment guaranteed
some kind of collective right of individuals to participate in state
militias,
Miller would have rejected the defendant's Second Amend-
ment argument for lack of standing. Since the accused (a
bootlegger) did not claim to be in the military or the Na-
tional Guard nor otherwise acting "in defense of the nation,"
the Court would have denied him standing to be heard chal-
lenging a law as supposedly violating the Second Amend-
ment. . . . But Miller does not treat the issue as one of
standing at all nor does it suggest that individuals cannot in-
voke the Amendment or that it is not a matter of fundamen-
508. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 31.
509. HALBROOK, supra note 148, at 164.
510. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175.
511. Ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236.
512. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. at 176.
513. Id. at 177.
514. At the time, the Criminal Appeals Act allowed direct appeal to the Supreme Court
when a federal statute was declared unconstitutional. See Criminal Appeals (Nelson) Act of
Mar. 2, 1907, ch. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (repealed).
515. For a critique of the standing doctrine as not based on the text or original intent of
the Framers of the Constitution, see Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right,
140 U. PA. L. REv. 1333 (1992).
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tal individual right. Rather, the Court dealt with the
challenge on its merits-implicit in which is that the accused
did have standing to invoke the Amendment.5" 6
Until Miller v. United States, the Court had said virtually nothing
about the history of the Second Amendment. Cruikshank did observe
that the right to keep and bear arms predated the Constitution," 7
and Robertson had noted that all of the Bill of Rights, including the
Second Amendment, implicitly included exceptions found in English
common law (such as the permissibility of a prohibition on carrying
concealed weapons).51 8  In United States v. Miller, however, the
Supreme Court offered several paragraphs of historical analysis of the
Second Amendment, paragraphs that to this day are the last words the
Court has spoken on the Amendment's history.
The Court observed: "The sentiment of the time [of the ratifica-
tion of the Second Amendment] strongly disfavored standing armies;
the common view was that adequate defense of country and laws
could be secured through the Militia-civilians primarily, soldiers on oc-
casion."519 The Court then commented at length upon American
political writings of the eighteenth century,5"' which "show plainly
enough that the Militia comprised all males physically capable of acting in
concert for the common defense... [a]nd further, that ... these men were
expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind
in common use at the time."521 The Court included long guns and
attachable bayonets in its description of personally owned weapons.52
Thus, United States v. Miller contains the following propositions
about the well regulated militia:
1. It is composed of all male citizens, and is not a "select" body of
uniformed federal or quasi-federal troops. (The current United
States Code defines the "unorganized" militia in essentially the same
terms.) ;523
516. Don B. Kates, Jr., et al., "Amicus Brief of International Wound Ballistics Associa-
tion, Doctors for Integrity in Research and Public Policy, Colorado Association of Law
Enforcement Firearms Instructors, National Association of Chiefs of Police, Congress on
Racial Equality, American Federation of Police, Independence Institute, Second Amend-
ment Foundation, and Veterans of Foreign Wars," Robertson v. City and County of Denver,
874 P.2d 325 (Colo. 1994) (No. 93SA91).
517. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875).
518. Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897).
519. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) (emphasis added).
520. See supra notes 431-443 and accompanying text.
521. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. at 179 (emphasis added).
522. Id. at 181.
523. 10 U.S.C. § 311 (1994).
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2. Militia firearms were generally not supplied by a state armory,
but were personally owned firearms brought to militia service;
52 4
3. These firearms were to be used for hostile purposes, rather
than for recreation. 52 5
Consistent with its definition of the militia, the Court in United
States v. Miller then asked whether these self-armed civilians-that is,
these two members of the unorganized militia-had been denied
their Second Amendment right by a law making the unregistered pos-
session of a sawed-off shotgun illegal. The Court answered:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that posses-
sion or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eight-
een inches in length" at this time has some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regu-
lated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.
Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is
any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use
could contribute to the common defense.526
Not only was the militia's usefulness of sawed-off shotguns beyond
the scope of common knowledge for which a court could take judicial
notice, no one had offered any argument to the Court suggesting that
such a shotgun had militia utility. The reason that no argument was
offered was that neither Layton, Miller, nor their counsel appeared
before the Court. The defendants had disappeared while free pend-
ing appeal, and, accordingly, their attorney was not allowed to make
an appearance before the Court.5 2 7 Had an attorney been allowed to
argue (before the Court, or on remand, if Miller and Layton had ever
been captured, which they were not), she could have proven that
short-barreled shotguns had been used during World War 1528 and,
thus, are "part of the ordinary military equipment." In the absence of
this evidence, however, the Court concluded that the NFA's require-
ment to register the personal ownership of sawed-off shotguns was not
shown to be facially unconstitutional. 529 The case was remanded for
further factfinding concerning whether sawed-off shotguns were "part
524. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. at 180-82.
525. Id. at 178.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 175.
528. See Kevin M. Cunningham, When Gun Control Meets the Constitution, 10 ST.JOHN'SJ.
LEGAL COMMENT. 59, 69 (1994); NRA-IA, ILA RESEARCH & INFORMATION FACT SHEET: TEN
MyT-s ABouT GuN CONTROL 11 (visited Mar. 28, 1997) <http://www.nra.org/research/
10myths.html>.
529. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
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of the ordinary military equipment."5 3 ° Miller and Layton having van-
ished, the factfinding on remand never took place.
As Domestic Disarmament avers, the Supreme Court's historical
analysis begins in United States v. Miller with the assertion that the Sec-
ond Amendment focuses on the preservation of a well-regulated mili-
tia and that the Amendment "must be interpreted and applied with
that end in view."- 3 1 Domestic Disarmament's selective quotation of
United States v. Miller, however, evades the fact that the opinion treats
ordinary, self-armed citizens as possessing Second Amendment rights.
All of the Supreme Court cases discussed thus far are useful cases
for gun control advocates. Dred Scott could bolster a ban on gun owner-
ship by noncitizens. 5 2 Presser, Cruikshank, and Miller v. Texas all pro-
vide some support for the position that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not forge the Second Amendment into a barrier to state gun
controls. Robertson supports laws banning or regulating the carrying of
concealed weapons. United States v. Miller endorses bans on whatever
types of weapons can be determined not to be useful in a militia con-
text, such as weapons only useful for sports.5"'
530. Id. at 178, 183.
531. Id. at 178.
532. Dred Scott has never formally been overruled, although other portions of it are no
longer law as a result of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text
and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108
HARv. L. REv. 1221, 1303 (1995).
533. The conclusion follows from the Court's language that the individual ownership of
a firearm that does bear a reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of the
civilian militia is protected by the Second Amendment. See United States. v. Miller, 307 U.S.
at 178. Notably, the Court did not state that the type of gun in question must be essential
to the militia; the type of gun need only bear a reasonable relationship to the preservation
of this reserve, self-armed fighting force called the militia. See id. Today, nearly every type
of firearm in America bears this type of relationship, because nearly every gun-including
most handguns and hunting rifles-either has a military pedigree or was adopted by the
military after attaining civilian popularity, and can still today be considered "part of the
ordinary military equipment," id., especially because familiarity with its use could translate
into enhanced ability to use more purely military arms. Id. The evolution of small arms
technology reveals that advances in firearms design were usually made in connection with
the needs of the military. Single shot breech loaders were improvements over muzzle load-
ers, and the former were later superseded by higher capacity guns with lever and bolt
actions. These have been superseded by semiautomatic and automatic firearms with mul-
tiround capacity. Most of today's hunting rifles are merely variants of the battle rifles used
in the last century, such as the Mauser. See EDWARD CLINTON EZELL, SMALL ARMS OF THE
WORLD 844 (12th ed. 1983). There is little difference, furthermore, between a high-pow-
ered deer rifle and the modem sniper rifle; both were designed to kill large mammals
(human or nonhuman) at a distance.
Had the Court in United States v. Miller performed a more extensive analysis of the
writings of the Framers, it would have discovered that the right to keep and bear arms at
common law is connected just as much with the right to self-defense as with the perpetua-
tion of the civilian militia. See Shalhope, supra note 401, at 612. It would, therefore, be
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What none of these cases comes close to supporting is the gun
prohibition viewpoint that the Second Amendment does not protect
the right of ordinary citizens to possess firearms. Unfortunately, the
incessant repetition in Domestic Disarmament that the Supreme Court
has "repeatedly held" that the Second Amendment does not guaran-
tee an individual right achieves a certain degree of credibility to its
audience-at least the large portion of the audience that never
bothers to read the cases for which the proposition is cited.
United States v. Miller is the last substantive gun case to be reviewed
by the Supreme Court. Domestic Disarmament asserts, however, that
three recent actions by the Supreme Court have "maintained its
strong stance against interpreting the Second Amendment as a pro-
tection of an individual citizen's right to possess weapons." 53 4 The
three actions referred to are Lewis v. United States535 and the Court's
refusal to hear two substantive gun rights cases-Quilici v. Morton
Grove536 and Farmer v. Higgins.53 7 Three more recent cases, in which
the Supreme Court actually does mention the Second Amendment-
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,53 Moore v. City of East Cleveland,5 s9 and
Planned Parenthood v. Case5 4 -are not mentioned. All six shall be dis-
cussed herein.
7. Lewis v. United States.-Here, at last, Domestic Disarmament ac-
tually does have a case that could be read as implying that the Second
Amendment does not guarantee an individual right. In Lewis v. United
wrong to infer from the Court's language about interpreting and applying the right "with
that end in view" that it must be done solely with that end in view. United States. v. Miller,
307 U.S. at 178. If that was what the Court meant, the Court was wrong. Even if the Court
meant that the Second Amendment relates solely to the militia, United States v. Miller af-
firms the right of ordinary Americans, as individuals, to possess militia-type firearms. See id.
at 179.
The historical evidence concerning the dual purpose of the right to arms was taken
into account by the Oregon Supreme Court in 1980, when it ruled that the constitutional
history behind both the Oregon and federal rights to arms plainly guarantees that individ-
ual ownership of "the modern day equivalents of the weapons used by colonial militiamen"
as well as of "handcarried weapons commonly used for defense" is protected. State v. Kess-
ler, 614 P.2d 94, 98-99 (Or. 1980).
534. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 32.
535. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
536. 464 U.S. 863 (1983), denying cert. to 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), aff'g 532 F. Supp.
1169 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
537. 498 U.S. 1047 (1991), denying cert. to 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990).
538. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
539. 431 U.S. 494 (1976).
540. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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States,54' the Court upheld a federal statute prohibiting gun posses-
sion by convicted felons.542 The Court averred:
These legislative restrictions on the use of firearms are
neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do
they trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties.
See United States v. Miller (the Second Amendment guaran-
tees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have
"some reasonable relationship to the preservation or effi-
ciency of a well regulated militia").4
There are two ways to interpret this statement. According to Hal-
brook: "Since felons were always excluded from the militia, the
Court's wording of the holding in Miller clearly indicates its accept-
ance of a Second Amendment right of law-abiding individuals to pos-
sess any firearms with any militia uses."' Alternatively, it is possible
that the Court's words could be construed to mean that, because no
one has a right to have a gun, a law against felons owning guns does
not infringe on constitutional rights. The Lewis case is, in a sense, the
high-water mark for the anti-individual view of the Second Amend-
ment, because one can read the Court's words as gun prohibitionists
want them read, without doing violence to the Court's plain meaning
or taking the words out of context."' Several other cases, however,
two of which were decided after Lewis, make Domestic Disarmament's
reading of Lewis appear untenable.
8. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.-Although United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez4 was decided two years before Domestic Disarma-
ment was published, Abdel-Malek omitted it from her analysis. Be-
cause the case is one in which the Court interpreted the meaning of
constitutional language by referring to "the community,"" the case's
absence from a communitarian position paper is surprising.
541. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
542. Id. at 67.
543. Id. at 65 n.8.
544. HALBROOK, supra note 148, at 172.
545. The only Supreme Court opinion that clearly agrees with Domestic Disarmament's
legal thesis is a 1972 dissent written by justice Douglas in the Fourth Amendment case of
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). Outraged at the warrantless frisk of a person who
was found to be carrying a firearm illegally, justice Douglas suggested that the real prob-
lem was not a lack of police search powers, but the ease with which handguns could be
acquired. Id. at 150 (Douglas,J, dissenting). He quoted and cited United States v. Miller for
the proposition that the Second Amendment would not prohibit a ban on all pistols. Id. at
150-51.
546. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
547. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
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Although Verdugo-Urquidez does not address firearms directly, it is
nonetheless squarely opposed to the exclusively collective-right the-
ory. The issue before the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez was whether a war-
rantless search by American drug agents of a residence in Mexico,
whose Mexican owner had been arrested on drug charges in the
United States, was a violation of the Fourth Amendment's provision
that the people be protected against unreasonable searches and
seizures." 8 The Court found it necessary to define the phrase "the
people" as it occurs in the Bill of Rights. s49 In doing so, the Court
specifically enumerated those amendments in which the term "the
people" is used, namely the First (with regard to right of assembly),
Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments.55 ° In these five
Amendments, "the people" is "a term of art" referring to "a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered
part of that community." 51 Therefore, by implication, just as the
other Amendments protect individual rights, the Second Amendment
guarantees the individual right to keep and bear arms.552
9. The Modern Fourteenth Amendment Cases.-Having used nine-
teenth-century Fourteenth Amendment cases to build the rather
548. Id. at 261-63. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. TV.
549. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264-66.
550. Id. at 265.
551. Id.
552. As Halbrook observed regarding the exclusively collective right interpretation:
"The phrase 'the people' meant the same thing in the Second Amendment as it did in the
First, Fourth, Ninth and Tenth Amendments-that is, each and every free person." HAt-
BROOK, supra note 148, at 83.
While the Ninth Amendment is a reservation of rights, specifying that unenumerated
rights are retained by "the people," U.S. CONST. amend. IX, the Tenth Amendment is a
reservation of power, specifying that "powers not delegated" to the federal government
"are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The
Tenth Amendment reservation of rights to the people does not arise today in litigation,
because a lawsuit claiming that the federal government has exceeded its enumerated pow-
ers can proceed directly to a discussion of the scope of whatever enumerated power is at
issue. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 322-26 (1819) (discussing the scope of
various legislative powers enumerated in the Federal Constitution). The fact that the reser-
vation of powers "to the States" in the Tenth Amendment creates a right for state govern-
ments does not mean that the alternative reservation of powers to the people creates a
right for state governments.
19971
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
shaky foundation for the thesis that the Second Amendment does not
protect individual rights, Domestic Disarmament surprisingly ignores
three twentieth-century Fourteenth Amendment Supreme Court cases
in which the Second Amendment is mentioned.
Starting in the mid-twentieth century, the Court began undoing
the damage of the Slaughter-House Cases and Cruikshank, and began
making the Bill of Rights enforceable against the states, holding that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment55 forbade
states to infringe upon fundamental liberties.55 4 Exactly what kind of
substantive liberties were within the scope of due process was not easy
to settle. Starting in the 1960s and continuing to the present, the
Court has wrestled with the question of whether various reproductive
or family rights should be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In these cases, the Second Amendment has made a recurring guest
appearance.
In the 1961 case Poe v. Ullman,555 the Court considered whether
married persons had a right to use contraceptives. The secondJustice
Harlan, in a dissent that gained ascendancy a few years later in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut,556 wrote that the Fourteenth Amendment did guar-
antee a right of privacy. 5 Developing a theory of exactly what the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause did protect, Justice
Harlan wrote that the Clause covered, but was not exclusively limited
to, "the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the
Constitution," such as "the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the
right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures. 5
58
It is impossible to read Justice Harlan's words as anything other
than a recognition that the Second Amendment protects the right of
individual Americans to possess firearms. Obviously, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a right of individuals
against government; it does not protect government, nor is it some
kind of collective right. It is notable that Justice Harlan felt no need
to defend or elaborate his position that the Second Amendment guar-
anteed an individual right. Despite Domestic Disarmament's assertion
that "[o]ver the past 114 years the Supreme Court has ruled at least
553. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
554. See generallyJerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253 (1982)
(discussing how the United States Supreme Court came to hold certain guarantees of the
Bill of Rights applicable to the states).
555. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
556. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
557. Poe, 367 U.S. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
558. Id. at 549 (emphasis added).
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three times that the Second Amendment has nothing to do with indi-
vidual rights to bear arms,""5 a it was unremarkable to Justice Harlan
that the Second Amendment guaranteed the right of individual peo-
ple to keep and bear arms.
Justice Harlan's opinion in Poe was a dissent, but like some other
famous dissents, one that later became law.5"' In the 1976 case of
Moore v. City of East Cleveland,56 1 the Court heard a challenge to a zon-
ing regulation that made it illegal for extended families to live to-
gether.56 In a plurality opinion, the Court struck down the
ordinance.563 To explain the content of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause, the plurality opinion quoted Justice
Harlan's earlier words, including his words about the Second
Amendment.56
The statement that the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms is one of the "specifically enumerated" individual rights that
are part of the "full scope of liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment against state infringement appeared yet again in the ma-
jority opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.565 Although Planned
Parenthood appeared the same year as Domestic Disarmament, Poe and
Moore long predated Domestic Disarmament.
Notwithstanding the claim of Domestic Disarmament,5 1 the Court
has never affirmed, much less repeatedly affirmed, that the Second
Amendment is not an individual right. To the contrary, it is impossi-
ble to read the Court's (meager) writings about the Second Amend-
ment as anything but a recognition that the Amendment guarantees
individual Americans a right that complete federal gun prohibition
would abridge.
559. DOMESTIC DisARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 11.
560. See Griswol4 381 U.S. at 479, 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing with approval
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe).
561. 431 U.S. 494 (1976).
562. Id. at 496 & n.2, 497.
563. Id. at 506.
564. Id. at 501-02. After retiring from the bench, Justice Powell, who had written the
Moore opinion, commented that "it is not easy to see why the Second Amendment, or the
notion of liberty, should be viewed as creating a right to own and carry a weapon [hand-
guns] that contributes so directly to the number of murders in our country." Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Capital Punishment, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1035, 1045 (1989). Justice Powell appar-
ently believed that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to keep and
bear arms, but only long guns and not handguns. See id. Thus, his position is consistent
with strict gun control, but not with Domestic Disarmament's call for gun prohibition.
565. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The portion of the opinion of the Court (Part II) was written
by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Id. at 843. Justices Blackmun and Stevens
joined in Part II of the opinion. Id. at 922.
566. See supra note 454 and accompanying text.
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C. Lower Federal Courts
Two lower federal court cases are discussed in Domestic Disarma-
ment.567 The cases, as far as they go, are not inconsistent with the the-
sis of Domestic Disarmament, neither can they support the heavy burden
that Domestic Disarmament demands of them. In both cases, the
Supreme Court denied certiorari." s Domestic Disarmament insists that
the certiorari denial is an "affirmation" of the Court's "century" of
"repeatedly" holding that the Second Amendment is not an individual
right.569 As detailed above, the Court has done nothing of the kind,
and as the Supreme Court has stated, certiorari denials are not deci-
sions on the merits.57 °
Because the two circuit court cases cited by Domestic Disarmament
are frequently mentioned in the gun control debate, they shall be dis-
cussed herein. In terms of whether federal prohibition of all firearms
is constitutional, however, nothing in these lower court opinions can
change the plain language of the Second Amendment, as recognized
repeatedly by the Supreme Court, that individual Americans have a
right to keep and bear arms.
1. Farmer v. Higgins.-Farmer v. Higgins5 71 arose as a result of
Congress's enactment of the Firearms Owners' Protection Act,
5 72
aimed at correcting abuses stemming from enforcement of the 1968
Gun Control Act.5 73 A rider was tacked onto the bill prohibiting the
possession or transfer of machine guns manufactured after May 19,
1986, unless such possession or transfer occurred "under the authority
of the United States." 5 74 J.D. Farmer, a Georgia firearms manufac-
turer, interpreted this to mean that, as long as a gun manufacturer
applied to the BATF for permission to transfer or possess a machine
567. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 32-33 (discussing Quilici v. Village of Mor-
ton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Il. 1981), affd, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) and Farmer v. Higgins, 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990), cem.
denied, 498 U.S. 1047 (1991)).
568. See supra note 567.
569. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 33.
570. See Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 501-02 (1985); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 366 n.1 (1973); United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490
(1923).
571. 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1047 (1991).
572. 18 U.S.C. § 921 (1994).
573. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5812 (1994).
574. See 27 C.F.R1 § 179.105(a), (b) (1989) (defining the implementing regulations pro-
scribing private possession of machine guns and the applicable "grandfather clause"); id.
§ 179.105(e) (defining the exception for transfer or possession "by or under the authority
of" the United States).
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gun pursuant to federal regulations, the BATF's permission would
subsequently be granted "under the authority of the United States."
5 75
The BATF believed, contrarily, that the 1986 law banned the pos-
session or transfer of post-1986 machine guns to anyone but law en-
forcement officials, who by the nature of their jobs would be acting
"under the authority of the United States."5 76 (It was not clear how
state or local law enforcement officials would be acting "under author-
ity of the United States.") BATF consequently denied Farmer's appli-
cation to manufacture a machine gun for his own possession.
577
Farmer brought suit in response.
The complicated legislative history of federal machine gun regu-
lations viewed in its relationship to constitutional issues led District
CourtJudgeJ. Owen Forrester to conclude that, while Farmer's "prof-
fered interpretation [of the 1986 statute] ... is not without flaws of its
own, it is clearly the proper choice between the two." 578 One reason
for preferring Farmer's interpretation was that courts should construe
statutes so as not to render them unconstitutional, and BATF's inter-
pretation would be constitutionally defective. Judge Forrester
concluded:
The most obvious constitutional challenge to [the BATF's in-
terpretation] is presented by the second amendment. A par-
ticular weapon need only bear some reasonable relationship
to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia to
fall within the scope of the second amendment. As noted by
plaintiff, "Machineguns manufactured and registered after
May 19, 1986 are part of the ordinary military equipment;
their use could contribute to the common defense; and law-
ful transfer and possession thereof have a reasonable rela-
tionship to the preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated
militia."5 79
Here Forrester dutifully followed the United States v. Miller decision,
holding that Farmer, as a member of the popular militia, had a right
under the Second Amendment's guarantee to possess any military-
type small arm.58 °
575. Farmer, 907 F.2d at 1043.
576. Id. at 1042.
577. Id.
578. Farmer v. Higgins, Civil Action No. 1:87-CV-0440-JOF, slip op. at 12 (N.D. Ga. Jan.
5, 1989).
579. Id. at 11.
580. Id. (citing Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980) (citing United States v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939))).
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The government appealed the decision,5 81 and Farmer's attorney
briefed both the statutory and the constitutional issues. Circuitjudges
Joseph Hatchett, Thomas Clark, and Lewis Morgan issued a brief
opinion, addressing primarily the statutory question, finding for the
BATF, and reversing Forrester's decision.582
As to the constitutional issue, the Eleventh Circuit judges had
much less to say-one sentence, in fact: "We have considered
Farmer's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit."
585
With that facile pronouncement, the court simply dodged the central
issue.
The Farmer court's silence helped it avoid what might have been
an insurmountable problem. United States v. Miller,584 which the Elev-
enth Circuit had no authority to overrule, had devised its militia-
weapon test in order to uphold a law regulating a particular type of
weapon (a sawed-off shotgun),585 but the rationale of United States v.
Miller would appear to protect under the Second Amendment those
guns with the greatest firepower, including especially machine guns.
Curtly side-stepping United States v. Millers precedent was a sensible
decision for a court that wanted to uphold the machine gun ban.
Although gun prohibition groups sometimes cite Farmer as one of
the supposed litany of circuit court of appeals cases holding that there
is no individual right to bear arms, the three-judge panel's single sen-
tence is being asked to carry a heavy burden. Equally consistent with
the Eleventh Circuit's single sentence is the view that there is an indi-
vidual right to arms, but the right is not infringed by a ban on
machine guns.
The Supreme Court rarely grants certiorari in questions of fed-
eral statutory interpretation if there is not a circuit split and the Solici-
tor General is not urging review. Because only the Eleventh Circuit
had interpreted the 1986 statute, the Supreme Court, unsurprisingly,
denied certiorari.
2. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove.-The highlight of the
small case-law foundation for handgun prohibition is Quilici v. Village
of Morton Grove,586 a 1982 case from Illinois. Unfortunately, Domestic
Disarmament misconstrues the case, making it into one in which the
581. Farmer, 907 F.2d at 1042.
582. Id. at 1042-45.
583. Id. at 1045.
584. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
585. Id. at 178.
586. 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
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Supreme Court "maintained its strong stance" in favor of gun prohibi-
tion.5 8 7 Again, certiorari denials are not decisions on the merits. 588
Although Abdel-Malek claims that denial of certiorari occurs because
the appealed decision "is consistent with Supreme Court prece-
dent,"589 denial occurs due to many other reasons as well, as the
Supreme Court grants only one out of every one hundred petitions
for writs of certiorari. 59 ° If the certiorari denials in the 99 out of 100
cases were taken as proof that the lower court decision was found by
the High Court to be "consistent with Supreme Court precedent," we
would live in a confused legal world indeed.
In cases that the Supreme Court does not want to hear, but still
wants to make a statement about the law, the Court issues a summary
affirmance.591 The summary affirmance makes the result (but not the
rationale) of the lower court into national law.5 92 Notably, the
Supreme Court did not issue a summary affirmance in either the
Farmer case or the Quilici case. In 1969, the Court did issue a summary
affirmance in another gun case, Burton v. Sills,59 in which the New
Jersey Supreme Court upheld NewJersey's strict (but not prohibitory)
gun licensing law. 594 Thus, to the extent anything can be inferred
from the Supreme Court's treatment of lower court cases, there exists
support for the constitutionality of state gun regulation, but no sup-
port for the proposition that there is no right at all to possess a
firearm.
In Quilici, the Village of Morton Grove, Illinois, banned the sale
and possession of handguns. 595 A lawsuit was filed based largely upon
state and federal constitutional guarantees of the right to keep and
bear arms.5 9 6 The trial court judge ruled, inter alia, that Morton
Grove's exercise of its police power permitted the ban on handguns,
587. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 32.
588. "The refusal of the Supreme Court to hear such cases cannot be taken as indicative
of the Court's view of the Second Amendment." Robert J. Cottrol, Introduction to GUN
CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMEND-
MENT XXX (RobertJ. Cottrol ed., 1994).
589. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 32.
590. See Stephen R. McAllister, Practice Before the Supreme Court of the United States, KANSAS
BAR ASS'N, Apr. 1995, at 5.
591. See 16 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4014
(1977).
592. See id.
593. 394 U.S. 812 (1969) (per curiam), dismissing appeal from 248 A.2d 521 (NJ. 1968).
594. Burton, 248 A.2d at 530-31.
595. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 263 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 863 (1983).
596. See Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (N.D. Ill. 1981),
affd, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied; 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
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as long as it did not ban all guns.597 Before hearing the appeal, Chief
Judge Bauer, who would author the Quilici opinion, had refused to
disqualify himself after he stated on a television talk show that he
thought the law was constitutional.598 The case was appealed, and the
trial court was upheld by two-to-one, Chief Judge William Bauer and
Senior Circuit Judge Harlington Wood voting to affirm 99 and Circuit
Judge John Coffey dissenting.6 ° °
Quilici pertains only to the issue of handguns, and not to the issue
of the individual right to keep guns in general. It cannot be cited,
therefore, in support of the Communitarian Network's assertion that
"the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled, for over a hundred years,
that [the Second Amendment] does not prevent laws that bar
guns."61 1 Even the majority in Quilici agreed that a wholesale ban on
firearms, such as the Communitarian Network desires, would be
unconstitutional.0 2
Thus, Quilici does not support Domestic Disarmament's claim that
there is no individual right to own a gun at all; nevertheless, it will be
discussed in more detail because it is so commonly cited by gun
prohibitionists.
Chief Judge Bauer and Senior Circuit Judge Wood were clearly
unhappy with the appellants' arguments in Quilici.60 In the discus-
sion of the Second Amendment, for example, Bauer and Wood
chided the appellants for "reluctantly conceding" that Presser ruled
that the Second Amendment was only a restraint upon the federal
government. 604 In spite of this concession, the appellants "neverthe-
less assert that Presser also held that the right to keep and bear arms is
an attribute of national citizenship which is not subject to state restric-
tion."605 This assertion "is based on dicta out of context."61 6 The ap-
pellants merely offered an argument, sniffed Bauer and Wood, that
"borders on the frivolous and does not warrant any further
consideration." 607
597. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 265.
598. See Robert Dowlut, Federal and State Constitutional Guarantees to Arms, 15 U. DAYrON
L. REv. 59, 70 n.77 (1989).
599. Quilic, 695 F.2d at 263.
600. Id. at 271 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
601. Platform, supra note 5, at 21.
602. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 268.
603. Id. at 267-69.
604. Id. at 269.
605. Id.
606. Id.
607. Id.
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Domestic Disarmament defends the majority's charge that the appel-
lants took certain utterances in Presser out of context." 8 The Court in
Presser wrote that "the States cannot, even laying the constitutional
provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping
and bearing arms."6"9 The appellants' attorneys quoted this statement
in support of the proposition that a state may not enact gun bans.6"'
Abdel-Malek retorts: "In its entirety, the phrase reads that the states
cannot prohibit people from bearing arms, 'so as to deprive the
United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public se-
curity, and disable the people from performing their duty to the gen-
eral government." 6 1 1 This, she claims, is a reference to the role of the
standing army.612 Adbel-Malek's claim is logically untenable; when
citizens serve in the standing army, they are supplied with weapons by
the federal government. No state law could possibly affect the federal
government's supplying weapons to the federal army or navy, and the
Presser Court would not have wasted a drop of ink on such a bizarre
proposition. The Presser Court was not discussing the federal army
power at all; rather, the Court was discussing the federal militia power,
which appears in constitutional clauses separate from those involving
the army.613
The full paragraph from Presser reads:
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing
arms constitute the reserve military force or reserve militia of
the United States as well as of the States, and, in view of this
prerogative of the general government, as well as of its gen-
eral powers, the States cannot, even laying the constitutional
provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from
keeping and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States
of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security,
and disable the people from performing their duty to the
general government. But, as already stated, we think it clear
that the sections under consideration do not have this
effect.614
Clearly, the standing army is not in view here, but rather the "reserve"
or "unorganized" militia, which is composed of "all citizens capable of
608. DOMESTIC DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 32.
609. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1896).
610. Quilci, 695 F.2d at 269.
611. DoMEsTIc DISARMAMENT, supra note 1, at 32-33 (quoting Presser, 116 U.S. at 265).
612. Id. at 33.
613. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12 (army); cl. 15-16 (militia).
614. Presser, 116 U.S. at 265-66.
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bearing arms. "11 5 The quotation above, in essence, says that, because
the Constitution grants the federal government certain powers to use
the militia, the states may not disarm the reserve force or unorganized
militia, which is a se/farmed force (as the Court in United States v.
Miller would observe). State laws forbidding the parading of private
organizations, however, do not have this effect-that is, the effect of
disarming the civilian militia.616 Abdel-Malek is correct in her asser-
tion that to quote Presser's language about the common law right to
keep and bear arms is to quote dicta, but it is dicta near the heart of
the decision, and it is most certainly not taken out of either the imme-
diate textual or the broader historical context. In fact, it is the major-
ity in Quilici and its defenders, such as the communitarians, who have
disregarded both. Therefore, it is not so much that the appellants'
argument borders on the frivolous as it is that the majority opinion
borders on judicial malfeasance.
After correcdy noting that Presser is still good law and that incor-
poration of the Second Amendment is an issue yet to be decided by
the Supreme Court, Judges Bauer and Wood, in their majority opin-
ion in Quilici, took up United States v. Miller
In an attempt to avoid the Miller holding that the right to
keep and bear arms exists only as it relates to protecting the
public security, appellants argue that "[t]he fact that the
right to keep and bear arms is joined with language expres-
sing one of its purposes in no way permits a construction
which limits or confines the exercise of that right." They of-
fer no explanation for how they arrived at this conclusion.617
In fact, United States v. Miller never stated "that the right to keep
and bear arms exists only as it relates to protecting the public secur-
ity."618 As the Court in Miller v. United States did say, and as the Quilici
court conspicuously avoided quoting, the militia's arms protected by
the Second Amendment were to be "supplied by themselves."61 9 The
615. Id. at 265.
616. As to what Presser means by "public security," Halbrook (one of the losing attorneys
in Quilic) wrote that "[t] he 'public security' concept at common law included justifiable
homicide of violent felons and citizens' arrests of fleeing felons who could not otherwise
be apprehended." HALBROOK, supra note 148, at 161. Thus, there is no reason to maintain
that Presser's connecting of the right to keep and bear arms with "public security" implied
an exclusively collective right. The well-regulated militia mentioned in the Second Amend-
ment was a self-armed force in the 1700s and was reaffirmed to be such by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179-80 (1939).
617. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 695 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1982) (citation omit-
ted), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
618. Id.
619. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. at 179.
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Court in United States v. Miller clearly viewed defendants Miller and
Layton as reserve militia members to whom the Second Amendment's
protection applied.62 ° The decision merely excepts sawed-off shot-
guns from "the ordinary military equipment" constitutionally pos-
sessable by American citizens.62
Because the logic of United States v. Miller is clear concerning the
type of small arms the Second Amendment protects, Judges Bauer
and Wood lastly addressed whether handguns are military weapons.6 2
Their finding is expressed in an astounding footnote:
Appellants devote a portion of their briefs to historical analy-
sis of the development of English common law and the de-
bate surrounding the adoption of the second and fourteenth
amendments. This analysis has no relevance on the resolu-
tion of the controversy before us. Accordingly, we decline to
comment on it, other than to note that we do not consider
individually owned handguns to be military weapons.62 3
Like Domestic Disarmament (which ignores all historical evidence and
scholarship), the Quilici majority dismissed the original intent behind
the Second and Fourteenth Amendments as irrelevant. 624
In contrast to sawed-off shotguns (whose possible militia use was
not common knowledge to the Court in United States v. Miller), it is
well known that handguns are useful in combat, 625 and, hence, would
seem to be, by the United States v. Miller test, plainly covered by the
Second Amendment. The Quilici court slides around this fact by stat-
ing that "individually owned handguns" are not "military weapons. "626
Quilicis formulation violates United States v. Miller. Layton and Miller
owned their own sawed-off shotguns.62 7 The Court in United States v.
Miller did not rule against Miller and Layton simply by pointing out
that Miller and Layton's privately owned, sawed-off shotguns were not
"military weapons" (in that the guns were not owned by the United
States Army) .628 For the Quilici court to assert that the mere fact the
620. Id. at 179-81.
621. Id. at 178.
622. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 270-71.
623. Id. at 270 n.8.
624. Id. at 269-70.
625. See Ted Shelsby, Beretta to Increase Output at Gun Plant; Military Contract to Bring More
Work to Accokeek Plant, BALT. SUN, July 30, 1996, at 1C, available in 1996 WL 6630129; Ted
Shelsby, Beretta Wins Navy Contract; $18.5 Million Worth of Guns Ordered, BALT. SUN, Sept. 21,
1995, at 1C, available in 1995 WL 2464978.
626. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 266-67.
627. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. at 175.
628. Id. at 178-82. In fact, the Court in United States v. Miller clearly implied that military-
style small arms are constitutionally possessable by American citizens. See id.
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handguns were individually owned was proof that the guns were
outside the protection of United States v. Millek6 29 was directly contrary
to it.
In a dissenting opinion in Quilici, Judge Coffey criticized the ma-
jority opinion for "impermissibly interfer[ing] with basic human free-
doms" and for "cavalierly dismiss[ing] the argument that the right to
possess commonly owned arms for self-defense and the protection of
loved ones is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution."63 °
After citing a number of Supreme Court decisions supporting the no-
tion that the right to privacy and self-defense are interwoven funda-
mental rights, Judge Coffey wrote:
A fundamental part of our concept of ordered liberty is the
right to protect one's home and family against dangerous in-
trusions .... Morton Grove, acting like the omniscient and
paternalistic "Big Brother" in George Orwell's novel, 1984,
cannot, in the name of public welfare, dictate to its residents
that they may not possess a handgun in the privacy of their
home. To so prohibit the possession of handguns ... ren-
ders meaningless the Supreme Court's teaching that "a
man's home is his castle. " 631
The Supreme Court refused to hear the case.632 Again, there is
no inference to be drawn from this fact in favor of the exclusively
collective-right theory advanced by the Communitarian Network. It is
certainly possible to agree with Sanford Levinson, however, that the
repeated refusal of the High Court to hear substantive gun rights
cases such as Quilici and Farmer is almost shameless.6"'
That the Supreme Court has avoided a direct Second Amend-
ment case since 1939 suggests that the Court is not interested in in-
vesting the same kind of institutional energy in protecting the Second
Amendment that it has invested in protecting other rights, such as
freedom of speech or equal protection. For many of the gun controls
that might come before the Court, we would not be surprised to see
629. Quilici, 695 F.2d at 270-71.
630. Id. at 278 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
631. Id. at 280. BecauseJudge Coffey apparently viewed Presser as preventing any direct
application of the Second Amendment against a subdivision of the State of Illinois, he
argued that the right to own a handgun in one's home was among the unenumerated
personal liberties protected by the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 278-80. For
more on the Ninth Amendment as an arms guarantee independent of the Second Amend-
ment, see Johnson, supra note 445, at 2-12.
632. Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 464 U.S. 863 (1983), denying cert. to 695 F.2d 261
(7th Cir. 1982).
633. Levinson, supra note 147, at 654.
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the Rehnquist Court treat the Second Amendment the same way it
treats the Fourth Amendment: to acknowledge the individual right
and then to uphold almost any particular control or infringement the
government would propose.6s ' Complete prohibition and confisca-
tion, as proposed by Domestic Disarmament, could not be upheld as
moderate regulation. It could only be upheld by holding that the Sec-
ond Amendment guarantees no individual right at all. That holding
would be inconsistent with everything that the Supreme Court has
said about the Second Amendment.
The notion advanced by the Communitarian Network that the
Second Amendment protects "community militias" but not individual
citizens6 5 is an "either/or" fallacy. In guaranteeing the preservation
of the militia, the Second Amendment thereby guarantees the individ-
ual right to keep and bear arms. It is both community militias and
individuals, not either/or.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, this Article answers the questions posed at its be-
ginning by prodisarmament writer Ronald Goldfarb:636
"Is there an individual right to self-defense that cannot be abro-
gated?"6" 7 Common law, the original intent of the Framers, and case
law indicate that there is a right to self-defense against both criminal
and government predators, and as Blackstone notes, the logical corol-
lary of that right is the individual right to keep and bear arms.63 8 Con-
trary to the Communitarian Network, the United States Supreme
Court has never denied this. Although courts often grant govern-
ments considerable leeway in enacting gun control, total gun prohibi-
tion appears to be plainly unconstitutional. 63 9
634. See, e.g., Arizona v. Evans, 115 S. Ct 1185 (1995) (allowing searches without prob-
able cause when based on reliance on erroneous computer data).
635. DOMEStic DmSARAMENTar, supra note 1, at 29-35.
636. See supra text accompanying note 88.
637. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
638. See 1 WitL.lAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 136 (1765) (stating that the right to
bear arms is one of five "auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, which serve principally
... to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights, of personal secur-
ity, personal liberty, and private property").
639. See Rabbitt v. Leonard, 413 A.2d 489, 491-92 (Conn. 1994) (interpreting state con-
stitutional right to arms provision as upholding ban on so-called assault weapons, but stat-
ing that a ban on all guns would be unconstitutional); cf. Robertson v. City & County of
Denver, 874 P.2d 325, 328 (Colo. 1994) ("[T]he state may regulate the exercise of that
right [to bear arms] under its inherent police power so long as the exercise of that power is
reasonable.").
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"How do we balance the necessary policing with the public's right
of privacy and its constitutional protections against illegal searches
and seizures?" "How would disarmament be accomplished?" In light
of the certain resistance to the imposition of domestic disarmament,
these are anybody's guess. Goldfarb perhaps senses the impossibility
of the endeavors when he asks: "Would a real ban on guns fail as
dismally as the attempt to ban alcohol?"64° Indeed, a repeat of the
alcohol prohibition disaster would be the best-case scenario. The
worst case-almost a certainty if the government actually attempts to
confiscate all guns-would be a civil war, in which at least some ele-
ments of the military and police would join the resistance.
"What would be done with the existing 200 million firearms?"64'
This question assumes that the government could successfully collect
200 million firearms. All empirical considerations show this to be a
flight of fancy.
"What about hunters and other sportsmen?" 2 The legislative as-
saults upon recreational firearms advocated by the Communitarian
Network will only bring hordes of heretofore uninvolved gun owners
into an already large and irate resistance movement.
"What is the danger of creating a disarmed public?"643 The first
danger of successful gun prohibition is that it leaves the public at the
mercy of violent criminals who, being criminals, will not disarm. Sec-
ond, successfully disarming the American public would indeed, to an-
swer Goldfarb's query, "make the law enforcement establishment too
powerful."64 This was, in fact, the fear of those who insisted upon
enshrining the right to arms in both state and federal constitutions as
a check and balance upon the power of government. More funda-
mental, further disconnecting citizens from responsibility for the
safety of themselves and their communities will foster the learned
helplessness, alienation, and moral degeneration that the Communi-
tarian Network attempts to combat.6 5
If personal responsibility is to remain an important theme in
communitarian thought, then communitarians should come to realize
what most people realize: only personal beings capable of moral be-
640. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
641. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
642. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
643. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
644. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
645. Radical criminologist Raymond Kessler criticized gun control as an effort to make
poor people more dependent on the state and, hence, less likely to challenge assertively
the social order. See Raymond G. Kessler, Gun Control and Political Power, 5 L. & POL'Y Q.
381, 383 (1983).
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havior can be responsible for harm inflicted on others. Social respon-
sibility, especially in America, is not engendered by legal constraints
imposed upon individuals from the outside, but rather by self-regula-
tion and virtue. The demonization of the gun must end if rational
policies are to be formulated and implemented.
For these reasons, a policy of domestic disarmament would not
serve communitarian interests. Conversely, policies encouraging re-
sponsible gun ownership in society would not only preserve the cur-
rent crime-inhibiting effect, but would also contribute to the re-
creation of a healthy militia-of-the-whole, which the Framers believed
necessary for a sound republican order. 6
That the American people should be encouraged to be armed
and trained in order to counter violence seems radical and runs di-
rectly counter to the notion that more gun control equals less gun
crime. The initial reaction to the proposition that an armed and well-
trained America reacquainted with republicanism will be a kinder and
gentler nation may be incredulity. Such a reaction is, however, merely
a gauge of how far we have departed from our roots.
Etzioni and the Communitarian Network recognize (rightly so)
the worthlessness of the vanilla-pale agenda of the gun control lob-
bies. Domestic Disarmament performs a tremendous service to the de-
bate on gun control because it forces one to think strategically-to
look beyond the raging, but often trivial, debates over the vanilla-pale
gun control measure-of-the-month. Once vanilla-pale measures are
abandoned, there remain three options. First, there is the Communi-
tarian Network's gun confiscation proposal. Second, there is the op-
tion of simply getting the government out of the gun policy business.
This second choice has been the status quo in America for most of its
history. This policy at least has the advantage of avoiding the disas-
trous consequences of coercive domestic disarmament.
There is a third, better option, however, and that is for the gov-
ernment-particularly local governments-to take an active role in
encouraging firearms responsibility. If Americans are to remain
free-and to live as securely as freedom allows-then it must be rec-
ognized that guns play an important and necessary role in American
society, and that Americans have inherited the right to arm them-
selves against those foreign or domestic enemies who would deprive
them of life and liberty.
There is much in the Communitarian Network's agenda that is
meritorious from the standpoint of neorepublicanism. Policies do
646. See Williams, supra note 6, at 563-86.
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need to be formulated that help heal families and reform government
schools. To the extent that communitarianism is serious about the
need for a restored sense of community, it will commit itself to the
decentralization necessary to achieve it. Strong rights do presume
strong responsibilities in republican ideology, as well as in communi-
tarian ideology.
Unfortunately, the kind of responsibility that the Communitarian
Network and its followers like President Clinton advocate (in spite of
claims to the contrary) seems to be a government-enforced, authorita-
rian version, which of course does not advance the cause of civic re-
sponsibility at all. Individual rights need not be traded for communal
security. Indeed, according to republican theory, "the common good
was not in opposition to individual freedoms. Republicans typically
believed that part of the common good was individual liberty for
all."" 7
Although gun ownership does currently exact a significant toll on
society, it by no means follows that the right to arms should be effaced
in the name of collective security. The costs of that solution are not
only significant, but communally disastrous. Domestic disarmament is
not the answer. Rather, the answer to gun-related violence in America
is to be found in the spiritual and civic renewal of its citizenry and in
the citizenry's rediscovery of its republican heritage as a responsible,
arms-bearing people.
647. Id. at 564 n.56.
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